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One neglected yet very important feature of family business is its internal
homogeneity. Different from heterogeneity which focuses on differences across family
firms, homogeneity here refers to the continuity and similarity of decision-making
patterns either over time or across business units in a single family firm. This dissertation
attempts to explore homogeneity in family businesses as well as its antecedents and
performance consequences. To distinguish different types of homogeneity, strategic
persistence is defined as homogeneity of strategic patterns over time and the pursuit of a
dominant strategy as the homogeneity across related business units. Based upon S&P
1500 manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2013, it is found that family firms have a higher
level of strategic persistence and a more consistent dominant strategy than non-family
firms. In addition, it appears that being older, with less organizational slack and having
higher family involvement in ownership and management tends to strengthen the two
kinds of homogeneity in family businesses. Finally, it is found that high homogeneity in
decision-making can result in better performance in family business compared to non-

family firms, especially for those with high family involvement in management.
Theoretical implications and limitations are discussed.

Key words: Family Business, Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Strategic
Persistence, Dominant Strategy, Firm Performance
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INTRODUCTION
Recent studies in the family business literature start to highlight that high
heterogeneity may be a distinguishing feature in the family business population (Chua et
al., 2012). Nevertheless, one neglected yet very important feature of family business is
the internal homogeneity of family businesses. Indeed, different from heterogeneity
which focuses on differences across family firms, homogeneity refers to the continuity
and similarity of decision-making patterns either over time or across business units in a
single family firm. This dissertation attempts to explore homogeneity in family
businesses as well as its antecedents and performance consequences. To distinguish
different types of homogeneity, strategic persistence is defined as homogeneity of
strategic patterns over time and the pursuit of a dominant strategy as the homogeneity
across related business units. Thus, strategic persistence refers to the continuation of
patterns of resource allocations in key strategic dimensions over time, while dominant
strategy refers to a corporation-level strategy that involves similar patterns of resource
allocations in key strategic dimensions among related business units in a diversified
multi-business company. Note that both constructs intend to highlight the constancy of
strategic decisions in individual family businesses. In addition, both constructs intend to
cover multiple strategic decisions as opposed to previous family business studies that
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only capture a single strategic decision such as R&D investment (Chrisman & Patel,
2012) or internationalization (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
Studying strategic persistence and dominant strategy may help to advance our
understandings of family firms in two ways. To begin, both strategic persistence and
dominant strategy refer to an idiosyncratic yet homogenous way of decision-making in
family business. Thus, family firms are different from non-family firms not only because
what they do but also because how they do (being more consistent over time and across
business units). In addition, exploring the performance consequences of strategic
persistence and dominant strategy may provide an additional rationale why some family
firms may perform differently from non-family firms.
This dissertation follows a behavior theory framework. Behavioral theory of the
firm (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963) suggests that the combination of goals, governance, and
resources is critical to any strategic action including strategic persistence and dominant
strategy. This framework is chosen because it covers major determining factors in
strategic formulation and its performance consequences (Hofer & Schendel, 1978), also
because family firms tend to have unique goal-settings, resource compositions and
governance structures compared to non-family firms (Carney, 2005). Indeed, such a
theoretical framework has been embraced by family business researchers in
distinguishing family firms from non-family firms as well as the differences among
family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 2012)
As will be further elaborated, it is argued that the presence of family goals
(maintaining family traditions and being parsimonious) and family governance over the
business should facilitate the rise of a homogeneous pattern of strategic decision-making
2

over time and across diversified business units. Associated with this framework, it is
hypothesized that firms that are older, with less organizational slack and higher family
ownership will have a higher extent of strategic persistence and dominant strategy in
family business. Finally, it is argued that the unique nature of resources as well as the
coordination of resource utilization across diversified units in family business should
make such a homogenous pattern of decision-making result in better performance relative
to that in non-family business.
The sample is composed of S&P manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2013.
Hoover’s, ExecuComp, Fundinguniverse.com, ancestry.com, firm websites, and firm
proxy statements are used to identify founding families and the family members. All data
associated with corporate governance and family business come from firm proxy
statements. Other data comes from the Compustat database. Endogeneity is controlled by
using four instrumental variables that are statistically correlated to family business
variables but not to the dependent variables and by using for one year lags between
dependent variables and other variables. Due to the longitudinal nature of data, this
dissertation uses fixed-effect longitudinal regression models to test all hypotheses.
Regression results from the primary and robustness analyses largely support the
idea that family firms have higher strategic persistence and a more homogeneous
dominate strategy than non-family firms, and such a higher level of homogeneity would
result in better performance in family business.
The dissertation is composed of two essays. The first essay hypothesizes and tests
the antecedents and performance consequences of strategic persistence in family
business. The second essay hypothesizes and tests the antecedents and performance
3

consequences of dominant strategy in family business. Note that although both essays use
the same theoretical framework, each has distinctive arguments due to the specific causal
relationships in question. This dissertation ends with a conclusion chapter summarizing
important results and implications.
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ESSAY 1: FAMILY BUSINESS, STRATEGIC PERSISTENCE
AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Introduction
Many corporations are controlled by a large shareholder group, typically founding
family (Villalonga & Amit, 2006, 2009). Indeed, family businesses1 are the dominant
organizational form around the world (Morck & Steier, 2005), and research suggests that
family firms behave differently from non-family firms (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). Heterogeneity also exists among family firms (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 2012; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2013), so “a theory of the family firm
must not only be able to distinguish between family and non-family firms but must also
be able to explain variations among family firms” (Chua et al., 2012, p1104). Despite the
inherent differences of firm behaviors between family and non-family firms and among
family firms themselves, family involvement in ownership and firm governance is underresearched (Chrisman et al., 2012).
One criticism of family firms is that they are quite resistant to change in terms of
firm behaviors (Chandler, 1990). Though some may choose to embrace rather than

1. Family firms are defined by a family’s involvement in ownership and governance and a
vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across generations (Chrisman &
Patel, 2012; Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999).
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repulse change (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007), the general
impression is that family firms tend to avoid uncertainty and risk-taking by persisting in
existing strategies, routines and practices (Block, 2012; König et al., 2013). Nevertheless,
there remain numerous gaps in the literature. Firstly, scholars often focus on singular
dimensions of change, which cannot necessarily extrapolate to a broader understanding of
strategic change (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In addition,
research often draws attention to between-firm differences, while the question of the
persistence of strategic actions in the temporal dimension is overlooked, despite its
relevance to well-documented long-term orientation in family business (Lumpkin &
Brigham, 2011; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Miller et al., 2007). Lastly, no one has
explored the performance consequences of the persistence of strategic decisions.
The central question this study intends to explore then is the relationship between
family businesses and strategic persistence. The antecedents and the performance
consequences of strategic persistence in family businesses are also explored. In this
regard, strategic persistence is defined as the continuation of similar patterns in resource
allocations in multiple key strategic dimensions over time (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1990; .Hambrick et al., 1993).
Such a concept is different from risk-taking, innovation or other decision-making
in a number of ways. First, previous studies often focus on one strategic dimension (e.g.
R&D investment, diversification, etc.), while strategic persistence refers to strategic
choices in multiple strategic areas. Second, in contrast to most studies in the family
business literature, strategic persistence draws its focus over a relatively long time
window. As some scholars point out (e.g. Sharma et al., 2014), this inquiry opens up a
6

new stream of research on the temporal dynamics of decision-making in family business.
Note that high persistence does not always mean that the firm is risk-averse, as a firm can
be risk-taking (e.g. high in R&D investment) and persistent (e.g. maintain high R&D
investment over time) at the same time. Third, a family firm’s persistence in strategic
decisions provides one additional explanation regarding how family involvement affects
firm performance. Put differently, some family firms perform differently than non-family
firms and other family firms (Miller et al., 2007) not only because they make
idiosyncratic strategic decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), but also because they realize
these decisions in a different (e.g. more/less persistent) manner.
This essay begins with an overview of strategic persistence and relevant concepts
in the literature, and then develops hypotheses related to family business and strategic
persistence. This essay also explore firm age, organizational slack and family ownership
as three antecedents related to strategic persistence in family businesses. After that, this
essay explores the relationship between strategic persistence and firm performance in
family business. Then, the methodology, analytic results and implications are discussed.
Strategic Persistence
In this study, strategic persistence is defined as the continuation of patterns of
resource allocations in key strategic dimensions over time (Finkelstein & Hambrick,
1990; Hambrick et al., 1993). Indeed, scholars have long been interested in the pattern of
firm’s strategies over time and their impact on firm performance. Firms tend to stick to
their own strategies, and firm strategy does not necessarily enhance a firm’s survival and
performance unless aligned with the firm’s history (Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Harrison
et al., 1993; Zajac et al., 2000). The central logic here is that an organization has the
7

tendency as well as the incentive to be persistent in its own strategy (Kisfalvi, 2000).
Hence, strategic persistence2 is a concept that is in direct opposition to strategic change in
the long-term (Ford et al., 2008).
There are a number of noteworthy implications related to this definition. First, it is
descriptive, not predictive in nature. Such a way of defining strategic persistence can
avoid the problem of tautology in conceptualization (Priem & Butler, 2001). Second, in
alignment with the resource-based theory in the strategic management literature (Barney,
1991; Sirmon et al., 2007, 2011), this definition emphasizes resource allocation as the key
issue in strategic decision-making (Mintzberg, 1978). Third, this definition
conceptualizes strategic decision-making as a multi-dimensional construct related to
resource allocations in multiple strategic areas (Carpenter, 2000; Zhang, 2006). Fourth,
this definition assumes that at least some companies are willing and able to maintain a
relatively stable pattern of strategic decision(s) over time. Hence, it directly contradicts
the assumptions that organizations are homogenous and they are just passive reflections
of industrial dynamics (Conner, 1991). Fifth, this definition highlights the pattern of
persistence of strategic decisions rather than the strategic decisions themselves. The latter
are concerned with a static state of resource allocation whereas the former emphasizes the
temporal dynamics of resource distributions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Sixth,
whereas there are a number of studies concerning the variations (Smith & Grimm, 1987),
dynamics (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Zajac et al., 2000) and deviations (Carpenter, 2000)
2. Another concept that relates to strategic persistence is organizational inertia, as "structures
of organizations have high inertia when the speed of reorganization is much lower than the
rate at which environmental conditions change" (Hannan & Freeman, 1984, p151).
Nevertheless, organizational inertia is more about the inability to change, while persistence is
more about not willing to change from a behavioral theory view (Cyert & March, 1963).
8

of strategic decision-makings from the previous temporal term to the current temporal
term, none of them has explored the question in a long time window. Put differently,
while the existing literature largely looks at short-term change, this study tends to explore
the dynamics (whether being persistent) of strategic decision-making in the long run
(Amburgey, Kelly & Barnettm 1994).
In order to explore the causal effect of family’s involvement on strategic
persistence, as well as the performance consequences of strategic persistence, the next
section follows a behavioral theory framework. It assumes that a decision-maker’s goals
and organizational governance eventually determines strategic action in business. On the
other hand, it is organizational resource that affects the implementation of strategic action
and eventually firm performance (Barney, 1991; Cyert & March, 1963).
Behavioral Theory Framework
Behavioral theory explores the “black box” in economic organizations in terms of
formulation and implementation of strategic actions (Hofer & Schendel, 1978).
According to the theory, organizational decision-makers pursue idiosyncratic goals,
which eventually determine organizational behaviors (Cyert & March, 1963, p26–43). In
this regard, behavioral theory explicitly recognizes the heterogeneity of goals in different
organizations. For instance, some organizations may place higher priority on firm growth
while some others may emphasize efficiency and performance (Greve, 2008). This view
has been largely embraced by family business scholars (Chua et al., 2012), as family
decision-makers often possess heterogeneous goals (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), leading
to diverging strategic actions (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). On the other hand, the
behavioral theory also assumes that multiple actors may have conflicting interests that are
9

not entirely alleviated by contracts (Cyert & March, 1963). This assumption implies that
organizational governance determines which goals turn into strategic actions
(Williamson, 1999). If a decision-maker is perceived to have power and legitimacy such
as the case of family owner-manager, his/her goals are more likely to manifest into firm
actions (Mitchell et al., 1997; Useem, 1993).
In the end, the implementation of strategic action relies on resources in the
organization (Hofer & Schendel, 1978). Indeed, the effective implementation of
organizational learning, adaption, and innovation is dependent upon the availability of
resources (Greve, 2003; Levinthal & March, 1993; Nohria & Gulati, 1996). On the other
hand, organizations often have difficulties in acquiring new resources as well as
leveraging and shedding existing resources, meaning that the successful implementation
of any kind of strategic action depends on resources in organization (Sirmon et al., 2007,
2011). Again, family firms may have a unique set of family-endowed resources such as
human, social, patient, survivability, and governance capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003),
which may give competitive advantages to some family firms over non-family
competitors (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003).
Overall, the behavioral theory framework suggests that the combination of goals,
governance, and resources is critical to any strategic action including strategic
persistence. This essay chooses to use this framework not only because it covers major
determining factors in strategic formulation and its performance consequences (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978), but also because it has been embraced by family business researchers in
distinguishing family firms from non-family firms as well as other family firms
(Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua et al., 2012). This essay also proposes that the unique
10

nature of resources in family business should make strategic persistence more favorable
compared to the case in non-family business. The following section intends to build
hypotheses relating family business to strategic persistence.
Hypothesis Development: Family Business and Strategic Persistence
In alignment with the behavioral theory framework, all antecedents3 behind high
strategic persistence in family firm can be grouped into goal and governance. These two
categories refer to the fact that family decision-makers choose to persist more than nonfamily ones because they are motivated to do so (goals), and because they have the
discretion to do so (governance). This classification also aligns with the family business
literature in terms of possible mechanisms by which family involvement may affect
strategic actions (Chrisman et al., 2013).
Goal
One basic assumption in the management literature is that firm decision-makers
have various economic goals, which eventually result in various strategic decisions across
firms (Cyert & March, 1963). Regarding strategic persistence, organizational decisionmakers may perceive that maintaining persistent strategy is more aligned with their
economic interest, as strategic change may either reduce existing benefits or bring in
additional costs (Miller, 1991; Vollman, 1996). The former implies that change in
existing strategy is often associated with high utility loss for owner-managers, whereas
the latter suggests that initiating change may increase costs due to the additional resource

3. In this essay, resources are conceptualized as organizational contingencies that may affect
the strategic implementation process. That is to say, the role of a resource is to impact the
strategy-performance link.
11

investments. Indeed, the literature acknowledges that there are rewards for exploiting
strategies established in the past (Levinthal & March, 1993). Returns on new and perhaps
superior strategies may be less certain compared to returns on existing strategies, because
performance of a new strategy is less reliable and less explicable to organizational
stakeholders (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
In the family business literature, a number of studies recognize that family firms
behave differently from non-family firms and one another due to the presence of
idiosyncratic goals in owning families (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; 2010; 2013). In
addition, family business scholars suggest that family owner-managers may have unique
non-economic goals including the willingness to exercise authority and influence, the
emotional value of owning a firm, family members’ identification with the firm, and
renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al., 2012).
Accordingly, family firms tend to favor strategies that can help achieve these goals
(Chrisman et al., 2012), and be averse to strategies that may potentially hinder their
achievements (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012).
While there may be a number of family goals that can relate to strategic
persistence in family business, this essay focuses on the goals of maintaining family
tradition and being parsimonious. Family tradition is chosen because it lies at the center
of the family’s socio-emotional or non-economic concerns (Berrone et al., 2005), and
also because it is directly related to the continuity of family’s control over generations
(Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Parsimony is chosen because it is a unique feature related to
family’s management of resources, which is expected to determine the formulation of
strategic choices in family firms (Carney, 2005). These two goals suggest that family
12

firms choose to be persistent in decision-making because they want to stick to their
traditions, and because they are parsimonious in resource acquisition and utilization.
One non-economic goal in family business is to sustain the family’s tradition and
heritage in the business (Berrone et al., 2012; Carney & Gedajlovic, 2003). Indeed,
family tradition4 consists of preservation, constancy, and durability (Lumpkin &
Brigham, 2011). For family owners the firm is not just an asset that can be sold
(Chrisman, Chua, Steier, Wright & Mckee, 2012; Zellweger et al., 2012), but rather a
symbol of family’s heritage and tradition that should be succeeded into later generation
(Casson, 1999; Tagiuri & Davis, 1992). Hence, choosing to continue past strategies may
be perceived as a practice that sustains family heritage and tradition (Kieser, 1989). Note
that the family tradition may be innovative and entrepreneurial. In this regard, the family
business may persist in their past startegies, reflected in high R&D investment over time.
In contrast, practices that deviate from past strategy may be perceived as a
violation of family tradition and history, and be discarded by family owner-managers.
Although under some circumstances family firms may choose to violate their long-lasting
traditions, especially when their socio-emotional wealth is under threat (Gomez-Mejia et
al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), the general impression is that family owners are riskaverse and willing to stick to what they have done in the past (Lumpkin & Brigham,
2011).
Family tradition also manifests in the temporal consideration of a family firm’s
strategic decision-making. In particular, the presence of family tradition make family
4. A relevant but slightly different concept is family legacy. However, legacy concerns what
can be passed for future family generations, while tradition concerns the preservation of what
happened in the past.
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decision-makers prioritize the long-range decisions and actions that may last for an
extended time period (Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006; Lumpkin et al., 2010; Lumpkin
& Brigham, 2011). This would suggest that the frequency of changing strategic decisions
in family business is not as high as that in non-family business. In other words, family
businesses are more likely to adhere to long-term plans than non-family businesses.
Hence, strategic persistence in family business is a reflection of decisions previously
developed and applied consistently over time.
Furthermore, one important part of family tradition in business is to pass the
control to later-generation family members (Berrone et al., 2012). Indeed, it has been
found that for the owning family, intra-family and especially inter-generation succession
intention is more important than the family’s dominant position in ownership or the
duration of family control in affecting firm decision-making (Zellweger et al., 2012). On
the other hand, the owning family often uses unique criteria in choosing a family
successor, such as the convergence to family tradition, obedience to the old generation, as
well as the maintenance of intra-family relationships (De Massis et al., 2008; Gersick et
al., 1997; Lee et al., 2003). This would suggest that among all later-generation family
members, those with the intent to follow previous strategies are more likely to be chosen
as successors of family business. In addition, family members in younger generations
often live under the shadow of the older family generation, even if they have already
taken the control of the business (Davis & Harveston, 1999). Thus, late-generation family
members are likely to follow whatever the older generation has formulated in firm
strategy, resulting in the persistence of firm actions. All points taken, it would imply that
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the intention to maintain family control across generations should lead to strategic
persistence.
Beside family tradition, another goal behind strategic persistence in family
business is parsimony. As Carney (2005) points out, family decision-makers tend to be
parsimonious in resource utilization and acquisition. Parsimony helps improve the
efficiency of resource utilization, often by reducing unnecessary expenditures (Carney,
2005). Indeed, empirical evidence has shown that family business tends to provide lower
compensation to family executives (Combs et al., 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2003) and
lower dividends or profit sharing (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005) to reduce the overall
expenses. This would suggest that family decision-makers are motivated to improve
efficiency by reducing administrative costs and avoiding unnecessary expenditures. In
this regard, family owners-managers may favor maximizing rent appropriation of current
strategy rather than searching for new alternatives (Pérez-González, 2006). Hence, family
decision-makers may favor maintaining current strategy (i.e. being persistent in strategic
decisions) rather than experimenting with new alternatives.
In addition, parsimony in resource acquisition also relates to the owning family’s
reluctance to acquire resources from non-family parties because doing so may dilute the
family’s control in business. In this instance, family business often avoids depending on
debt or outside equity in order to raise fresh funds (Chua et al., 2011; Zellweger et al.,
2012). In addition, family owners often intentionally reserve managerial or other key
business positions for family members because doing so may induce less owner-manager
agency cost (Chrisman et al., 2004; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and is helpful to the
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creation and preservation of family-centered socio-emotional wealth5 (Berrone et al.,
2012; Chrisman et al., 2014). Nevertheless, changing a firm’s strategy inevitably involves
new financial and human capital investments. To overcome the limitations of familyendowed resources, family decision-makers have to employ non-family managers and
other talent and/or search for external investment (Carney, 2005; Chrisman, Memili &
Misra, 2014; Chua et al., 2011). This is not favored by family-owner-managers unless the
family is under significant threat of losing its socio-emotional wealth endowment in the
firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012) or with no other choice (Ilias,
2006).
Governance
Decision-makers must hold dominant positions in corporate governance to
transmit their goals into strategic actions in organizations (Bunderson, 2003; Cybert &
March, 1963; Tang et al., 2011). In this sense, group attributes of the dominant coalition6
such as demographic characteristics (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), diversity (Goodstein et
al., 1994), position (Daily & Dalton, 1997) and power relationships (Ocasio, 1994; Shen
& Cannella, 2002) often affect decision-making processes. In addition, decision-makers

5. Socio-emotional wealth refers to non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of
members in the controlling families, in terms of the propensity to exercise authority and
influence, the emotional value of owning a firm, family members’ identification with the
firm, and renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone et al.,
2012).
6. Dominant coalition is conceptualized as the governance network of decision-makers - such
as owners, top manager(s) or top management team (TMT) - within an organization that
influence the goals and the resources of the organization (Cyert & March, 1963). In a family
business, the dominant coalition refers to that group of family members who control, manage
and make major decisions aimed at shaping and preserving the business across generations
(Chua et al., 1999).
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are often responsible for guiding the rationalization of strategic decisions (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991), such as interpreting and disseminating information throughout the
whole company (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Hence, governance not only ensures the
transitions of a decision-maker’s goals into the formulation of strategic decisions, but also
facilitates the spread of such a decision throughout the whole organization (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978). On the other hand, the family business literature acknowledges that
family firms may possess a governance structure different from non-family firms
(Carney, 2005). Indeed, when ownership and management are tightly held by a limited
number of individuals such as the case in family business, it is likely that individualized
and simplified rules and heuristics are used in planning strategic decisions (Gedajlovic,
Lubatkin, & Schulze, 2004). By contrast, professional managers are constrained by
formal procedures and the need to quantify risks and returns to justify decision-making
(Stewart & Hitt, 2012).
Regarding strategic persistence, the likelihood of persistence is dependent upon
the governance structure by which decision-maker’s willingness may transfer into
strategic action in organizations (Gibbs, 1993; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zahra, 1996).
Thus, the extent to which family-centered goals can be transmitted into firm decisionmaking is dependent upon the power, legitimacy, and family-centered-stakeholdersalience of the dominant coalition (Carney, 2005). Hence, governance is a necessary but
insufficient condition for strategic persistence to take place. Put differently, having
personalized, particularized, and family-stakeholder-salient governance does not
automatically ensure the rise of strategic persistence. The persistence arises only when
the governance aligns with goals mentioned above.
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In this regard, family business governance features the combination of
personalism and particularism (Carney, 2005). Personalism refers to the “personalization
of authority that allows the family to project its own vision onto the business”, while
particularism means that “family control rights permit the family to intervene in the
affairs of the firm to substitute other, “particularistic” criteria of their choosing” (Carney,
2005, p253). The combination of personalism and particularism ensures that familycentered goals can transmit into firm strategies such as making persistent strategic
decisions over time.
From a different view, stakeholder theory suggests that the family ownermanager’s goal is not only transmitted through their power and legitimacy but also their
identity of belonging to the control family. In this regard, Mitchell et al. (2011) argue that
a distinguishing characteristic of family firms is a tendency to confer power and/or
legitimacy to certain family members because of who they are, even though their actual
power and legitimacy would not normally warrant such attention. Managers in a family
firm may consider the importance and urgency of claims from family stakeholders
(Mitchell et al., 1997). This view complements Carney’s arguments, as it suggests that
family’s influence over governance is not necessarily limited in their power and
discretion, and family members who are not involved in operation may also post their
influences on business.
All taken, due to the unique combination of goals and governances in family firms
compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to adhere to persistent
strategic decisions. In formal terms,
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Hypothesis 1: Family businesses have a higher level of strategic persistence than
non-family businesses.
Hypothesis Development: Age, Organizational Slack and Family Ownership in
Family Business
Family businesses comprise a heterogeneous population that varies significantly
by idiosyncratic goals and governances that are aligned with each owning family (Chua et
al., 2012). While Hypothesis 1 focuses on the general tendency of family firms, it should
not be interpreted to mean that all family firms are alike. Some family firms may instead
have a higher level of strategic persistence compared to others. Following the goalgovernance framework developed above, it is argued that firm age, organizational slack,
and family ownership of the firm may affect the salience of goals and governance in
family business. Thus, these three factors make some family firms more persistent than
others.
Firm Age
Scholars have long claimed that organizations have the tendency to become rigid
and inflexible when they grow older (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). As firms age, their
behaviors become increasingly guided by existing norms and traditions (Deephouse,
1996). On the other hand, the development of tradition often derives from prior operating
experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Thus, ceteris paribus, in comparison to younger
firms, older firms have more salient traditions embedded (Hannan & Freeman, 1984).
It is expected that firm age should positively relate to strategic persistence in
family business for two reasons. First, when family firms age, family tradition becomes
more valuable in the family system (Gersick et al., 1997). Indeed, family tradition
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concerns the preservation of past long-standing aspirations in the family system (Miller &
Le Breton-Miller, 2005), thus the value and importance of family tradition should
become larger when a family firm ages. This is especially true given the higher
interaction and overlap between family and business (Habbershon et al., 2003), the
owning family’s dominant position in firm governance (Carney, 2005) and the owning
family’s endowment of key strategic resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In this regard,
compared to younger family firms, older family firms are more likely to make persistent
strategic decisions because family tradition becomes more valuable and important to
family decision-makers (Lumpkin et al., 2010; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011).
Second, the question of firm age is more complex in family firms, because the
family system also evolves with age. In this sense, when a family firm ages, additional
individuals may join in the family system by genetic, marital and kinship ties (Gersick et
al., 1997). The inclusion of new family members would make the family tradition more
salient, as these members are born, educated and groomed with family tradition. Thus,
older family firms are more likely to embrace strategic persistence because more family
members are included in business operation, while these members are natural agents of
family traditions. Although arguably there may be some family members who are
unwilling to follow what other family members are doing, strong social connections
among family members make these divergent behaviors more likely to be found, while
strong family-centered norms may pose high social pressure upon those family members
to conform (Pollak, 1985). Differently put, strong family connections and norms have the
potential to strengthen family tradition over time.
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Combined, it is expected that the extent of strategic persistence in family business
should increase when the business grows older, hence:
Hypothesis 2a: Within family firms, there is a positive relationship between firm age
and strategic persistence.
Organizational slack
One reason behind strategic persistence is parsimony in family business.
Nevertheless, not all family firms are alike, as some may be more willing to lavishly
invest while others may not (Arregle et al., 2012). In particular, this essay proposes that
family firms with higher organizational slack are less parsimonious thus less likely to
persist with existing strategy.
Organizational slack refers to organizational resources embedded in the firm as
excess costs that are greater than those needed by the firm (Singh, 1986). Examples of
organizational slack include excessive stocks of cash and liquidable assets or excessive
expenditures paid in seedlings and administrations (Greve, 2003). In this matter, firms
may reserve more cash or employ more individuals than necessary to operate effectively
such that these slacks can provide a cushion or buffer from disruptions in output (Cyert &
March, 1963). As parsimony concerns the efficiency of resource utilization, a high level
of organizational slack would signal a low level of parsimony (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss
et al., 2008).
Following this rationale, organizational slack is expected to negatively relate to
strategic persistence in family business. Indeed, increasing investment in organizational
slack would suggest that some family business are less parsimonious compared to others.
In this matter, although in general family firms tend to avoid high specific investment,
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some may choose to do so anyway due to the reversal of reference or other potential
threats to family-centered socio-emotional wealth (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; GomezMejia et al., 2007, 2013). Given the fact that parsimony is one factor driving the rise of
strategic persistence, the increase of organizational slack would be negatively associated
with persistent decision-making in family business over time. Hence, it is expected that:
Hypothesis 2b: Within family firms, there is a negative relationship between
organizational slack and strategic persistence.
Family Ownership
Family ownership can work as a medium to transfer owning family’s goals and
willingness into the business system. Nevertheless, publicly-traded firms often involve
non-family even institutional owners, whose goals are not always aligned with the
owning family’s interest (Chrisman et al., 2012). For instance, non-family public
shareholders may be concerned with rent appropriation by majority family owners and
oppose to strategic decisions may would strengthen the family’s power and legitimacy
(Almeida & Wolfenzon, 2006; Anderson et al., 2009; Morck & Young, 2003; Young et
al., 2008). In addition, non-family and especially institutional owners are primarily
concerned with organizational profitability, which often relates to innovation and
corporate venturing. Although these non-family owners and stakeholders are not as
powerful as owning families in publicly- firms (Carney, 2005), their presence still works
as hindrance to mitigate family’s influence on strategic decision-making (Arregle et al.,
2012). On the other hand, high family ownership would weaken the bargaining power of
non-family owners and strengthen family governance (Cyert & March, 1963). Hence,
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strategic persistence becomes more likely given high family ownership in publicly-traded
family firms, meaning:
Hypothesis 2c: Within family firms, there is a positive relationship between family
ownership and strategic persistence.
Hypothesis Development: Strategic Persistence and Firm Performance in Family
and Non-family Businesses
Given the higher strategic persistence in family firms compared to non-family
ones, it is natural to ask how strategic persistence affects firm’s performance in family
business. The following section intends to discuss about the linkage between strategic
persistence and economic performance in family businesses.
Strategic persistence may be harmful to organizations (Zajac & Kraatz, 1993;
Zajac et al., 2000). In this sense, strategic change may represent organizational adaption
to changing conditions either within or outside of the organization. Indeed, sustainable
performance requires organizational responses that maintain the alignment of the firm's
strategy, structure and ideology with the demands of an evolving and changing
environment (Hedberg, Bystrom & Starbuck, 1976). In addition, change may reflect
experimentation and risk-taking (Carpenter, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang,
2006). Thus, change may be a consequence of bold thinking and pursuit of novel strategic
alternatives, which may help achieve superior performance (Haveman, 1992; Zajac &
Kraatz, 1993; Zajac et al., 2000). Finally, strategic change is essential in organization
turnaround as successful turnarounds require managers to initiate change that is
consistent with organizational and environmental situations (Baker & Duhaime, 1997).
Nonetheless, it is inaccurate to claim strategic persistence is always harmful.
Indeed, one enduring assumption in the strategy literature is that the effect of a firm’s
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strategy on firm performance depends upon its fit with organizational resources and the
environment (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Miles & Snow, 1994; Sirmon et al., 2011).
Resources influence the competitive position of organizations (Barney, 1991). On the
other hand, resources must be structured and leveraged according to the requests
associated with a strategic decision (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Sirmon et al., 2007). Here,
structuring involves the processes of acquiring, accumulating, and deploying focal
resources, while leveraging includes the processes of mobilizing and coordinating
resources (Sirmon et al., 2011). For instance, firms need to purchase new resources,
deploy existing resources or change the structure of existing resources in order to extend
their product lines or change the firm’s product portfolios (Barney, 1991; Karim &
Mitchell, 2000).
Concerning strategic persistence, making persistent decisions may lead to aboveaverage performance when an existing resource portfolio is path-dependent and thus
appropriate only to a unique strategic choice (Patel & Pavitt, 1997). Furthermore,
strategic persistence is favorable when it is hard to re-structure, organize or redeploy
(Karim & Mitchell, 2000). In the end, the benefits of strategic persistence may arise when
it is costly to leverage resources within the company (Sirmon et al., 2007). Conversely,
family business features the interaction between the family unit, the business unit, and
individual family members, making its resources specific, inseparable and intangible
(Habbershon et al., 2003). Being specific means existing resources are path-dependent
and cannot support the development of a new strategic choice (Habbershon et al., 2003).
Being inseparable means that family members often have emotional attachment to these
resources, hence any attempt to divest existing resources or acquiring new ones may
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result in great internal resistance (Gedajlovic et al., 2004). Intangibility suggests that
some family-centered resources do not have a physical presence and thus cannot be easily
re-leveraged (Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). As will be discussed in the next section, this
essay espouses the view that the combination of specificity, inseparability and
intangibility makes strategic persistence generally more valuable in family business than
that in non-family business.
Resources in Family Business
Besides family-centered goals and family-centered governance, a family’s
influence on business may also arise through the family’s endowment of resources.
Family business researchers recognize that the interaction of family units, business units,
and individual members, (Gersick, et al., 1997) can lead to competitive advantages in
some family firms (Habbershon & Williams, 1999; Habbershon et al., 2003; Pearson et
al., 2008). For instance, Habbershon and Williams (1999) and Habbershon et al. (2003)
argue that a family’s involvement in businesses may bring in distinctive resources
unavailable to non-family firms, such as those based on human, social, patient,
survivability, and governance capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). The follow-up literature
further suggests that family governance may have advantage over non-family governance
in the process of creating, accumulating and managing resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003),
such as family and kinship networks (Lester & Cannella, 2006), intangible knowledge
(Cabrera-Suárez, Saá-Pérez & García-Almeida, 2001), reputation (Dyer, 2006) and social
capital (Pearson et al., 2008). While these resources may take variant forms, they all
feature three shared attributes: specificity, inseparability, and intangibility.
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Specificity
Specificity means that the effectiveness of some resources is dependent on the
local environment (Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993). When resources become specific (e.g.,
tooling used to manufacture a single product), they become valuable only to that specific
context and costly to redeploy without loss in value (Riordan & Williamson, 1985;
Williamson, 1999).
In family businesses, resource specificity means that most of the family-endowed
resources are path-dependent and cannot be easily used for purposes other than those for
which they were originally designed (Habbershon et al., 2003). For instance, family firms
often rely on family members to take key managerial positions (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2003). Positive attributes of family human resources include extraordinary commitment,
and warm, friendly and intimate relationships (Donnelley, 1964; Horton, 198).
On the other hand, the accumulation of family human resources depends upon
family members’ early childhood involvement and long-term learning-by-doing in the
family firm (Chirico et al., 2011; Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). In particular, family members’
simultaneous participation in both business and family relationships make the
accumulation of family human resources unique and distinctive from the case in nonfamily firms. In this regard, knowledge aligned with these family members is often pathdependent, meaning that these human resources are often contingent upon a particular
way of running business and can no longer be valuable under a different context (Sirmon
et al., 2008). Another example is patient capital, defined as financial assets invested
without threat of liquidation for long periods (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Patient capital stems
from family firm’s longer time horizon of decision-making compared to non-family
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firms, as family firms often look into the longer future planning its strategies and
operations (Zellweger, 2007). This would suggest that the current utilization of patient
capital is planned in the past and cannot be easily altered at present. Therefore, the
resource portfolio in family business may not be supportive to any change that diverges
from existing strategic choice (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011).
Nonetheless, having resource specificity does not mean strategic change is
impossible. The focal firm can always change its resource portfolio by divesting old
and/or acquiring new resources, or re-leveraging existing resources by de-coupling old
bundles and/or creating new ones. As will be further elaborated, this is not the case in
family business due to the combination of resource inseparability and resource
intangibility.
Inseparability
Inseparability means that it is rather costly to separate the family’s involvement
from its endowment of resources. Indeed, in order to get resources from the family
system, there must be some level of family involvement in business (Habbershon et al.,
2003). However, making strategic change (and being non-persistent) often requires the
shedding of old resources and acquiring of new resources; thus the portfolio of
organizational resources may better fit the newly-developed strategy (Sirmon & Hitt,
2003). However, family members as well as the whole family may have emotional
attachment for family-endowed resources (König et al., 2013). Emotional ties among
family members make shedding old and acquiring new resource less likely. As an
example, compared to non-family counterparts, family firms are less likely to end the
tenure of their employees especially those belonging to owning families (Cruz et al.,
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2010; Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Nonetheless, under high pressure family owners may
be willing to unbind their emotional attachments, but often demand higher economic
compensations to do so. For instance, family owners often ask for higher prices to sell
their businesses (Zellweger et al., 2012).
In addition, family owners may oppose acquisition of new resources from nonfamily parties, because doing so may potentially dilute family’s influence and mitigate
family’s attachment to the business. In the end, even with new resource investment
family decision-makers may choose to strengthen existing business routines rather than
initiating new ones. In comparison, due to lower extent of emotional attachment,
shedding old resources and acquiring new ones would be easier and less costly in the
setting of non-family business.
Therefore, it appears that the feature of resource inseparability makes obtaining
new resources and/or shedding old resources difficult in family firms. Given the fact that
strategic change often requires the revision of existing resource portfolio to support its
implementation, persisting old strategic choices become a better option to reach superior
performance.
Intangibility
Recent work distinguishes tangible resources (e.g., people, machinery, financial
capital) from intangible, knowledge-based resources (e.g., Kogut & Zander, 1992). In this
instance, intangibility refers to the fact that some resources have no actual physical
presence. Examples of intangible resources include organizing principles, skills, and
processes that direct organizational actions (Kogut & Zander, 1996). In family business,
family-centered intangible resources include family cultures, heuristics and routines,
28

which are largely possessed, shared and transferred among family members (CabreraSuárez et al., 2001). In comparison, non-family firms are often characterized by
professional and explicit knowledge that non-family executives learn from educational
institutions.
Family-centered intangible resources are important to family business, as they
work as high-order managerial principals to coordinate activities and manage other
resources (Carney, 2005; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Nevertheless, these intangible
resources also have limitations. For example, they depend on the endowment of the
owning family and cannot be directly purchased from external factor markets (Barney,
1986; Pearson et al., 2008). In addition, these resources cannot be codified and easily
transferred, and often requires the buildup of shared understanding and trust either
between family and non-family members or among family members (Cabrera-Suárez et
al., 2001; Von Krogh et al., 2000). In the end, these family-centered resources are
accumulated through either learning-by-doing or social interactions, but often limited
among family members only (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003).
Under the condition of resource intangibility, frequent strategic changes become
less valuable. Indeed, the creation of competitive advantage through strategic change
depends upon the successful de-bundling of old resources and re-bundling of new
resources (Barney, 1991; Sirmon et al., 2007). Different from shedding old resources
and/or acquiring new ones discussed above, this one concerns the re-leveraging of
existing resource portfolio (Barney & Arikan, 2001). On the other hand, because familycentered intangible resources are difficult to transmit and their transmissions are often
limited among family members, it is hard and costly to re-leverage these resources
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(Cabrera-Suárez et al., 2001). For instance, strategic change often requires the inclusion
of new non-family professionals to lead or assist initiatives in business. However, these
non-family members cannot easily understand family-centered traditions and routines
(Chrisman et al., 2014). In addition, besides the problem of understanding, the presence
of family heuristics makes the adoption of new practices difficult in family business
(Gedajlovic et al., 2004), as family members would resist in accepting non-family
practices whereas non-family members would resist in family practices. This would
suggest that the feature of resource intangibility makes strategic change a less optimal
option because re-structuring of existing resources becomes difficult thus costly.
In sum, being specific, inseparable and intangible makes it difficult to restructure, leverage or redeploy resources in family business (Sirmon et al., 2007). Thus,
resource portfolio in family business is path-dependent and appropriate only to existing
strategic choice (Karim & Mitchell, 2000; Patel & Pavitt, 1997). That is, in family
business strategic persistence should lead to the increase of firm performance. In formal
terms:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive interaction between family business and strategic
persistence on firm performance.
Hypothesis Development: The Moderating Effect of Family Management
Specificity, inseparability and intangibility are interdependent. On the one hand,
being inseparable and intangible makes some family-endowed resources specific. Indeed,
when the resource endowment of a business is not linked to family involvement, nonfamily managers can easily substitute family managers, because these resources in
question are just like the resources in a non-family setting (Stewart & Hitt , 2012). In this
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instance, resource specificity may result in high transaction costs of strategic change only
when resource inseparability and intangibility are high. However, specificity,
inseparability and intangibility are endogenously developed as their saliences all
associate with the family’s involvement in business, especially the family’s participation
in firm management. That is, specificity, inseparability and intangibility of familyendowed resources increase when family involvement in management increases. In
particular, family management may signal the organization’s reliance upon the family’s
provision of resources (Gedajlovic et al., 2004); meaning the path-dependence nature
(specificity) of resources would arise aligned with family management. In addition,
family involvement in management can represent the family’s intention to maintain
control over business, which should directly relate to its psychological and emotional
attachments to family-endowed resources (Arregle et al., 2007). In the end, family
managers are agents not only transmitting family-centered intangible resources to the
business system, but also structuring and leveraging these resources in the business
system (Chirico et al., 2011). All taken, it would suggest that resource specificity,
inseparability and intangibility all result from family involvement in management. Given
the rationale of H3, the positive effect of strategic persistence on firm performance in
family firms should be more salient in those with higher family management than those
with lower family management. In another word:
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive interaction between family management and
strategic persistence on firm performance in family firms.

31

Methodology
Data
The sample is composed of manufacturing firms listed in the S&P 1500 index
from 1996 to 2013 with at least five years of continuous information on the firm
available. Utility and service firms are excluded owing to differences in government
regulation and feasible strategic actions of these firms compared to manufacturing firms.
Such exclusion ensures greater homogeneity in the sample. The focus is on 1996 to 2013
because it covers the “Internet Bubble” and financial crisis periods in which firms’
strategic decisions would be likely to vary. Hence, strategic persistence and firm
performance should have sufficient variations in the sample. Such a long range also
means that there are enough time-series observations to ensure that the measure of
strategic persistence is meaningful. In addition, this range covers periods used in previous
studies on family businesses (Anderson & Reeb 2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester &
Cannella, 2007) and observations in recent years. Firms without at least five years of
continuous information are excluded, because strategic persistence by nature requires
sustained operations over an extended period of time.
The data are longitudinal in nature. To identify founding families, and the role of
those families in a firm (as part of the top management team and/or board of directors),
Hoover’s, ExecuComp, Fundinguniverse.com, ancestry.com, firm websites, as well as
company proxy statements were examined. Measures related to corporate governance and
family business -such as family ownership and family management- are obtained from
firm proxy annual reports. Other variables, including strategic persistence, primarily
come from the Compustat database. To ensure the direction of causality, one-year lags
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between the dependent variable and other variables are used. Also for all models, the
dependent variable(s) are adjusted by industry-average(s), thus industry-specific effects
can be mitigated.
In total, the primary sample includes 682 firms representing 5,048 firm-year
observations from 1996 to 2013 for further analysis. Note that the actual sample size for
each model greatly varies due to missing data and the loss of time-series observations in
calculating strategic persistence.
Independent and Dependent Variables
The primary independent variable is family business. Although the definition of
family business is still debated (Chrisman et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), the
literature generally measures family business via some combination of family ownership
and family management. Thus, family business is defined by a family’s involvement in
ownership and management and a vision for how the firm benefits the family, potentially
across generations (e.g. Chua et al., 1999). This definition implies that family
management is at least as important as family ownership, because it is the medium
through which the owning family can transmit its goals and endow its resources into the
firm’s operation (Chrisman et al., 2012).
Consistent with this definition, family business is measured as a binary variable in
which 1 indicates that the focal firm has at least 5 % family ownership, at least two
family members who are or have been employed as significant owners, top managers, or
directors in firm’s history, and at least one family member who is currently involved in
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TMT7 8 9(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013;
Miller et al., 2007). All firms that do not meet these conditions are considered non-family
firms and are coded as 0. Such a measurement highlights that multiple family members
are or have been involved in the company, which may signal the presence of intra-family
succession intention. Such a measurement also ensures family’s involvement in both
ownership and management, which may represent the family’s ability in transferring
family-centered visions into firm strategic behaviors. In addition, this measurement
differentiate family firms from either lone-founder firms which by definition do not have
multiple family members involved in the business, or from non-family blockholdercontrolled firms in which the significant owners are neither family members nor
founders.
Also, Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2011, p659) notes that, “the potential
existence of unknown threshold effects also poses a problem when relying on continuous
measures of ownership. For example, holding 5% or more of a firm’s shares in a Fortune
500 company may convey a dominant position, and owning an additional 20% or 30% of
the shares may not make much difference in terms of influence over the firm’s affairs
(Tosi et al., 1999)”. Thus, this study chooses not to use a continuous measure of family

7, Family business is also measured by at least 5 % family ownership, at least two family
members currently or historically involved, and either family CEO or family chairman as an
alternative measure of family business. Regression results are similar to the primary results.
8, Family business is also measured by at least 5 % family ownership and at least two family
members currently involved in TMT. Such a measure may signal the presence of intra-family
succession intention in the family. Regression results are discussed in the robustness tests.
9, Family business is also measured by the number of family managers in TMT if there is at
least 5 % family ownership, at least two family members currently or historically involved,
and at least one family managers in TMT. Such a measure is continuous in nature and may
better capture the variance of family’s involvement in business. Regression results are
discussed in the robustness tests.
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ownership to proxy the extent of family’s involvement in business. As will be further
discussed in the post hoc tests, it is found that family ownership may have a non-linear
relationship with strategic persistence or its effect may be contingent upon other factors.
Strategic Persistence is defined as the continuation of similar patterns in resource
allocations in key strategic dimensions over time (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990;
Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993). There are two issues worth noting about
this definition. First, strategic persistence should cover multiple strategic areas rather than
focus on a single area. Second, strategic persistence should be measured across a
relatively long time window.
To deal with the first issue, six key strategic dimensions are used: (1) advertising
intensity (advertising/ sales), (2) research and development intensity (R&D/sales), (3)
plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E), (4) non-production overhead
(selling, general, and administrative [SGA] expenses/sales), (5) inventory levels
(inventories/ sales), and (6) financial leverage (debt/equity). These dimensions have been
used in previous studies to capture the general pattern of strategic decision-making in
each firm (Carpenter, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Zhang, 2006).
For the second issue, the standard deviations of the variables over the most recent
ten year period are calculated. Note that strategic persistence is used as a dependent
variable in testing for H1 and H2a-c, and used as an independent variable in testing for
H3 and H4. When it is used as dependent variable, the standard deviation of ten years in
the future (year t~ year t+9) is used, while in the case of independent variable, ten years
(year t-10~ year t-1) in the past is used. Such a treatment further ensures the direction of
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causality in the analyses. As a robustness test, a five year window is used for an
alternative measure of strategic persistence.
It should be noted that the standard deviation is empirically different from the
mean of the variable over time or the stock value of the variable in a given year. The
former captures the dynamic variation over time, while the latter measures are static in
nature. For instance, it is possible for a company to have a high amount of R&D
investment in a given year, but low variation across time if the company persists in high
R&D investments.
After that, all six variables are standardized (Mean= 0 and S.D. =1). Then mean of
all six variables was calculated, which represents the average of variation of strategic
actions across the ten-year window. Then, because persistence is opposite to variation in
definition, the reverse value of the average (i.e. -0.5 is reversed into 0.5) was used to
create the measure of strategic persistence. Such a treatment ensures that if the focal firmyear observation has above-average strategic persistence, its value should be higher than
0. Similarly, if the observation has below-average strategic persistence, its value should
be lower than 0. In the end, to ensure industry-specific effects were considered by
adjusting this measure by industry-average.
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (market value to assets adjusted by industrial average
as computed by Chung & Pruitt, 1994) is used as the measure of firm performance. This
measure has been widely used in the family business literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Miller et al., 2007). Industry-adjusted Return on Assets (ROA) is also used for a
robustness test.
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Firm age is calculated as the number of years that a company has been operating
in the market. Firm age is also used as a control variable in testing H3 and H4 as firm
performance may vary according to the time that the firm has been operating.
Organizational slack is defined as organizational resources that are more than
what actually needed (Singh, 1986). Aligned with the definition, organizational slack is
calculated as the ratio of liquid asset (reserved cash and marketable securities) divided by
sales (Tan & Peng, 2003). Similar to firm age, this variable is added as a control variable
in testing for H3 and H4, as organizational slack often affects the variation of firm
performance.
Family ownership is measured as the overall percentage of family ownership
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). It is different from the family business measure such that this
variable is continuous. Note that although family ownership has been used to classify
family and non-family firms, it still significantly varies in family firms. This feature
allows the test of H2c as some family firms may have higher family ownership compared
to others. Also, note that this variable is used to test for H2c, as the emphasis here is on
the variation of family ownership in the family business population only. Thus, any firm
with less than 5% family ownership is not included in the analysis.
Family management is measured as the number of family members among the
Top Management Team (TMT). The number of the sum of family members on the board
of director (BOD) and family TMT members is also used as an alternative measure of
family management for a robustness test. This alternative measure reflects the fact that
family board members may engage in monitoring thus may affect the implementation of
strategic actions in family firms.
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Control Variables
As mentioned above, two independent variables (firm age and organizational
slack) are used as control variables in regressing firm performance (H3 and H4). In
addition, following Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) and Miller et al. (2007), a number
of control variables are included because of their potential influences on firm behaviors
and performance.
The variable of lone-founder firm is controlled, measured by a binary variable in
which 1 denotes the situation where the one-founder has at least 5% ownership (Miller et
al., 2007). Note that lone-founder firms are differentiated from family firms as the latter
must have at least two family members historically involved in the business. In addition,
note that lone-founder firms and family firms are mutually exclusive, thus this variable is
not included in testing hypotheses for the family business sample (H2a-H2c & H4).
Non-family blockholder ownership, measured as the overall percentage of
blockholder ownership in year t-1, is controlled as these non-family owners may have
concerns that are incompatible with the owning family’s interests (Morck et al., 2005).
Note that these blockholder may be representative of institutional investors as their
presence is often affiliated with financial institutes.
In addition, firm size (i.e., log of the number of sales in year t-1, Anderson &
Reeb, 2003, 2004), debt ratio (debt-to-asset ratio measured as a ratio in year t-1) and firm
risk (the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous three years, Anderson &
Reeb, 2003) are also controlled, as these factors often affect the decision-making process
and accordingly firm performance (Dean & Sharfman, 1996).
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This study also includes five out of six strategic actions mentioned above for each
given period, namely advertising intensity (advertising/ sales in t-1 period), R&D
intensity (R&D/sales in t-1 period), plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E in
t-1 period), inventory level (inventories/sales in t-1 period), and financial leverage
(debt/equity in t-1 period), all measured as ratios. Indeed, strategic actions in the past may
affect strategic decisions in future, as firms are often path-dependent in their patterns of
decision-making. It should be noted that the independent variable is calculated based on
the S.D.s of these variables across a ten-year window, whereas the controls are calculated
as their static values in year t-1. Also, note that the measure of SGA ratio (selling,
general, and administrative [SGA] expenses/sales) is not included. This is because this
variable is often used as a measure of organizational slack and may therefore be
theoretically redundant as this study has already included a measure of organizational
slack10. Because corporations often diversified into foreign markets, this study also
includes a measure of international sales calculated by the percentage of sales coming
from foreign domains in year t-1. As performance may also affect strategic decisions in
family business, this study controls for past performance (ROA in t-1 term). Industrial
affiliation is also controlled by industrial average performance, measured as industry
averages of ROA at the four-digit SIC codes in year t-1. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio
calculated to control for endogeneity is added as an additional control for all models.

10, Empirically, SGA ratio and the measure of organizational slack show a high level of
correlation that may bias the estimation.
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Controlling for Endogeneity
It is possible that endogeneity may make the regression estimates biased. This
study uses two approaches to control for endogeneity. First, as mentioned above, oneyear lag is used between the dependent variable and others to ensure the direction of
causality, thus the probability of reverse causality is mitigated. Second, the Heckman’s
(1979) two-stage technique (see Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007) is also used. The key here is
to find instrumental variables that are highly related to the independent variable (family
business measure) but are unrelated to the dependent variables. Put differently, high
quality instrumental variables in this instance should be family firm specific and not
strongly connected to either strategic action or firm performance.
This study uses four instrumental variables. First, this study uses family trustholdings affiliated with the largest owner in the firm in a given year, measured as a binary
variable in which 1 denotes the situation that the owner holds either trusts or foundations
associated with family members and 0 otherwise. Indeed, founders, family owners and
other major shareholders often choose to use trust or foundation to take care of their
family members. Note that the establishment of trust-holding may be driven by superior
firm performance. Nonetheless, as one-year lags are used between dependent variable and
other variables, the direction of causality is ensured. In addition, theoretically family
trust-holding can be a signal of the owning family’s vision such that the business is used
to ensure the benefit of the whole family as well as individual family members. Thus, the
inclusion of this instrumental variable also helps to ensure the presence of familycentered vision in business. This variable is obtained from annual proxy statements.
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Second, this study controls for the fraction of industry sales that comes from
family firms (i.e. family firm sales fraction by industry), which is naturally related to the
probability that a firm in the industry is such a firm, yet is independent of the second
stage dependent variables (strategic persistence and Tobin’Q) because the latter are
industry-adjusted. Similar measures have been used in previous studies in family business
(Amit et al., 2015) and finance (Campa & Kedia, 2002). Third, this study also controls
for family firms’ fraction of capital expenditure by industry (i.e. family firm capital
fraction by industry). Lastly, family firms’ fraction of advertisement expenditure by
industry (i.e. family firm advertisement fraction by industry) is also controlled. Note that
within three family firm fraction variables, one is related to performance (sales) and the
other two are related to decision-making. Such a design is appropriate because the
hypotheses are related to both strategic persistence and firm performance. Using
Heckman’s two-stage procedure, this study first estimates one probit model in which
family business (=1) versus non-family firm (=0) is regressed against four instrumental
variables and other controls mentioned above. According to the estimation results, the
inverse Mills ratio is calculated for each yearly-firm observation and included as a control
in all models.
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. In general, 23% of
the sample are family firms, while 9% are lone-founder firms. These numbers are similar
to other studies exploring publicly traded lone-founder and family firms (Miller et al.,
2007). In addition, consistent with Chrisman and Patel (2012), as well as Miller and
colleagues (2007), family firms are negatively while lone-founder firms are positively
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correlated with R&D investments. Thus, it appears that the sample is comparable to other
family business studies in publicly traded firms. Although the correlation between family
business and strategic persistence is not significant (0.00 in 5 years period; 0.05 in 10
years periods), family management appears to have positive and significant relationships
with strategic persistence (0.03 in 5 years period; 0.01 in 10 years periods). Also
consistent with expectations, strategic persistence is negatively correlated with firm
performance. In terms of the selection of instrumental variables, all four variables are
positively and significantly related to family business variable(s). In addition, their
correlations with family business variable(s) are much higher compared to their
correlations with either strategic persistence or firm performance, which are largely not
significant11 (Table 1). All of these provide initial support that the selection of
instrumental variables is appropriate. The highest variance inflation factor (VIF) is 2.78,
suggesting that multi-collinearity is not a major concern.

11, Z-statistics reveal that the smallest difference between instrumental variables’ correlation
with family business variable and their correlation with strategic persistence or performance
is significant at 0.001 level (Z=-13.47).
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Mean
0.00
0.00
2.33
0.44
0.23
9.82
51.37
0.56
0.35
0.94
0.09
2.83
6.98
0.04
8.57
0.01
0.04
0.53
0.13
0.25
0.13
0.44
0.44
0.36
0.20
0.17
0.19

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation

1, Strategic Persistence (10 years)
2, Strategic Persistence (5 years)
3, TOBIN's Q
4, ROA
5, Family Business (Family TMT>0)
6, Family Ownership
7, Age
8, Organizational Slack
9, Family Management (TMT)
10, Family Management (TMT+ BOD)
11, Lone-Founder Firm
12, Blockholder Ownership
13, Firm Size
14, Debt Ratio
15, Firm Risk
16, Advertisement Ratio
17, R&D Ratio
18, Plant Newness
19, Inventory Ratio
20, Leverage Ratio
21, International Sales
22, Past Performance
23, Industrial Average Performance
24, Family Trust-Holdings
25, Family Firm Sales Ratio by Industry
26, Family Firm Advertisement Ratio by Industry
27, Family Firm Capital Ratio by Industry

Table 1
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S.D.
0.48
0.50
2.02
0.24
0.42
20.15
40.41
24.83
0.70
1.66
0.29
8.75
1.66
0.06
10.99
0.04
0.09
0.14
0.20
1.73
17.59
0.25
0.19
0.48
0.31
0.34
0.31

1
1.00
0.91
-0.09
0.06
0.00
-0.01
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
-0.01
-0.05
0.09
-0.03
0.03
-0.11
-0.11
-0.02
-0.06
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.00
-0.02
0.01
0.03
-0.01

3
1.00
0.24
0.00
-0.02
-0.02
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.04
0.02
-0.02
-0.04
0.13
0.02
0.00
0.03
-0.02
-0.01
-0.03
0.13
-0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01

2
1.00
-0.11
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.05
0.05
-0.03
-0.03
0.08
-0.02
-0.01
-0.13
-0.15
0.00
-0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.03
0.00
-0.02
0.02
0.04
-0.01
1.00
-0.03
-0.03
-0.05
0.02
-0.02
-0.03
0.00
0.15
-0.12
-0.01
0.02
0.10
-0.02
-0.10
-0.06
-0.01
0.01
0.54
-0.03
-0.01
0.02
0.00
0.02

4

0.71
-0.06
-0.03
0.80
0.84
-0.18
0.00
-0.12
0.00
-0.05
0.07
-0.12
0.10
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.68
0.49
0.32
0.49

5

1.00
0.01
-0.04
0.63
0.73
-0.15
-0.04
-0.06
0.03
-0.03
0.13
-0.14
0.10
0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.05
0.09
0.61
0.43
0.30
0.41

6

1.00
0.02
-0.07
-0.02
-0.24
-0.06
0.35
0.12
-0.06
0.00
-0.21
-0.13
0.01
0.02
0.00
-0.06
-0.03
-0.11
-0.03
-0.02
-0.03

7

1.00
-0.01
-0.02
0.01
0.01
0.08
0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.01
-0.05
-0.27
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.02
-0.02
-0.03
-0.03
-0.03

8

1.00
0.92
-0.16
-0.01
-0.11
0.02
-0.05
0.08
-0.10
0.10
0.05
-0.02
0.00
0.04
0.06
0.58
0.46
0.31
0.46

9

1.00
-0.18
-0.03
-0.09
0.02
-0.07
0.08
-0.13
0.09
0.05
-0.01
0.00
0.04
0.07
0.67
0.48
0.31
0.48

10

1.00
0.10
0.07
0.11
0.12

1.00
0.36
0.21
0.36

24

23

12
1.00
-0.19
0.00
-0.03
0.01
-0.01
0.06
0.01
-0.01
-0.02
0.13
0.05
0.15
-0.02
-0.05
-0.02

11
1.00
0.07
-0.15
-0.06
0.11
0.03
0.16
0.06
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.03
0.04
0.21
-0.10
-0.08
-0.10

1.00
0.53
0.95

25

1.00
0.16
0.07
0.02
-0.25
0.05
-0.08
0.08
0.01
-0.07
0.00
-0.16
-0.07
-0.01
-0.08

13

1.00
0.50

26

1.00
-0.02
0.02
-0.08
0.04
0.08
0.23
0.01
-0.03
-0.02
-0.03
0.06
0.08
0.04

14

1.00

27

1.00
0.16
0.17
0.04
-0.01
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
-0.01
-0.01
-0.02
-0.02

15

Note:
All variables are NOT adjusted by industrial average
All correlations above | 0.03 | are significant at 0.10 or better for a two-tailed test

23, Industrial Average Performance
24, Family Trust-Holdings
25, Family Business Sales Ratio by Industry
26, Family Advertisement Ratio by Industry
27, Family Capital Ratio by Industry

11, Lone-Founder Firm
12, Blockholder Ownership
13, Firm Size
14, Debt Ratio
15, Firm Risk
16, Advertisement Ratio
17, R&D Ratio
18, Plant Newness
19, Inventory Ratio
20, Leverage Ratio
21, International Sales
22, Past Performance
23, Industrial Average Performance
24, Family Trust-Holdings
25, Family Business Sales Ratio by Industry
26, Family Advertisement Ratio by Industry
27, Family Capital Ratio by Industry

Table 1 (continued)
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1.00
0.29
0.08
-0.03
0.00
0.00
0.21
0.20
0.08
0.09
0.13
0.10

16

1.00
-0.11
0.30
-0.01
0.02
-0.09
-0.08
-0.06
-0.16
-0.12
-0.15

17

1.00
0.07
0.02
0.00
-0.09
-0.02
0.07
0.13
0.06
0.10

18

1.00
0.04
0.00
-0.11
-0.09
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.04

19

1.00
0.00
-0.04
-0.03
-0.02
0.00
0.03
-0.01

20

1.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00

21

1.00
0.76
0.07
0.07
0.09
0.11

22

Due to the nature of longitudinal data, Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression
analysis may yield biased estimations. The Hausman test (Chi Sq Statistic=303.90, PValue<0.001) suggests that the fixed effect model is more appropriate than the randomeffect. Thus, fixed-effect longitudinal regression is used as the primary analytic
technique. In order to control for potential serial correlation and heteroscedasticity,
Huber-White estimator clustered at the firm level is also used (Judson & Owen, 1999). In
all models, a one year lag between dependent and other variables is used.
As mentioned above, this study uses Heckman’s two-stage approach to partially
control for endogeneity. Model 1 (Table 2) is the first-stage probit treatment model in
which the binary variable of family business is regressed against instrumental variables
and other controls. Lone-founder firms are not included as a control as this category is
mutually exclusive from the family business variable. Overall, four instrumental variables
are all positively and significantly related to the family business variable, suggesting that
the selection of instruments is reasonable (Table 2, Model 1).
Model 2 (Table 2) tests H1. Firm risk (B= -0.002, p-value<0.001), plant newness
(B= -0.225, p-value<0.001) and international sales (B= -0.0001, p-value<0.001) are
negatively related to strategic persistence. In support of H1, the family business variable
is positively (B= 0.047, p-value<0.001) related to strategic persistence. This means that,
ceteris paribus, being a family business increases the extent of strategic persistence by
0.047 units compared to case of non-family business. Thus, the result indicates that
family firms tend to be more persistent in strategic decision-making compared to nonfamily firms. It should also be noted that the estimated coefficients of lone-founder firms
and blockholder ownership are not significant. Combined with the significant coefficient
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of family ownership, it suggests that the result found here is not due to the effect of
ownership concentration.
Model 3 (Table 2) tests H2a-H2c. Note that while H1 intends to address the
difference between family and non-family businesses, H2a-H2c aim at exploring the
heterogeneity in the family business population. Thus, Model 2 (Table 2) focuses on
family firms only, and the control variable of lone-founder firm is taken out because this
type of organization is mutually exclusive from family business.
In support of H2a and H2b, firm age (B= 0.011, p-value<0.001) is positively
related to strategic persistence, while organizational slack (B= -0.002, p-value<0.001) is
negatively related to strategic persistence.
Nevertheless, H2c is not supported as the family ownership (B= -0.375, pvalue>0.10) variable is negatively but not significantly related to strategic persistence.
Thus, it appears that in the family business population, family ownership does not have a
linear and positive relationship with strategic persistence. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, it
is possible that family ownership may have a non-linear impact upon the exercise of
family’s influence in business. This issue will be further discussed in the post hoc
analysis.
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Table 2

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H1-H2c

Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business (H1)
Firm Age (H2a)
Organizational Slack (H2b)
Family Ownership (H2c)
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Family Trust-Holdings
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
Family Advertisement Ratio by Industry
Family Capital Ratio by Industry
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics
Absolute Log Likelihood

Model 1
Family Business
Binary Variable
FB & NFB
-1.622***
-0.0004
-0.004**
-0.020***
-0.160***
1.736***
-0.006***
0.506
-2.001***
0.456
0.000
0.326
0.001
-0.570
0.438
2.219***
1.408***
0.352***
0.419*
682
9
5,048
0.57
2300.65***

Model 2
Strategic
Persistence
FB & NFB
0.058
0.047***

0.029
0.000
0.004
-0.078
-0.002***
-0.295
-0.981
-0.225***
0.400
-0.004
-0.0001***
-0.005
0.015
-0.023

682
9
5,048
0.30
9.30***

Model 3
Strategic
Persistence
FB
0.405
0.011**
-0.002***
-0.0002
-0.003***
-0.096*
-0.378
-0.001
-0.192
-0.190
-0.142†
-0.196
0.012**
0.001
-0.184†
-0.109
0.024

164
9
1,092
0.10
25.47***

Note:
1) Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2) † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3) Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Model 4 (Table 3) tests H3. The family business variable (B= -0.240, pvalue<0.05) is negatively related to firm performance. Strategic persistence (B= -0.130,
p-value>0.10) has a negative but not significant effect on firm performance. In support of
H3, the interaction between the family business variable and strategic persistence is
positive and significant (B= 0.130, p-value<0.05). This suggests persisting in previous
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strategic decision-making may help improve performance in family owned and managed
organizations. Model 5 (Table 3) tests H4. Supporting H4, the interaction between
strategic persistence and family management is positive and significant (B= 0.258, pvalue<0.05). It appears that family firms with high levels of family management
primarily capture the positive effect of strategic persistence.
Figure 1 plots Model 3. It appears that, non-family firms have higher performance
compared to family firms. In addition, the increase of strategic persistence is not
associated with salient change in firm performance in non-family firms. In support of H3,
there is a positive relationship between strategic persistence and firm performance in
family business. Indeed, given the high level of strategic persistence, the performance
difference between family and non-family firms becomes minimized.
Figure 2 plots Model 4. Similar to Figure 1, it appears that strategic persistence
has a positive effect on firm performance given high family’s involvement in
management. Supporting H4, when strategic persistence approaches a relatively high
level, family firms with high family management outperform those with low family
management.
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Table 3

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H3-H4

Model

Model 4

Dependent Variable

Firm Performance

Sample
Constant
Family Business
Family Management
Strategic Persistence
Family Business * Strategic Persistence (H3)
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (H4)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership

Note:

FB & NFB
4.649*
-0.240*
-0.130
0.130*
-0.011
0.049***
0.137
0.006

Firm Size

-0.503***

Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance

-0.413
0.010***
-1.726
-1.323
-0.931***
-0.631*
0.000
0.004
1.009***

Industrial Average Performance

-0.599*

Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

0.048**
669
7
4,056
0.21
12.87***

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Model 5
Firm
Performance
FB
2.193
0.055*
-0.351
0.258*
0.014
0.003
-0.001
0.367***
-0.265
0.006*
-3.480
-5.233*
-0.376
-0.449
0.004
-0.013**
1.717***
1.336***
-0.034
133
7
713
0.31
7.61***

Figure 1

Family Business, Strategic Persistence and Firm Performance

Figure 2

Family Management, Strategic Persistence and Firm Performance

Robustness Tests
A number of robustness tests are conducted to ensure that the results are not
artificial. Firstly, instead of a 10 year window, 5 years is used to calculate the variable of
strategic persistence. Note that 10 years is intentionally chosen because such a long time
range ensures that the measure of strategic persistence is not determined by short-term
dynamics. Using 5 years, H1 and H3 are still supported, as the family business variable is
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positively related to strategic persistence (Table 4, Model 6, B= 0.059, p-value<0.10),
while the interaction between the family business variable and strategic persistence is
positively related to firm performance (Table 5, Model 8, B= 0.074, p-value<0.01).
Nevertheless, among H2a-H2c (Table 4, Model 7), only H2c (positive relationship
between family ownership and strategic persistence) is supported. Neither firm age
(Model 7, B= 0.072, p-value >0.10) or organizational slack (Model 7, B= - 0.0001, pvalue >0.10) are significantly related to strategic persistence, though the coefficients are
in the hypothesized directions. In addition, H4 is not supported, as the coefficient of the
interaction between family management and strategic persistence (Model 8, B= 0.107, pvalue >0.10) is positive but nonsignificant. Thus, the basic conceptual idea (family firms
tend to be more persistent and strategic persistence is more likely to result in superior
performance in family business compared to non-family business) is reasonably robust,
although hypotheses related to the heterogeneity among family business population are
not supported for the 5 year window.
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Table 4

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests H1-H2c
Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business (H1)
Firm Age (H2a)
Organizational Slack (H2b)
Family Ownership (H2c)
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 6
Strategic
Persistence
(Five Years)
FB & NFB
-0.671
0.059†

Model 7
Strategic
Persistence
(Five Years)
FB
-2.417
-0.072
0.000
0.008*

-0.024
0.004*
0.131*
-0.062
-0.002**
-0.502
-1.277***
-0.324***
0.303†
0.001
0.000†
0.014
-0.195
0.005
794
14
8,785
0.15
5.56***

0.011
0.871†
-0.657
0.003†
0.392
-0.544
-1.055*
1.714†
-0.029
0.000
-0.009
-0.280
-0.008
179
14
1,747
0.15
3.73***

Note:

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Furthermore, performance measure is changed from industry-adjusted Tobin’Q
into industry-adjusted ROA12. Indeed, Tobin’s Q reflects more about the stock market’s

12, This study also uses industry-adjusted ROS. Results are similar to industry-adjusted ROA
in terms of directions, magnitudes and significances.
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perception of the firm value, while ROA is more about the firm’s yearly profitability.
Again, both H3 (Table 6, Model 10) and H4 (Table 6, Model 11) are supported.
Table 5

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests H3-H4

Model

Model 8

Dependent Variable

Firm Performance

Sample
Constant
Family Business
Family Management
Strategic Persistence (Five Years)
Family Business * Strategic Persistence (Five Years) (H3)
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (Five Years) (H4)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Note:

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1

53

FB & NFB
4.048***
-0.045
-0.062***
0.075**
-0.012
0.000***
-0.220**
0.005†
-0.467***
-0.978***
0.019***
-1.295
-1.594†
-0.466
-0.412***
0.001
0.001***
1.412***
-0.931**
-0.001
787
12
7,642
0.21
11.94***

Model 9
Firm
Performance
FB
-0.321
0.131
0.121
-0.107
0.027*
-0.007
0.007
-0.225*
0.684
-0.001
-5.616***
-2.066
0.309
-0.177
-0.0003*
-0.003
2.143***
-1.311***
-0.006
172
12
1,410
0.22
17.19***

Table 6

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3-H4
Model
Dependent Variable

Note:

Sample
Constant
Family Business
Family Management
Strategic Persistence
Family Business * Strategic Persistence (H3)
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (H4)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 11
Model 10
Firm Performance
(Industry-Adjusted ROA)
FB
FB & NFB
0.096***
0.062
-0.045***
-0.024
-0.002**
-0.033
0.023***
0.033*
0.000
0.000
-0.008
-0.029†
0.013
0.0003*
-0.002*
-0.010**
-0.015
0.148***
0.007
0.000
0.000
-0.010
-0.110
0.135
-0.284
-0.014
-0.064†
-0.019
-0.056*
0.000
0.0001**
0.000
0.000
0.447***
0.300**
-0.490***
-0.036
0.005
0.003†
669
136
7
8
4056
824
0.14
0.11
16.13***
44.10***

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Furthermore, note that the measure of family business does not necessarily
captures the vision of the owning family. This may suggest an isolation between the
definition and the measurement. Here, two alternative measures of family business are
used in testing for H1 and H3.
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To begin, instead of one family manager, this study uses at least two family
managers in TMT to classify family business, aligned with at least 5% family ownership
and at least two family members historically or currently involved in business. Such a
measure highlights the presence of multiple family members in TMT, which may signal
the presence of intra-family succession intention. Consistent with the primary analysis,
H1 (Table 7, Model 12) and H3 (Table 8, Model 14) are supported.
In addition, family business is measured by the number of family managers in
business if there is at least 5% family ownership and at least two family members
historically or currently involved in business. This measure is continuous in nature and
may better reflect the variance of family involvement in business. Also note that family
managers are directly involved in daily-management in business. This issue is important
as publicly-traded firms feature the isolation between ownership and management, thus
family ownership may not have direct effect on firm decision-making. In addition, the
number of family managers may better capture the vision of the owning family, as more
family managers may signal a higher intention of maintaining family’s control in
business possibly across generations. Again, both H1 (Table 7, Model 13) and H3 (Table
8, Model 15) are supported.
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Table 7

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H1
Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business (>=2 family managers, H1)
Family Management (H1)
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Note:

1.
2.
3.

Model 12
Strategic
Persistence
FB & NFB
0.059
0.085**
0.029
0.000
0.004
-0.077
-0.002***
-0.295
-0.983
-0.224***
0.401
-0.004
-0.0002***
-0.006
0.013
-0.022
682
9
5,048
0.31
11.61***

Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1

56

Model 13
Strategic
Persistence
FB & NFB
0.052
0.037**
0.030
0.000
0.004
-0.078†
-0.002***
-0.293
-0.983
-0.226***
0.401
-0.004
-0.0001***
-0.007
0.015
-0.024
682
9
5,048
0.31
11.60***

Table 8

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3
Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business (>=2 family managers)
Family Management
Strategic Persistence
Family Business (>=2 family managers) *
Strategic Persistence (H3)
Family Management *
Strategic Persistence (H3)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 14
Firm
Performance
FB & NFB
4.606**
-0.137**
0.007

Model 15
Firm
Performance
FB & NFB
4.683**
-0.111*
0.006

0.209**
-0.009
0.050***
0.144
0.006
-0.503***
-0.417
0.010***
-1.366
-1.353
-0.922***
-0.733**
0.001
0.004
0.839*
-0.167
0.031†
669
7
4,056
0.21
9.29***

0.100**
-0.009
0.049***
0.141
0.006
-0.505***
-0.413
0.010***
-1.579
-1.338
-0.916***
-0.650*
0.001
0.004
0.837*
-0.158
0.042**
669
7
4,056
0.21
9.30***

Note:

1.
2.
3.

Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
Lastly, this study also tries to use the sum of family TMT members and family

board of directors (BOD) members as an alternative measure of family management in
testing for H4. This measurement reflects the fact that family BOD members may engage
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in monitoring firm operations thus may have extensive influences on daily management.
Again, H4 (Table 9, Model 16) is supported.
To summarize, results of robustness tests show a high level of consistency with
the primary results.
Table 9

Note:

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H4

Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Management
Strategic Persistence
Family Management * Strategic Persistence (H4)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Model 16
Firm Performance
FB
2.213
0.078*
-0.232
0.073*
0.002
-0.030
0.002
-0.347**
-0.404
0.006†
-4.694**
-3.827**
-0.204
-0.352
-0.0003**
-0.017*
1.578***
-1.065***
-0.010
142
8
835
0.30
8.35***

Post hoc Analysis
While most of hypotheses proposed in this study are supported, it is worth noting
that H2c is rejected in the primary analysis. This section intends to explore this issue
further.
Table 10

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Post hoc Analysis
Model

Model 17
Strategic
Persistence
FB
0.647**
0.060**

Dependent Variable

Note:

Sample
Constant
Family Management
Family Ownership
Family Ownership ^2
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

0.012**
-0.002***
-0.003**
-0.093**
-0.384
-0.001
-0.237
-0.221
-0.149†
-0.152
0.013**
0.000
-0.193†
-0.129
0.023
164
9
1,092
0.14
25.62***

Model 18
Strategic
Persistence
FB
0.647**
-0.0095**
0.000095*
0.012**
-0.002***
-0.003***
-0.119**
-0.351
-0.001
-0.521
-0.216
-0.123
-0.205
0.012**
0.001
-0.119
-0.148
0.022
164
9
1,092
0.14
25.53***

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
To begin, family ownership is conceptualized as a measure of family’s control in
decision-making. Nevertheless, it is possible that family management –rather than family
ownership- is more directly related to family’s dominance in the decision-making
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process. Indeed, compared to shareholders, managers are arguably more apt to affect
what decisions can eventually lead to strategic actions in business. Hence, family
ownership is replaced by family management in testing for H2c (Table 10, Model 17). It
is found that family management (Model 17, B= 0.60, p-value <0.01) has a positive and
significant effect on strategic persistence.
In addition, it is possible that family ownership may have a curvilinear
relationship with strategic persistence. In particular, when family ownership increases
from low to moderate levels, the family owners may be under the pressure of conformity
and have to adjust firm strategy in order to impress public shareholders as well as
external institutes (Miller et al., 2011). At this stage, strategic change (rather than
strategic persistence) may be favored by family shareholders. However, when family
ownership reaches a certain threshold, family owners may not need to consider other
minor shareholders’ opinions in making decisions, and the increase of family ownership
starts to be associated with the increase of strategic persistence. Indeed, the post hoc
analysis suggests that there is a U-shape relationship between family ownership13 and
strategic persistence (Table 10, Model 18), such that the estimated coefficient of family
ownership is negative (Table 10, Model 18, B= -0.0095, p-value <0.01), whereas the
coefficient of the square term of family business is positive (Table 10, Model 18, B=
0.0000095, p-value <0.05). After calculation, it is also found that the inflection of the U
shape is 50.0% ( 50.0=0.0095/(2*0.000095); also see Figure 3). This result is consistent

13, To ensure that the curvilinear relationship is due to the family ownership’s effect rather
than the ownership’s effect, the square term of blockholder ownership is also added into the
regression model. The estimated coefficient of blockholder ownership and the estimated
coefficient of its square term are both nonsignificant.
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with the argument above. Indeed, although in general family firms have higher levels of
strategic persistence compared to non-family firms, when the family ownership has not
reached a majority ownership position, the relationship between the level of family
ownership and strategic persistence is negative rather than positive14.

Figure 3

Family Ownership and Strategic Persistence

Discussion
Studies have highlighted that family’s involvement in business may lead to
distinctive strategic decisions and performance (Anderson & Reed, 2003; Villalonga, &
Amit, 2006). One neglected area is the implementation of a family firm’s strategy and
how such implementation would lead to idiosyncratic firm performance. This essay

14, An alternative explanation is that high persistence may signal the presence of family
tradition in business, thus motivating the family to gain more ownership in business. This
argument means that strategic persistence may cause the change of family ownership rather
than the vice versa. Nonetheless, one-year time lags have been used in the analysis to ensure
the direction of causality. It is also possible that the presence of some exogenous factor (i.e.
firm performance) will cause the co-variance of two variables, although the endogeneity has
been controlled as mentioned above.
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intended to address these gaps. In particular, it is hypothesize that family firms tend to be
more persistent in their implementation of strategic decisions over time, and such
strategic persistence is likely to contribute to superior performance in family firms. It is
also hypothesized that family firms with higher firm age, lower organizational slack and
higher family ownership are more likely to develop persistent strategic decisions. All
hypotheses are supported except for the effect of family ownership on strategic
persistence within the family business population. This section intends to discuss the
implications of this study.
To begin, strategic persistence is important yet neglected in the family business
literature. Indeed, the family business literature has long recognized that some family
firms are oriented toward the long run, and such long-term orientation may contribute to
superior performance (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Nevertheless, few have
developed theories regarding what types of family firms are more likely to express such
an orientation, and how such an orientation would contribute to firm performance. More
importantly, the attention is often drawn to short-term strategic behavior (e.g. Gentry et
al., forthcoming) rather than to the long-term window for multiple strategic dimensions.
Such neglect may result in inaccurate theoretical propositions as well as biased empirical
results. This study intends to fill these gaps and shed light on the long-term orientation
literature in the family business field. The empirical results suggest that in general family
firms are more persistent compared to non-family firms, and this strategic persistence
may help improve their performance.
In addition, drawing upon the behavioral theory of the firm, this study develops a
theoretical framework related to goals, resources, and governance in family businesses.
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Such a framework highlights that any strategic action in family business is the
consequences of unique goals, resources, and governance stemming from the intertwining
of family and business systems (Chua et al., 2012). Yet, the literature often highlights one
but overlooks others, which leads to inconsistent or incomplete empirical findings
regarding family firm’s behavior and performance. Thus, the theoretical framework here
is more comprehensive compared to prevailing theories such as the SEW perspective.
Furthermore, this study hypothesizes that firm age, organizational slack and
family ownership would contribute to the variations of family-centered goal and
governance respectively. This hypothesis highlights that family firms are indeed
heterogeneous, and some family firms are more persistent compared to others. Note that
the direct effect of family ownership (H3c) is not supported in the primary analysis.
However, it is found in the post hoc analysis that such a result is primarily due to nonlinearity in the influence of family ownership. While the basic hypotheses in this study
are still robust, further researchers are encouraged to keep exploring this direction.
Lastly, this study conceptualizes that family endowments of resources are
characterized by inseparability, specificity and intangibility, and such characteristics
manifest mainly through the family’s involvement in management. Here a contingency
perspective is used, assuming that a high fit between strategic actions and resource
configuration would lead to better performance. Hence, strategic action that require less
adding, leveraging and shedding of resources are more suitable for family business, and
are more likely to bring them competitive advantage. Note that such a contingency
perspective has not been fully embraced by the family business literature (for a notable
exception, see Kammerlander et al., 2015). Indeed, the theory may shed light on why and
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how certain strategic actions are more likely to bring in competitive advantages compared
to others.
Theoretical Implication
This essay may have potential to contribute to theories in the family business
literature in several ways. Firstly, one notable view in the family business literature is that
family firms need to learn from non-family firms in terms of favorable strategic choices
(e.g. Stewart & Hitt, 2012). This view has its roots in the work of business historian
Alfred Chandler (1962) who views family business as the relics of an old era. His
followers compellingly argue that learning from non-family firms and embracing
innovation (Block, 2012), risk-taking or corporate entrepreneurship (Chirico et al., 2011)
may bring competitive advantage to family-owned and –managed type of organizations.
The empirical result suggests that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, while strategic
persistence may bring in negative consequences by itself, its interaction with family
business is positive and significant. Indeed, as Figure 1 shows, family firms with high
strategic persistence perform better compared to family firms with low strategic
persistence. Combined with the high strategic persistence found in family business (H1),
it would imply that family business may have a unique way of implementing strategic
decisions, and persisting in past strategy may help to narrow the performance difference
between family and non-family firms.
In a similar inquiry, some scholars advocate that at least some if not all family
firms should professionalize by employing non-family managers and experts. Such an
argument is often based upon the assumption that family labor pool is often limited by its
size and quality, and recruiting non-family talents may help overcome the defects of
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family managers (Chua et al., 2009). This essay challenges this view. What have been
found in this study suggest that, although in general family’s involvement in management
may bring in negative effects upon firm performance, its alignment with persist strategic
decisions would result in even better performance. It appears that family managers may
have certain advantages in some strategic actions. The view that non-family managers are
always superior compared to family managers seems to be too absolute.
Such a finding is also consistent with the contingency view which proposes that
there should be a “fit” between strategic action and implementation, and a high level of
fit would likely lead to superior performance (Kammerlander et al., 2015). Such a view
of “fit” may also shed light on the performance heterogeneity in family business. Indeed,
family business scholars have recognized that performance heterogeneity in family
business may stem from unique compositions of goals, resources, and governance
structures in family business (Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua et al., 2012). What they have
not recognized and what may further advance the family business filed is that the
interaction among goal, resource and governance may be even more important. That is to
say, further studies should further explore different combinations of goals, resources, and
governance in terms of their interactive impacts on strategy and performance in family
business.
One area that closely relates to the continuity of family governance in business is
the temporality in family business. In strategy, temporality can be defined as an
organization’s variation in strategic actions and performances across time (Langley et al.,
2013; Mosakowski & Earley, 2000). Temporality is closely related to family business
because the continuity of family’s control in business often across generations has been
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highlighted as a distinguishing feature of family business (Chua et al., 1999), which may
affect both strategic decision-making and performance in family business (Zellweger et
al., 2012). In addition, generational difference in family business has been highlighted by
scholars, as founding- and late-generations often differ regarding their strategic decisionmaking as well as their capabilities in appropriating rent from strategic decisions (Miller
et al., 2007). Yet, except for a dedicated special issue in Family Business Review (2013,
27), not much attention has been paid in the area. This essay may shed light on this track,
as it is hypothesized and found that family firms tend to be more persistent in their
strategic decisions, and such persistence may bring in positive outcomes in this type of
organizations.
In addition, as aforementioned, the theoretical framework in this study covers
idiosyncratic goals, resources and governance structures in family business (Chua et al.,
2012). Note that overly emphasizing one single dimension may result in inaccurate
predictions regarding how family firms would behave and perform. Indeed, just as Chua
and colleagues (2012, p2) have warned, “continuing to ignore family firm heterogeneity
could institutionalize a distorted homogeneous view of family firms that generates
“panaceas,” supposedly applicable to all family firms”.
Finally, recent development in the family business literature tends to emphasize
the non-economic and socio-emotional goals of owning families (e.g. Berrone et al.,
2012; Chrisman et al., 2012) and how such goals would affect family firm’s strategic
decisions such as risk-taking (Chrisman & Patel, 2012) and diversification (GomezMejia, 2010). Nonetheless, it is still not well known why some family firms have better
performance compared to others from this perspective. Indeed, the SEW view is better
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suited exploring the heterogeneity of family firm behaviors. On the other hand, the RBV
has been used to explore the competitive advantages in some family firms. Nevertheless,
existing RBV studies often draw attention to different categories of family resources in
business, assuming having resource endowments from the family system is sufficient to
ensure superior performance. This essay focuses on the overall features of family
resources, which fundamentally affect the ways that owning families manage familyendowed resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Indeed, it is the management of resources that
eventually determine the consequence of any strategic action. Thus, some family firms
are better than non-family firms not only because these family firms have valuable, rare
and non-imitable and non-substitutable resources, that also because these family firms
have a better way of managing resources. Such a perspective also suggests that given
high inseparability, specificity and intangibility, family firms may have advantages in
strategic actions that require less acquisition, mobilization, and divestment of resources in
the business systems.
Limitation
While this study may make several contributions, it is also important to recognize
its limitations. Firstly, family ownership is used as a measure of family control in
corporate governance. This treatment leads to the hypothesis that family ownership is
positively relate to strategic persistence in the family business population (H2c).
However, as shown in the primary and robustness tests, this hypothesis is not supported.
Also as revealed in the post hoc analysis, family ownership may have multiple
implications in terms of its effects on strategic behaviors. Indeed, family ownership may
represent the legitimate right that owning family has in affecting a firm’s decision67

making process, but it may not capture the actual power of the owning family in such a
process. In this matter, family management may be a better measure associated with the
family’s actual control in daily management. In addition, family ownership may be seen
as a signal of family’s presence in business. In this manner, family firms especially those
with low to moderate levels of family ownership may be exposed to public pressure of
strategic conformity (Miller et al., 2011). Indeed, this theoretical issue may be one of the
limitations, and future studies should further consider the multiple facets of family
ownership in their studies.
Also, family business is defined by family’s involvement in ownership and
management as well as the family’s vision of using the business to benefit the family and
family members. Although several alternative measures of family business have been
used, and some of the measures are related to the “vision” of the family, it is important to
note that the “vision” of the family has not been directly measured, which may lead to an
isolation between the theory and the methodology. Future studies should try to use better
scales of family business in testing for the hypotheses in this study.
In addition, this study uses firm age, organizational slack and family ownership as
three measures related to family tradition, resource parsimony and family control,
respectively. Such a conceptualization was supported by the empirical results. However,
family tradition, resource parsimony and family control are not directly measured in the
study. One reason is the secondary data source, as it is rather difficult to gain primary
data from publicly traded companies. Indeed, this issue may lead to the isolation between
the theory and the methodology. Indeed, this is a limitation, and future studies should use
valid scales to better test the relationship between the constructs and strategic persistence.
68

Furthermore, it is also important to note that these three variables mentioned
above may only represent a small portion of variation in the family business population.
Differently put, it is possible that there are more factors, especially those stemming from
the family system that may further contribute to the heterogeneity in the family business
population.
It is also important to note that, although there are multiple hypotheses in this
study, they are tested separately. Note that some analytic techniques such as path analysis
and structural equation modeling (SEM) may test multiple hypotheses simultaneously.
Nevertheless, the data used in this study is longitudinal, meaning that for SEM or path
analysis, cross-sections (682 firms) and years (9 years) must be added as control variables
into the model (682+9), which may greatly limit the degree of freedom in the analysis
and make the analysis infeasible. Future studies should try to use other analytic
approaches to test all hypotheses simultaneously.
Moreover, this study uses publicly-traded firms in S&P 1500 manufacturing as
the primary sample. Indeed, one feature of public-traded family firms is the limited range
of family ownership, as it is impossible for family ownership to reach 100% by nature. In
addition, it is impossible to collect data for firms with less than 5% family ownership,
because only owners with more than 5% ownership are reported in the proxy statements.
Such a sampling would limit the generalizability of the findings in small and privately
owned family and non-family firms, as privately-owned or small- and medium-sized
family firms often feature high family ownership as well as a higher variance of family
ownership compared to publicly-traded family firms. Future studies are encouraged to
replicate this study in the privately-owned small- and medium- sized firms.
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In addition, note that this study excludes firms without at least five years
continuous observations. Such a treatment is to ensure that the calculation of strategic
persistence is meaningful. Nevertheless, it may also affect the generalabiliy of the
sampling, as newly founded firms or firms that are reluctant to release information to the
public may be excluded from the sample. Future studies may try to use primary data
collection in dealing with these issues.
Finally, this study chooses to focus on the 1996-2013 range in the analysis. Such a
period is not homogenous regarding economic growth as well as market competition,
which should provide enough variations in terms of strategic persistence as well as firm
performance. However, even given such a long and dynamic period, the primary results
remain significant. Future studies may further test the hypotheses in different periods.
Conclusion
To conclude, this essay intends to explore the antecedents and consequences of
strategic persistence in publicly-trade family business. The differences between family
and non-family firms as well as the heterogeneity among family firms themselves
presented in this essay can help scholars, family business members, and investors better
understand family involvement and how it affects strategic behaviors and firm
performances.
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ESSAY 2: FAMILY BUSINESS, DOMINANT STRATEGY AND FIRM
PERFORMANCE
Introduction
One critical yet under-researched strategy that family decision-makers must
consider is diversification (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), which involves the organization of
multiple business units under the control of a single corporation (Markowitz, 1968;
Rumelt, 1982; Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Diversification can be extremely
attractive to family businesses15, because it may reduce the overall business risk that a
family-owned-managed corporation is exposed to (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Yet the
current inquiry of diversification in the family business literature largely focuses on the
extent of diversification (Pukall & Calabrò, 2014), or the sequential pattern in which a
family business chooses to diversify (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). This leaves unexplored
inquiries related to the actual management of diversified units. It is not known, for
example, how family firms manage their diversified units, and how family management
of diversified units may impact performance in family businesses. Given the importance

15. Family firms are defined by a family’s involvement in firm ownership and management and the pursuit
of family-centered vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across generations (e.g.,
Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999).
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of diversification strategies in family businesses, this inquiry is critical and valuable to
both family business researchers and practitioners.
Drawing upon the literatures of the behavioral theory of the firm, diversification,
and family business, this study intends to explore the extent that a family business
chooses to use a dominant resource- allocation strategy among its diversified units, and
how this dominant strategy may affect family business performance. In this regard, a
dominant strategy is defined as a corporate-level strategy where similar patterns of
resource allocation are utilized among related16 diversified units in a multi-business
company (Lamberg et al., 2009; Turner & Rindova, 2012).
In this study, it is hypothesized that in comparison to non-family businesses,
family businesses are more likely to have a dominant strategy due to the presence of
family tradition, parsimony and family control in family-owned and –managed firms. It is
also hypothesized that firm age, organizational slack and family ownership will influence
the usage of a dominant strategy in family business. In the end, it is expected that a
dominant strategy will lead to better performance in family businesses relative to nonfamily businesses, especially for family firms with high family involvement in
management.
Thus, this essay intends to make several major contributions to the literature.
First, building upon the concept of dominant strategy in diversified corporations, this
essay develops theory on how family businesses may differ from non-family businesses,

16. This study follows Rumelt (1974) in using the portion of total revenue coming from a single business
segment based on SIC-2 code to classify related and unrelated business units. To address the fact that
resource are allocated among multiple areas in a business unit, three strategic dimensions are chosen for
each unit. More discussions can be found in the methodology section.
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and from one another in the manner in which they manage related diversification. Indeed,
family firms tend to formulate idiosyncratic strategies (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). However, the literature has never explored how a family
business realizes its strategy in terms of resource allocations in diversification (c.f. Hofer
& Schendel, 1978). This essay attempts to fill this gap by exploring whether and how
family businesses---in comparison to non-family businesses and one another---are more
likely to use a dominant strategy across diversified units. Second, there is an increasing
recognition that family businesses are heterogeneous in terms of firm behaviors and
performance (Chua et al., 2012). In this essay it is argued that related business units in a
family-owned corporation are rather homogenous in terms of allocations of key
resources. Hence within the boundary of a family firm, firm behaviors tend to converge
rather than diverge across business units. Third, this essay contributes to the
diversification literature (e.g. Harrison et al., 1993; Lamberg et al., 2009), as it proposes
that at least some family businesses may have unique ways to manage their diversified
units and may benefit from doing that. Finally, this essay contributes to an improved
understanding of family firm performance (e.g. Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Miller et al.,
2007), as the model suggests that the pursuit of a dominant strategy can be one
mechanism by which family governance contributes to firm performance.
This essay starts with an overview of the diversification literature followed by a
review of diversification in family business. Then it builds hypotheses related to family
business and dominant strategy. This essay also explore firm age, organizational slack
and family ownership as three antecedents related to dominant strategy in family
businesses. After that, this essay explores the relationship between dominant strategy and
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firm performance in family business. Then, the methodology, analytic results and
implications are discussed. This essay ends with discussions of theoretical implications,
limitations and conclusion.
Dominant Strategy in Related Diversification
Related diversification may bring in competitive advantages to organizations.
The relatedness of diversification refers to the existence of similarities among products,
markets and/or technologies across diversified business units (Miller, 2006; Pehrsson,
2006; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005; Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987). Relatedness
in diversification can create synergies when a firm shares production factors across
related business units (Goold & Luchs, 1993; Markides & Williamson, 1994; Rumelt,
1974, 1982; Teece, 1980). Indeed, when managed properly, relatedness should result in
superior performance such that the whole multi-business corporation is more profitable
than the sum of the individual business units (Kanter, 1989; Porter, 1985).
Although there are numerous studies supporting the superiority of related
diversification (Hitt et al., 2006; Rumelt, 1982; Mille, 2006), a substantial body of
empirical research have found no significant relationship between diversification strategy
and performance (Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Grant et al., 1988). In order to
explore this “paradox”, some theorists argue that the organization of related business
units is at least as important as diversifying into related businesses (Hill & Hoskisson,
1987; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Shayne Gary, 2005). Indeed, although synergy can
result from relatedness, achieving synergy depends upon proper management (Grant,
1988; Hill et al., 1992; Markides & Williamson, 1996).
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One appealing argument in this inquiry is that there should be a dominant strategy
in all related business units so that synergy can be created (Grant, 1988; Hoskisson &
Hitt, 1990; Prehalad & Bettis, 1986). As Mahoney and Pandian contend, "a rich
connection among the firm's resources, distinctive competencies and mental models or
‘dominant logic’…of the managerial team drives the diversification process" (1992,
p.365). Indeed, resource allocations across units need to be coherent to ensure the
creation and sustainability of competitive advantage (Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Nath &
Sudharstnan, 1994; Sirmon et al., 2007, 2010). Given the assumption that strategy
concerns the acquisition, mobilization, utilization and divestment of resources (Hofer &
Schendel, 1978; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Sirmon et al., 2007, 2011; Wernerfelt,
1984), a dominant strategy can be defined as a corporation-level strategy that involves
similar patterns of resource allocations among related business units in a diversified
multi-business company (Lamberg et al., 2009; Palich et al., 2000; Turner & Rindova,
2012).
To sum up, the diversification literature often assumes diversifying into related
businesses is sufficient to create competitive advantage, while a dominant strategy
perspective recognizes that related units need to be properly organized in order to create
superior performance at the corporation level (Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; Govindarajan,
1988; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Hoskisson et al., 1991). In this regard, a dominant
strategy can be conceptualized as a special form of relatedness occurring in the manner
that resources are located across related business units (Harrison et al., 1993).
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Family Business and Diversification
Due to the particular focus in this essay, it is critical to review the diversification
literature in family businesses. The literature remains controversial in terms of whether
family business diversifies more or less (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010), but there appears to be
a consensus that there are two primary drivers that distinguish diversification decisions
between family and non-family firms: family-centered goals and family-endowed
resources.
Family-centered goals refer to those coming from family owner-managers or
other influential family members that affect strategic decision-making in a family firm
(Berrone et al., 2012; Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al., 2012; Chua et al., 2012). Those
goals include not only family-centered non-economic goals (Chrisman et al., 2012;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), but also the family’s economic concerns regarding the
creation and accumulation of family wealth (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman et al.,
2003). Family-centered non-economic goals include the preservation of the family’s
authority and influence in business, the emotional value of owning a firm, family
members’ identification with the firm, the closeness and cohesion among family
members, and renewal of family bonds to the firm through dynastic succession (Berrone
et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; Zellweger & Astrachan, 2008). There are several
mechanisms by which family-centered goals may impact the extent of diversification in
family business.
Firstly, the separation of ownership and control leads to information asymmetries
and contractual problems, giving rise to the potential for agency conflicts between
shareholders and managers (Jensen, 1994). However, family businesses are different
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from other firms as owners and managers are more likely to belong to the same family or
families (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1994). Thus, diversification is less likely to be
embraced by family-owned and -managed firms because controlling families are often
risk-averse (Gallo et al., 2004) and refuse to engage in risky strategies such as
diversification (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Chrisman & Patel, 2012). Diversification may
also require the introduction of external investment and/or the employment of non-family
experts, both of which may dilute family control (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, family owner-managers tend to have fast decision-making processes and
often possess shared vision in strategic decisions (Carney, 2005). That would suggest that
when family owner-managers decide to diversify, the decision-making process in the
business system can be faster and the implementation of diversification decisions more
efficient than those in a non-family business setting (Tsang, 2002).
Furthermore, scholars recognize that family businesses are unique, as the family’s
involvement endows the business with family-based resources. In this sense, the
interaction of family units, the business entity and individual members (Gersick, et al.,
1997), can lead to competitive advantages in family firms (Pearson et al., 2008). For
instance, Habbershon and Williams (1999) and Habbershon et al. (2003) argue that a
family’s involvement in business may bring in distinctive resources unavailable to nonfamily firms, such as those based on human, social, patient, survivability, and governance
capital (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Following the logic of the resource-based view of the firm
(e.g. Barney, 1991), if resource attributes in an organization affect the process of strategic
decision-making (Wernerfelt, 1984), then the family-endowed resources should affect the
extent as well as the pattern of diversification in family firms (Carr & Bateman, 2009).
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Indeed, it has been argued that family firms possess certain relation-based capital
either among family members or with its stakeholders such as trust, altruism and social
connections (Pearson et al., 2008; Zahra, 2003). This source of capital can positively
influence relationships within the family as well as relationships with non-family
stakeholders, including non-family managers, customers, business partners, governmental
institutions, etc. (Zellweger & Nason, 2008). This source of capital may contribute to
diversification as it increases the coordination among business units in family business as
well as the collaboration between a family business and its stakeholders (Zahra, 2003).
On the other hand, family-endowed human resources are characterized by high levels of
specificity meaning family managers often possess deep knowledge, but only in certain
strategic areas (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Hence, the specificity of family human resource
may limit the scope of diversification in family business (Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010).
Although not documented directly, the literature implies that family firms may
follow a generic approach in designing diversification strategies (Graves & Thomas,
2006, 2008). For instance, family businesses tend to diversify sequentially and are more
likely to diversify in international markets that are geographically or culturally close to
their headquarters (Claver et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). This would suggest
that family firms differ from non-family ones not only in the extent to which they
diversify but also in the way that they try to manage their diversified units.
Unfortunately, firm diversification is still an understudied research area in the
family business literature (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010; Pukall & Calabrò, 2014). In
particular, most studies have focused on the extent of diversification rather than the
management of diversification in multiple business units. In addition, conflicting findings
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concerning family businesses and diversification may be due to the fact that family firms
manage diversification differently from non-family firms. The topic of this essay may
have the potential to fill these gaps.
Hypothesis Development: Family Business and Dominant Strategy in Related
Diversification
Theoretical Framework
There appears to be few if any studies in the family business literature that
explicitly explore the management of diversified units or a dominant strategy in related
diversification. In addition, existing studies of diversification in family business remains
controversial in terms of whether family businesses diversify more or less, as well as the
performance consequences of diversification in family firms (Kontinen & Ojala, 2010).
Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that the management of diversification is still an
understudied research area in the family business literature (Pukall & Calabrò, 2014).
Due to the uniqueness of family businesses, it is rather naive to directly borrow
theories from non-family business settings (Berrone et al., 2012; Chua et al., 1999;
Gedajlovic et al., 2012). In addition, the literature suggests that family firms have
heterogeneous goals, resources and governance structures (Carney, 2005; Chrisman et al.,
2005; Chua et al., 2012). Indeed, strategic decisions in family businesses are often
initiated by family-centered goals (Chrisman et al., 2012), supported by family-endowed
resources (Habbershon & Williams, 1999) and implemented by the family’s dominant
position in corporation governance (Carney, 2005). Accordingly, this paper follows a
behavioral perspective (Cybert & March, 1963). Such a perspective assumes that a
family’s strategic decisions are influenced by the family’s intention of achieving family79

centered non-economic goals that create or preserve its socio-emotional wealth17
(Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2011).
Furthermore, this perspective assumes that family governance is a necessary condition for
the controlling family to realize its strategy in the organization (Carney, 2005). In other
words, without strong family control, the presence of family-centered goals and/or
family-endowed resources may not significantly influence strategic actions in family
business simply because the family does not have the ability to do so (De Massis et al.,
2014). In the end, the performance consequence of a specific strategic action is also
influenced by the organization of resources such that a structure that may facilitate
coordination of multiple tasks should lead to superior performance (Hofer & Schendel,
1978; Jones & Hill, 1988). This point is especially critical to diversification as the
creation of synergy in diversification often results from coordination of resources in
diversified yet related business units (Agarwal et al., 2012; Rawley, 2010; Zhou, 2011).
According to this perspective, the owning-family’s management of
diversification, such as using a dominant strategy in related diversification, is driven by
its willingness to maintain family tradition and its intention to invest parsimoniously,
being supported by family’s control over the business. In addition, it is expected that
family management also serve as a unique type of governance of resource management
that may facilitate the coordination of related business units in diversification, hence
dominant strategy should lead to better performance given high family involvement in
daily management.

17. Socio-emotional wealth refers to non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of members in the
controlling families (Berrone et al., 2012).
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The following section hypothesizes that relative to non-family businesses, family
businesses are more likely to have a dominant strategy in related diversification than nonfamily businesses.
Family Business and Dominant Strategy
To begin, family-owned-managed businesses are characterized by family tradition
in the business system (Berrone et al., 2012). Family tradition is chosen because it lies at
the center of the family’s socio-emotional or non-economic concerns (Berrone et al.,
2005), and also because it is directly related to the continuity of family’s control over
generations (Tagiuri & Davis, 1992).
Indeed, family tradition consists of preservation, constancy, and durability
(Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011), and concerns the preservation of long-standing aspirations
and legacy in the family system (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005; Gersick et al., 1997),
ensures the constancy of family image and reputation in the eye of non-family
stakeholders and local community (Berrone et al., 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013),
and directly relates to the family’s intention to maintain control of the business,
especially across multiple generations (Miller et al., 2003; Le Breton-Miller et al., 2004).
Also, maintaining a strong family tradition may facilitate the rise of an individual family
member’s identification of “belongingness” to the family (Zellweger et al., 2010),
strengthen a family member’s emotional attachment with the business (Miller & Le
Breton-Miller, 2005), and enhance the legitimacy that the business system adopts for the
benefits of the individual family member (Schulze et al., 2001, 2003). Combined, it
appears that family tradition is important to both the owning family and individual family
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members (Sharma, 2004), and is strongly related to the owning family’s non-economic
goals and socio-emotional wealth (Berrone et al., 2012; Chrisman et al., 2012).
So, the presence of family tradition in business should strengthen a dominant
strategy in related diversification. Firstly, family tradition may give rise to rigid mindsets
of family decision-makers (König et al., 2013). The intention to maintain family tradition
is based on the belief that that which is long-lasting has value to both the family and the
business (Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). Hence mental rigidity may make family decisionmakers less open to new and alternative options (Chandler, 1962) and have whatever has
been used in the past, unless the family’s non-economic or socio-emotional goals have
been threaten (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2013). Indeed, family
decision-makers often continue existing mindsets in terms of the heuristic principals used
in interpreting information as well as sorting possible alternative solutions (Gedajlovic et
al., 2004). For the concern of diversification, family decision-makers often choose to
diversify into areas that are similar to existing businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
Using the same rationale, it is reasonable to assume that family decision-makers will
continue the management approaches and practices used in existing businesses, leading to
the rise of a dominant strategy in related diversification.
In addition, an owning-family may have incentives to build family image and
reputation (Berrone et al., 2010; Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013), especially for the local
community and other external stakeholders who are important to the economic and noneconomic success of the owning-family (Sharma & Manikuti, 2005; Zahra, 2010). On the
other hand, the strength of family image and reputation in a multi-business family
corporation can be further enhanced via the congruence of strategic actions across
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individual business units (Carter, 2006; Highhouse et al., 2009). Put differently, to build a
prominent family image and reputation, the owning family could intentionally manipulate
strategic actions in multiple business units, such as diversifying into related businesses
and choosing to use exiting patterns of resource allocation in managing newly acquired
businesses. Thus, due to the presence of family tradition, family businesses are more
likely to build dominant strategy in related diversification in comparison to non-family
businesses.
Another reason behind the pursuit of a dominant strategy in family business is the
family’s tendency of being parsimonious in resource utilization. Unless it is unavoidable,
owning families are often parsimonious in utilizing resources, because a large amount of
resources in the business comes from the family system, and the family attempts to
optimize the utilization of their resources (Carney, 2005). This would suggest that the
owning family may be motivated to reduce unnecessary expenses and/or favor strategies
that requires less additional investment. Diversifying into new areas and/or using new
ways to manage diversified units often require extensive resource investments in research
and development, production capacity, advertisement and administration (Chatterjee &
Wernerfelt, 1991). Furthermore, building dominant strategy across related business units
may be beneficial for family owner-managers, as they don't need to design idiosyncratic
practices and routines for each unit (Lampel & Shamsie, 2000), and administrative
experience in existing business units can be easily transferred into new ones (Agarwal et
al., 2012; Breschi et al., 2003; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005).
In addition, to the arguments above, the pursuit of dominant strategy in family
business is also supported by the family’s control of the business. Indeed, family control
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is a necessary condition to transfer the family’s concerns of family tradition and resource
parsimony into actual firm behaviors (Cyert & March, 1963). Family control may help
facilitate the rise of a dominant strategy in related diversification for two primary reasons.
First, family owner-managers have power, discretion, and legitimacy in the
dominant coalition in a family business, making their personalized goals more likely to
be transmitted into the business system (Carney, 2005). This suggests that decisionmakers in diversified units are more likely to behave in accordance with the owning
family’s goals and concerns such as maintaining family tradition and being parsimonious
in resource investment, making dominant strategy more likely to arise.
Second, a definitive feature of a family business is the family’s tendency to
maintain its control. In this sense, family firms may intentionally avoid hiring non-family
professional executives (McConaughy, 2000) or borrowing monetary resources from
external sources (Anderson et al., 2003; Chua et al., 2011) as these practices would dilute
family’s direct control over firm operation (McConaughy et al., 1998). On the other hand,
diversifying into new areas or using new ways to manage diversified units often depends
upon skills and knowledge from professional executives as well as extra financial
resources coming from external institutes (Kochhar & Hitt, 1998; Kor & Leblebici,
2005). One potential solution is to diversify into similar areas, which by definition should
increase the relatedness of diversification in family businesses (Gomez-Mejia et al.,
2010). At the same time, family firms may choose to replicate what hsd been used before
in newly acquired businesses especially in related ones, leading to the rise of dominant
strategy in related diversification.
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Taken all the aforementioned together, because of the unique combination of
family tradition, parsimony and family control, family firms are more likely to use
similar resource allocations across their related business units than non-family firms.
Hypothesis 1: Family businesses are more likely to have a dominant strategy across
related multiple business units than non-family businesses.
Hypothesis Development: Heterogeneity of Family Business and Dominant Strategy
Family businesses are heterogeneous due to idiosyncratic goals, resources, and
governance structures aligned with the family’s involvement in business (Chua et al.,
2012). One remaining question is what causes the variance of the use of dominant
strategy in the family business population. Framed differently, what are the conditions
that make some family firms more likely to embrace such a strategic choice compared to
other family firms? Indeed, it is possible that some family firms perceive family tradition
as being more important, are more parsimonious in resource investment, and have more
power in decision-making compared to others. Consistent with the theoretical framework
mentioned above, firm age, organizational slack, and family ownership should be
relevant to the use of a dominant strategy in family business.
Firm Age
Firm age is an important research focus in the strategic management literature
(Durand & Coeurderoy, 2001; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Indeed, scholars have long
claimed that organizations tend to become rigid and slow to change when they grow older
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984). As firms age, the behaviors of decision-makers become
increasingly guided by institutionalized norms and habits (Deephouse, 1996). In
particular, firms may develop well-embedded, robust routines derived from prior
85

operating experiences (Nelson & Winter, 1982), and pre-existing rules are increasingly
used to understand their environment (Daft & Weick, 1984). Hence rigidity should be
higher in older than younger firms (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). The same rationale can be
applied to family firms, as relative to younger family firms, older ones would become
more rigid in using family-centered practices and routines which are guided by family
tradition. Indeed, while non-family firms only become inflexible in the business system,
family firms become inflexible in both the family and the business systems (Gersick et
al., 1997). In this regard, the preservation and continuity of family tradition in the family
system would further facilitate the adoption of family tradition in the business system
(Arregle et al., 2007). Hence, the use of a dominant strategy is expected to be greater in
older compared to younger family firms, as older ones are more rigid in using familycenters traditions in strategic decision-making such as diversification.
Furthermore, more family members tend to be involved in firm management
when family firms get older (Gersick et al., 1997). The inclusion of new family members
would make family tradition more salient, as these family members are born, educated
and groomed within family tradition. Thus, older family firms are more likely to embrace
dominant strategy because more family members are included in the business, while
these members are natural agents of family traditions. Although arguably there may be
some especially late-generation junior family members who are unwilling to follow what
other family members are doing, strong social connections among family members make
these divergent behaviors more likely to be found, while strong family-centered norms
may pose high social pressure upon those family members to conform (Pollak, 1985). Put
Differently, strong family connections and norms have the potential to strengthen family
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tradition over time. As a comparison, non-family business may also have new members
joining in over time, but these members often have diverse backgrounds and experiences
hence their participations may weaken rather than strengthen the tradition in the
organization (Schneider et al., 1995).
In sum, it appears that the effect of family tradition should be stronger in older
family firms. Thus:
Hypothesis 2a: Firm age is positively related to the use of a dominant strategy in the
diversification of family firms.
Organizational Slack
Organizational slack refers to organizational resources that are embedded in the
firm as costs which are greater than those needed by the firm (Singh, 1986). Examples of
organizational slack include excessive stocks of cash and securities (Greve, 2003). In this
matter, firms may employ more individuals than necessary to operate effectively year
round to provide a cushion or buffer from disruptions in output (Cyert & March, 1963).
As mentioned above, one distinguishing feature of family business is resource
parsimony (Carney, 2005). Nonetheless, not all family firms are alike, and some may be
more parsimonious than others. Given the fact that parsimony concerns the efficiency of
resource utilization, a high level of organizational slack in family business would signal a
lower level of resource parsimony in the owning family (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al.,
2008).
Following this rationale, organizational slack should negatively relate to the use
of a dominant strategy in family business. Indeed, increasing investment in organizational
slack suggests that some family business are less parsimonious than others. Although
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family firms tend to avoid specific non-deployable investments, some may choose to do
so anyway due to threats to family-centered socio-emotional wealth (Chrisman & Patel,
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007, 2013). Given the fact that resource parsimony is an
important factor driving the use of a dominant strategy, the increase of organizational
slack would be negatively associated with the use of a dominant strategy in related
diversification, meaning family firms with higher organizational slack would be less
likely to use a dominant strategy. Hence:
Hypothesis 2b: Organizational slack is negatively related to the use of a dominant
strategy in the diversification of family firms.
Family Ownership
Family firms vary by the extent of families’ involvement in ownership (Arregle et
al., 2012). Indeed, the extent of controlling family ownership may significantly impact
the decision-making process, as it directly relates to the extent that the dominant coalition
considers the family’s interests in making decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013; Mitchell
et al., 1997). This suggests that idiosyncratic firm decisions resulting from family’s
involvement in business is more salient given high family ownership compared to those
with low family ownership.
Indeed, the increase of family ownership in family business could provide power
and legitimacy to family owner-managers (Carney, 2005). In addition, the increase of
family ownership should strengthen the salience of family interests and concerns in
family business decisions such as the use of a dominant strategy in related diversification
(Chrisman et al., 2012). On the other hand, non-family owners may have concerns that
are not necessarily aligned with the non-economic interests of the owning family
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(Gedajlovic et al., 2004). In this regard, non-family owners put more attention on growth
in their investments, which is more aligned with a higher level of diversification and
probably a more idiosyncratic way of managing each business unit. Although these nonfamily owners are not as powerful as family owner-managers, the presence of non-family
blockholder or institutional investors may still be a hindrance, mitigating family influence
on strategic decisions such as diversification (Arregle et al., 2012).
Combined, it is expected that relative to family firms with lower family
ownership, those with higher family ownership should have more power as a result of
less hindrance coming from non-family owners.
Hypothesis 2c: Family ownership is positively related to the use of a dominant
strategy in the diversification of family firms.
Hypothesis Development: Dominant Strategy and Firm Performance
Regarding the consequence of pursuing a dominant strategy in family business, it
is still not well known how a dominant strategy in related diversification affects family
firm performance. As will be further discussed below, based upon the coordination and
the resource management literature, it is argued that governance structure in familyowned and -managed business features better internal mobilization of resources thus
lower coordination cost in diversification, hence facilitate the creation of synergy through
a dominant strategy. This section intends to review relevant literature and develop
hypotheses that link dominant strategy to firm performance in family business.
Resource Management and Coordination Cost
According to Teece (1980, p.224), “diversification can represent a mechanism for
capturing integration economies associated with the simultaneous supply of inputs
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common to a number of production processes geared to distinct final product markets.” In
this sense, synergy is created when a firm shares input factors across multiple lines of
business (Rumelt, 1982). Accordingly, it is generally believed that related diversification
is preferable to unrelated or less related diversification because more inputs/resources can
be shared and better synergy of resource utilization can be created in related
diversification (Markides & Williamson, 1994; Miller, 2006).
The center of synergy creation lies in the sharing and free mobilization of key
resources across business units (Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1980). So using a dominant
strategy in related diversification can improve firm performance for a number of reasons.
First, a dominant strategy across units itself is a critical organizational resource. Indeed,
diversification often demands highly-specialized administrative resources or skills (Aiken
& Hage, 1968), which are often not divisible and difficult to share across units (Penrose,
1959). Hence a dominant strategy in related diversification can improve corporate-level
performance, because individual business units in this instance do not need to build
idiosyncratic individual-based administrative strategy for each unit (Lampel & Shamsie,
2000). Second, a dominant strategy in related diversification can be perceived as a pattern
of thinking in organizing resources, which may reduce physical and mental boundaries of
resource transfer across business units. Resources here include tangible resources such as
technology, employees, facilities, etc. as well as intangible resources such as
organizational knowledge, culture, identity, etc. (Barney, 1986; Fiol, 2001; Grant, 1996;
Harrison et al., 1991). Indeed, the successful transfer of intangible resources across
business units has been highlighted as a key factor contributing to the effectiveness of
diversification strategy (Agarwa net al., 2012; Breschi et al., 2003; Tanriverdi &
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Venkatraman, 2005). Thus, a shared dominant strategy in related diversification may
signal similar routines and practices under which resources are managed. In this regard,
resources can be easily shed, leveraged and re-bundled as business units all share the
same routines and practices in organizing these resources.
Nevertheless, having a dominant strategy in related diversification does not
necessarily ensure superior performance as there may be coordination problems
remaining. Here, coordination problems refer to barriers that may hinder resource
mobilizations and leveraging across business units. Indeed, under a dominant strategy,
although diversified business units may use similar patterns of resource distribution,
managers may still have varying cognitions regarding what they are supposed to do. In
addition, managers may have insufficient communication with each other and not fully
understand the dynamics across multiple units. Lastly, managers may have conflicts
which hinder resource sharing and mobilization across units. Hence, superior
performance can be better achieved in dominant strategy when the company applies an
appropriate governance structure to manage coordination (Datta, 1991; Larsson &
Finkelstein, 1999; Pablo, 1994).
Sharing common inputs creates interdependencies between business lines (Gupta
& Govindarajan, 1984). It requires joint designing, joint scheduling, and mutual
adjustments, as well as setting transfer prices and designing incentive schemes
(Williamson, 1981). Consequently, interdependencies in diversification challenge three
fundamental elements of coordination: problem framing, communication and conflict
resolution in the top management team (TMT) (Marschak & Radner, 1972). Problem
framing refers to the interpretation of the focal problem in terms of potential causes and
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alternative solutions in the mindsets of top managers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986; Yeo,
1995). Accordingly, coherent problem framing in a top management team could reduce
coordination problems resulting from cognitive divergences in the side of top managers
(Amason & Sapienza, 1997). Communication means the exchange of personal options as
well as the sharing of information in order to reducing information asymmetry within
TMT (Priem, 1990). Conflict resolution refers to formal and informal approaches
occupied by the focal organization to mitigate or diminish inter-personal conflicts in the
TMT (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Simons & Peterson, 2000). These three elements refer to
coordination problems stemming from cognitive divergence, miscommunication, and
conflict among top managers (Mitchell et al., 2011). In other words, coordination costs in
related diversification may increase if top managers do not have coherent problem
framing, do not have sufficient communication, and/or have conflicts with each other.
Such a perspective assumes that managers in the TMT are largely in charge of
coordinating activities in diversified business units, especially related ones. This
assumption is built upon the fact that diversified units, although directly managed by
middle-level executives in each unit, often follow orders and instructions from top
managers (Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Hence coordination among diversified units is
directly determined by coordination among the TMT (Kogut & Zander, 1996. Martinez &
Jarillo, 1989). One notable feature of family business is the family’s involvement in the
top management team, which not only transmits the owning family’s goals and concerns
into firm’s decision-making (Chrisman et al., 2012), but also provides power and
legitimacy to ensure these startegic decisions are being implemented (Carney, 2005).
This essay hypothesizes that firms with high family management are better at problem
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framing, communication and conflict resolution, and hence have lower coordination cost
and superior performance when using a dominant strategy in related diversification.
Problem Framing
Coordination costs in diversified business units initially stem from the divergence
of the cognitions of top managers in framing a strategic problem. Arguably all strategic
decisions stem from cognitions framed on top managers’ mindsets (Gioia & Chittipeddi,
1991). It is a manager’s cognition that allows comprehension of the complexity of threats
and opportunities in the environment (Rainbow & Sullivan, 1987; Thomas & McDaniel,
1990), as well as the formulation of solutions that take advantage of business
opportunities and/or to cope with environmental threats (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991).
Indeed, cognition allows managers to “categorize an event, assess its consequences, and
consider appropriate actions (including doing nothing), and to do so rapidly and often
efficiently” (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986, p.489). Nevertheless, top managers often hold
distinctive, and in under some circumstances even conflicting, beliefs about internal and
external contexts (Health et al., 1998), and problems of coordination may result from that
(Wilson & Brekke, 1994). It is found that TMTs with high diversity (e.g. Horwitz &
Horwitz, 2007) of past experience (Mitchell et al., 2011), demographics (Klenke, 2003)
and education (Simons et al., 1999) may have high cognitive divergence in framing
problems. This in turn may result in high costs in coordinating firm activities even in
related diversification, as top managers may hold idiosyncratic beliefs about what they
are supposed to do (Martinez & Jarillo, 1989; Rawley, 2010).
On the other hand, family managers, compared to non-family managers, are more
likely to frame problems in a coherent manner for two reasons. Firstly, family members
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often have shared vision and language due to their long embeddedness in the family
system (Adler & Kwon, 2002), hence they are more likely to have similar systems of
meaning, interpretations and representations in handling day-to-day business (Pearson et
al., 2008). In comparison, managers in non-family settings, due to their distinctive
personal beliefs, educational backgrounds and working experiences, are more likely to
have different cognitions for framing problems. Secondly, family managers often use the
collective interest of the whole family as their primary reference point in framing
problems (Pollak, 1985). In this regard, family managers often have converging
cognitions regarding what best aligns with the interest of the family, and engage in
behaviors that protect or fulfill family-centered interests, such as formulating and
implementing a dominant strategy in related diversification to preserve family image and
family reputation (Berrone et al., 2010). On the other hand, non-family managers are
motivated to a great extent by their personal interests, which are by nature divergent from
each other (Jensen & Meckling, 1994).
Combined, both points appear to suggest that, relative to non-family managers,
family managers will have a higher level of similarity of cognition in framing problems.
This is to suggest that family firm’s advantages in coherent problem framing may
improve the performance of a dominant strategy. Indeed, having a dominant strategy does
not automatically ensure managers understand what to do to implement such a strategy.
Coherent problem framing in family business would reduce the coordination costs
associated with divergent understandings among family managers, which potentially
improves the effectiveness of a dominant strategy.
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Communication
Communication refers to the exchange of personal opinions and business
information among managers. One advantage of using a dominant strategy in related
diversification is that similarity of strategic activities across units may facilitate resource
sharing and mobilizing among related units (Sirmon et al., 2007). In addition,
communication may facilitate knowledge transfer, which allows knowledge gained in one
business unit to be applied to problems being experienced in another unit (Agarwal et al.,
2012). On the other hand, miscommunication may lead to problems in coordination, as
managers often receive inconsistent, even conflicting, information regarding what others
are doing and what they are supposed to react (Bergh, 1998).
Relative to non-family managers, family managers may have fewer
communication problems for two reasons. First, family managers often have formal and
informal channels of information flow, which are not likely to be shared by all managers
in a non-family business setting (Pearson et al., 2008). This would suggest that besides
communication channels in business, family managers may have additional and often
informal ways to share opinions and exchange information in the family system
(Hoffman et al., 2006). While arguably some non-family managers may also have
informal communications, it is not likely that all of them share the same informal
network of communication. Second, there is a large network overlap among family
managers compared to non-family managers, meaning that even without intra-family
communication, family managers are still more likely to get homogenous information
compared to non-family managers.
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Similar to coherent problem framing, frequent communication is expected to help
the implementation of a dominant strategy in family business. Indeed, by communicating
with each other, family managers may gather more information about what diversified
units are doing, which may help to understand how resources should be mobilized and
shared across units. This would in turn assure the creation of synergy among related units
given a dominant strategy.
Conflict Resolution
It is certainly possible that top managers may have conflicts with each other
(Simons & Peterson, 2000). Compared to non-family managers, family managers are
expected to have more and better methods to resolve inter-personal conflicts for several
reasons.
First, by nature, non-family managers are often driven by their personal interests
while family managers are more likely to be influenced by the collective interest of the
whole family (Carney, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 1994). Indeed, individual family
members often perceive themselves as part of the owning family (Zellweger et al., 2010),
feeling that the family business’ success is their own success (Berrone et al., 2012).
Hence ceteris paribus interest divergence is higher among non-family managers
compared to family managers, which may in turn result in more inter-personal conflicts
among non-family managers. In addition, as mentioned above, family managers have
informal as well as formal communication channels, which are absent among non-family
managers (Pearson et al., 2008). This would suggest that frequent communications
among family members may partially resolve conflicts stemming from information
asymmetry among family managers. Lastly, there are strong family-centered norms in the
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family system, making family managers being motivated and/or obligated to behave
according to the best interest of the whole family (Chrisman et al., 2012; Eddleston &
Kellermanns, 2007; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004; Pearson et al., 2008). Although
arguably there may be some family members who are unwilling to understand or follow
what other family members are doing, strong social connections among family members
make these divergent behaviors more likely to be found, while strong family-centered
norms may pose high social pressure upon those family members to conform (Pollak,
1985). Differently put, strong family norms have the potential to resolve intra-family
conflicts over time.
Family firm’s advantage in conflict resolution may help the implementation of a
dominant strategy for two reasons. First, given the fact that top managers are often in
charge of different units, conflict among top managers may give rise to antagonism
among related business units, which in turn weakens resource sharing/mobilization across
units and eventually hinder the synergy creation stemming from a dominant strategy
(Hansen et al., 2005). Second, better methods of conflict resolution in family business
may further contribute to coherent problem framing and effective communication, both of
which are expected to support the implementation of a dominant strategy as mentioned
above (Ensley et al., 2002).
In sum, insights from problem framing, communication and conflict resolution all
taken, it is expected that family involvement in a business should strengthen the positive
effect of a dominant strategy on firm performance.
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Family Management
To this point, this essay proposes that in comparison to non-family business, the
family business is a better form of governance to appropriate rent from a dominant
strategy in related diversification. To justify this point, this essay suggests that family
business can mitigate problems of problem framing, communication and conflict
resolution in coordinating related business units in diversification, which is built upon the
assumption that interactions among family managers may lead to less coordination
problems. Nevertheless, not all family firms have a large number of family members
involved in management. Indeed, the growth of the business may surpass the growth of
the family hence the family may not have sufficient members to fill top managerial
positions (Illias, 2006). In addition, some family members may prefer to stay in
ownership instead of managerial positions (Gersick et al., 1997). In this instance family
businesses may vary by family’s involvement in management. Following the rationale
above, it is expected that the higher family involvement in management the fewer the
coordination problems that should occur in using dominant strategy in related
diversification. That would suggest that compared to family businesses with low family
involvement in management, those with high involvement should have better
performance stemming from the use of a dominant strategy in related diversification.
Hence it is expected:
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive interaction between family management and
dominant strategy on firm performance in family firms.
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Methodology
Data
The sample is composed of manufacturing firms listed in the S&P 1500 index
from 1996 to 2013 with at least five years of continuous information available. Utility
and service firms are excluded owing to differences in government regulations and
feasible diversification options of these firms compared to manufacturing firms. Such
exclusion ensures greater homogeneity in the sample. The data is longitudinal in nature.
The 1996 to 2013 period is used because it covers the “Internet Bubble” and financial
crisis periods in which firms’ diversification are likely to vary. Hence dominant strategy
and firm performance should have sufficient variation in the sample. In addition, this
range covers periods used in previous studies on family businesses (Anderson & Reeb
2003; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester & Cannella, 2007) as well as observations in
recent years. Firms without at least five years of continuous information are also
excluded, because the measure of dominant strategy by nature requires sustained
operation of the business units over an extended period of time.
To identify founding families, and the role of those families in a firm (as part of
the top management team and/or board of directors), information in Hoover’s,
ExecuComp, Fundinguniverse.com, ancestry.com, firm websites, and company proxy
statements are collected. Measures related to corporate governance and family business
such as family ownership and family management are obtained from annual firm proxy
reports. Other variables including dominant strategy primarily come from the Historical
Segment in the Compustat database. To ensure the direction of causality, one-year lags
between the dependent variable and other variables are used. Also for all models,
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dependent variables are adjusted by industry-averages, so that industry-specific effects
can be mitigated.
In total, initial data collection generates 848 firms representing 13,401 firm-years
observations from 1996 to 2013 for further cleaning. Nevertheless, missing data,
especially those in the historical segment database in compustat reduces the actual sample
size to 288 firms representing 2,296 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2013. This large
amount of missing data is due to the need to calculate the variable of dominant strategy
on all related business units in the corporation. Note that, instead of coding them as 0,
missing data is excluded. Such a treatment ensures that the estimates are not biased by
misrepresentation of observations in the sample. However, as will be further discussed
below, such a treatment does not significantly affect the proportions of family firms and
lone-founder firms as well as the average of other statistics (e.g. Miller et al., 2007). In
addition, t-tests reveal that there are no significant differences in key statistics between
the observations included and not included. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the
sample is generally representative of publicly-traded manufacturing firms in North
America. It is also worth noting that the actual sample size for each model varies due to
missing data and the loss of time-series observations in manipulating the time lag
between the dependent and other variables.
Independent and Dependent Variables
The primary independent variable is the family business measure. Although the
definition of family business is not universally agreed (Chrisman et al., 2005; GomezMejia et al., 2011), the literature generally measures family business via family
ownership and family management. Thus, family business is defined by a family’s
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involvement in ownership and management, which help transfer owning family’s vision
into firm behaviors (e.g. Chua et al., 1999). This implies that family management is at
least as important as family ownership, because it is the medium through which the
owning family can transmit its goals and endow its resources into the firm’s operations
(Chrisman et al., 2012).
Consistent with this definition, family business is measured as a binary variable in
which 1 indicates that the focal firm has at least 5 % family ownership, at least two
family members who are or have been significant owners, top managers, or directors in
the firm’s history, and at least one family member who is currently involved in the TMT
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2013; Miller et
al., 2007) 18 19. All firms that do not meet this condition are considered non-family firms
and are coded as 0. This definition highlights the involvement of multiple family
members in ownership and management, thus ensuring the presence of high possibility of
intra-family succession in business. Such a definition also ensures that family firms can
be differentiated from either lone-founder firms, which by definition do not have multiple
family members involved in the business, or from non-family blockholder-controlled
firms in which the significant owners are neither family members nor founders.
The dependent variable used to test H1 and H2a, b, c is the extent of use of a
dominant strategy in related diversification. This variable is also the independent variable
in testing H3. The measurement of this variable is relevant to the classification of related

18, For a robustness test, family business is also measured as firms with at least 5 % family ownership, at
least two family members historically involved, and at least one family member currently employed as
either CEO or chairman. Regression results are similar to the primary results.
19, A continuous measure of family ownership is also used in testing H1. Regression results are supportive
of H1.
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business, so the first step is to specify the level of relatedness of business units in a
diversified company. This essay follows Montgomery (1982), Jacquemin and Berry
(1979), and Rumelt (1974) in specifying that relatedness exists when at least 50%20 of
total revenue (i.e. sales) comes from a single business segment based on SIC 2-digit code.
Consistent with the definition above, in each related business unit three strategic
dimensions related to resource investments are calculated: (1) research and development
intensity (R&D/sales in the unit), (2) capital intensity (capital expenditure/sales in the
unit), and (3) nonproduction overhead (selling, general, and administrative [SGA]
expenses/sales in the unit) (Carpenter, 2000; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Previous
studies have used these three variables in exploring strategic behaviors across business
units (Harrison et al., 1991, 1993). Furthermore, these three dimensions cover the
primary strategic areas of R&D, production, and administration. Thus, the combination of
these dimensions should reflect strategic action in each unit. Note that advertisement
intensity is not included because publicly-trade firms often associate advertisement
expenses in their headquarters rather than diversified units. In addition, nonproduction
overhead includes selling expense, which is a significant piortion in the overall marketing
expense. Only those in related business units are used in the calculations.
For each dimension, the standard deviation (S.D.) across all related business units
is calculated. In total, this step leaves three S.D.s. Because S.D.s may be based on
different scales, they must be standardized. Finally, the extent of a dominant strategy is
calculated by the inverse of the average of these three standardized variables (S.D.s). The

20, 30% and 70% area also used as thresholds. Calculated variables are almost identical to the one based on
50%.
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inverse value is used because S.D. measures the variance of a variable, meaning its
inverse value would be a good measure of consistency of this variables, and that is
naturally linked to the definition of dominant strategy.
This variable is continuous in nature as it intends to capture the extent of the use
of a dominant strategy across related business units. If revenue coming from the largest
group of business units is less than 50%, the firm-year observation is excluded from the
sample. In other words, this yearly-firm observation is believed not having enough level
of relatedness and is excluded from the sample.
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (market value to assets adjusted by industrial average
as computed by Chung & Pruitt, 1994) is used as the measure of firm performance. This
measure has been widely used in the family business literature (Anderson & Reeb, 2003;
Miller et al., 2007). Industry-adjusted Return on Asset (ROA) is also used for a
robustness test.
Firm age is calculated as the number of years that a company has been operating
in the market. Firm age is also used as a control variable in testing H3 as firm
performance may vary according to the time that the firm has been operating.
Organizational slack is defined as organizational resources that are greater than
actually needed (Singh, 1986). Thus, organizational slack is calculated as a ratio of liquid
assets (cash reserves and marketable securities) divided by sales (Tan & Peng, 2003).
Similar to firm age, this variable is controlled in testing for H3, as organizational slack
often affects the variation of firm performance.
Family ownership is measured as the overall percentage of family ownership
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004). It is different from the family business measure as this
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variable is continuous. Note that although family ownership has been used to classify
family and non-family firms, it still significantly varies in family firms. This feature
allows the test of H2c as some family firms may have higher family ownership compared
to others. Also note that this variable is used to test for H2c, meaning that the focus here
is the variation of family ownership in the family business population. Any firm with less
than 5% family ownership is not included in the analysis.
Family management is measured as the number of family members among the
Top Management Team (TMT). The sum of family members in the board of director
(BOD) and family TMT members is also used as an alternative measure of family
management for a robustness test. This alternative measure reflects the fact that family
board members may engage in monitoring, potentially affecting the implementation of
dominant strategy across related business units.
Control Variables
As mentioned above, two independent variables (firm age and organizational
slack) are used as control variables in regressing firm performance (H3). In addition,
following Anderson and Reeb (2003, 2004) and Miller et al. (2007), a number of control
variables are included because of their potential influence on firm behaviors and
performance.
This study also controls for lone-founder firms, measured by a binary variable in
which 1 denotes the situation where the lone-founder has at least 5% ownership (Miller et
al., 2007). Note that lone-founder firms are differentiated from family firms as the latter
includes the involvement of at least two family members in the business. Also note that
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lone-founder firms and family firms are mutually exclusive, thus this variable is not
included in testing hypotheses for the family business sample (H2a-H2c & H3).
Non-family blockholder ownership, measured as the overall percentage of
blockholder ownership in year t-1, is controlled as these non-family owners may have
concerns that are incompatible with the owning family’s interests (Morck et al., 2005).
Note that these blockholder may be representative of institutional investors as their
presence is often affiliated with financial institutions.
In addition, this study controls for firm size (i.e., log of the number of sales in year
t-1, Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004), debt ratio (debt-to-asset ratio measured as a ratio in
year t-1) and firm risk (the standard deviation of stock returns for the previous three
years, Anderson & Reeb, 2003), as these factors often affect decision-making process and
accordingly firm performance (Dean & Sharfman, 1996).
This study also includes five strategic actions at the corproate level for each firmyear observation. They are advertising intensity (advertising/ sales in t-1 period), R&D
intensity (R&D/sales in t-1 period), plant and equipment newness (net P&E/gross P&E in
t-1 period), inventory level (inventories/sales in t-1 period), and financial leverage
(debt/equity in t-1 period), all measured as ratios. Indeed, strategic actions in the past
may affect strategic decisions in future. It should be noted that the independent variable is
calculated based on the standard deviations of R&D intensity, capital intensity and SGA
ratio across related business units, thus it should be inherently distinctive from the
control variables, which are calculated at the corporate level. Also note that this study
does not include the measure of selling, general, and administrative ratio (SGA). This is
because this variable is often used as a measure of organizational slack thus may be
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theoretically redundant because a measure of organizational slack has already been
included21. Capital intensity is not included because it may overlap with the R&D and
plant and equipment varaibles mentioned above.
Because corporations often diversify into foreign markets, this study also includes
a measure of international sales calculated by the percentage of sales coming from
foreign domain measured in year t-1. Because performance may also affect
diversification in family business, this study controls for past performance (ROA in t-1
term) because performance in the past may affect strategic action and performance in
current term. This study also controls for industrial affiliation by industrial average
performance, measured as industry averages of ROA at the four-digit SIC codes in year t1. Finally, the inverse Mills ratio calculated to control for endogeneity is added as an
additional control for all models.
Controlling for Endogeneity
It is possible that endogeneity may make the regression estimates biased. This
study uses two approaches to control for endogeneity. First, as mentioned above, oneyear lags are used between dependent variable and other variables to ensure the direction
of causality, thus the probability of reverse causality would be mitigated. Second, this
study uses the Heckman’s (1979) two-stage technique (see Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007).
The key here is to find instrumental variables that are highly related to the independent
variable (family business measure) but are unrelated to the dependent variables. Put
differently, high quality instrumental variables in this instance should be family-firm

21, Empirically, SGA ratio and the measure of organizational slack (quick ratio) show a high level of
correlation which may bias the estimation.
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specific and not strongly connected to either the dominant strategy of diversification or
firm performance.
This study uses four instrumental variables. Family trust-holdings affiliated with
significant owners are measured as a binary variable in which 1 denotes the situation
where owners have either a trust or foundation associated with family members and 0
otherwise. Indeed, founders, family owners and other major shareholders often choose to
use family trusts or foundations to take care of their family members. Nonetheless, there
is no theory that can be used to link family trusts with either firm’s management of
diversification or firm performance. This variable is obtained from firms’ annual proxy
statements.
Second, this study controls for the fraction of industry sales that comes from
family firms (i.e. family firm sales fraction by industry), which is naturally related with
the probability that a firm in the industry is such a firm, yet is independent of the second
stage dependent variables (dominant strategy and Tobin’s Q) because the latter are
industry-adjusted. Similar measures have been used in previous studies in family business
(Amit et al., 2015) and finance (Campa & Kedia, 2002). Third, family firms’ fraction of
capital expenditure by industry (i.e. family firm capital fraction by industry) is also used.
Finally, this study controls for family firms’ fraction of advertisement expenditure by
industry (i.e. family firm advertisement fraction by industry). Note that within three
family firm fraction variables, one is related to performance (sales) and the other two are
related to firm decision-making. Such a design is appropriate because the hypotheses are
related to both dominant strategy and firm performance. Using Heckman’s two-stage
procedure, this study first estimates a probit model in which family business (=1) versus
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non-family firm (=0) is regressed against the four instrumental variables and other
controls mentioned above. According to the estimation results, the inverse Mills ratio is
calculated for each yearly-firm observation and included as a control in all models.
Empirical Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are reported in Table 1. In general, 20% of
the observations can be classified as family firms, while 10% are lone-founder firms.
These numbers are similar to other studies exploring public-traded lone-founder and
family firms (Miller et al., 2007).
In addition, consistent with Chrisman & Patel (2012) as well as Miller and
colleagues (2007), it is found that the family firm variable is negatively correlated (-0.15,
p-value<0.001), while the lone-founder firm variable is positively correlated (0.20, pvalue<0.001), with R&D investments. Thus, it appears that the sample is comparable to
other family business studies of public-traded firms, and missing observations do not
seem to affect the validity of the sampling. In support of the hypotheses, dominant
strategy is positively correlated with the family business measure (0.04, p-value<0.05),
family ownership (0.07, p-value<0.01), and family management (0.09, p-value<0.001).
Also note that, consistent with the expectations, dominant strategy is positively correlated
with ROA (0.14, p-value<0.001), but negatively correlated with Tobin’Q (-0.06, pvalue<0.01).
In terms of the selection of instrumental variables, all four variables are found
significantly related to the family business variable(s). In addition, their correlations with
family business variable(s) are much higher compared to their correlations with either
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dominant strategy or firm performance22. All of these suggest that the selection of
instrumental variables is appropriate.
The highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 3.47, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a big concern. Due to the nature of longitudinal data, Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) regression analysis may yield biased estimations. In addition, the Hausman
test (Chi Sq Statistic=349.95, p-value<0.001) suggests that a fixed effect model is more
appropriate than a random-effect model. Thus, fixed-effect longitudinal regression is used
as the primary analytic technique. In order to control for serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity, this study also uses the White cross-section sandwich estimator
clustered at the firm level (Judson & Owen, 1999). In all models, one year lags between
dependent and other variables is used.

22, Z-statistics reveal that the smallest difference between instrumental variables’ correlation with family
business variable and their correlation with dominant strategy or performance is significant at 0.001 level
(Z= - 9.47).
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1,
2,
3,
4,
5,
6,
7,
8,
9,
10,
11,
12,
13,
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,

Mean
0.03
2.43
0.49
0.20
0.14
6.01
38.85
0.05
0.29
0.69
0.10
2.74
6.79
0.02
8.86
0.01
0.08
0.49
0.12
0.42
0.02
0.49
0.47
0.35
0.14
0.13
0.14

Descriptive Statistics and Correlation

Dominant Strategy
TOBIN's Q
ROA
Family Business (Family TMT>0)
Family Business (Ownership >10%)
Family Ownership
Age
Organizational Slack
Family Management (TMT)
Family Management (TMT+ BOD)
Lone-Founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Family Trusts
Family Firm Sales Ratio by Industry
Family Firm Advertisement Ratio by Industry
Family Firm Capital Ratio by Industry

Table 11

110

S.D.
1.01
1.44
0.28
0.40
0.34
14.80
30.03
0.47
0.63
1.40
0.30
8.33
1.63
0.06
11.02
0.03
0.10
0.15
0.10
14.28
20.13
0.28
0.19
0.48
0.26
0.29
0.26

1
1.00
-0.06
0.14
0.04
0.07
0.09
0.19
-0.10
0.04
0.06
-0.06
0.03
0.25
0.06
-0.18
0.06
-0.47
0.04
0.04
0.01
0.00
0.15
0.16
0.01
0.11
0.12
0.11

3
1.00
-0.01
0.02
0.05
0.12
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.14
0.11
0.02
-0.05
0.42
-0.27
-0.04
-0.05
0.00
-0.01
0.93
0.75
0.05
0.15
0.21
0.17

2
1.00
0.27
-0.09
-0.08
-0.11
-0.19
0.08
-0.06
-0.08
0.22
-0.01
-0.12
-0.09
0.17
0.08
0.05
0.00
-0.23
-0.02
0.01
0.26
0.15
0.03
-0.08
-0.04
-0.07
1.00
0.79
0.63
-0.01
0.09
0.91
0.90
-0.17
0.04
-0.17
0.13
-0.09
-0.02
-0.15
0.09
0.19
0.04
0.00
-0.01
0.05
0.61
0.42
0.37
0.45

4

1.00
0.73
0.08
0.04
0.77
0.77
-0.13
0.07
-0.10
0.11
-0.06
0.00
-0.17
0.11
0.13
0.05
0.00
0.02
0.08
0.51
0.46
0.39
0.48

5

1.00
0.17
0.01
0.65
0.68
-0.14
0.04
-0.02
0.25
-0.08
0.04
-0.21
0.14
0.14
0.10
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.52
0.40
0.38
0.41

6

1.00
-0.16
0.00
0.05
-0.23
-0.05
0.34
0.07
-0.10
0.08
-0.37
-0.03
0.24
-0.01
0.01
0.11
0.18
-0.03
0.15
0.13
0.17

7

1.00
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.01
-0.27
-0.17
-0.04
-0.04
0.19
-0.06
0.03
-0.01
-0.02
0.05
0.06
0.11
0.02
-0.01
0.03

8

1.00
0.95
-0.15
0.04
-0.16
0.14
-0.08
0.01
-0.15
0.12
0.12
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.05
0.56
0.43
0.37
0.44

9

1.00
-0.17
0.02
-0.14
0.13
-0.09
0.00
-0.19
0.13
0.17
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.07
0.61
0.45
0.40
0.47

10

Industrial Average Performance
Family Trusts
Family Firm Sales Ratio by Industry
Family Firm Advertisement Ratio by Industry
Family Firm Capital Ratio by Industry

23,
24,
25,
26,
27,

11
1.00
0.04
-0.12
-0.10
0.14
0.01
0.20
0.06
-0.15
-0.01
0.00
0.03
0.05
0.35
-0.12
-0.10
-0.12
23
1.00
0.11
0.20
0.27
0.22

13
1.00
0.12
0.08
0.10
-0.40
0.25
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.11
0.24
-0.19
-0.04
0.06
-0.02
25
1.00
0.68
0.96

12
1.00
-0.13
-0.03
-0.05
0.10
-0.09
0.02
0.07
-0.01
0.00
0.14
0.11
0.14
-0.02
0.02
-0.01
24
1.00
0.23
0.23
0.26
1.00
0.67

1.00
-0.03
0.03
-0.12
0.12
0.11
0.17
0.00
0.00
-0.04
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.02
26

14

1.00

1.00
-0.01
0.15
0.17
-0.08
-0.01
-0.04
-0.04
0.00
-0.04
-0.04
0.00
-0.03
27

15

16

1.00
-0.17
0.04
-0.11
-0.01
0.00
0.41
0.34
0.02
0.08
0.12
0.09

Note:
All variables are NOT adjusted by industrial average
All correlations above | 0.03 | are significant at 0.10 or better for a two-tailed test

Lone-Founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Family Trusts
Family Firm Sales Ratio by Industry
Family Firm Advertisement Ratio by Industry
Family Firm Capital Ratio by Industry

11,
12,
13,
14,
15,
16,
17,
18,
19,
20,
21,
22,
23,
24,
25,
26,
27,

Table 11 (continued)
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1.00
-0.30
-0.18
-0.02
0.02
-0.28
-0.33
-0.04
-0.26
-0.28
-0.26

17

1.00
0.14
0.03
0.01
-0.03
0.11
0.06
0.13
0.15
0.14

18

1.00
0.00
0.00
-0.07
0.03
0.09
0.12
0.11
0.13

19

1.00
0.00
0.00
-0.01
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.00

20

1.00
-0.02
-0.02
0.01
-0.02
0.00
-0.03

21

1.00
0.77
0.06
0.15
0.21
0.17

22

As mentioned above, this study uses Heckman’s two-stage approach to partially
control for endogeneity. Model 1 is the first-stage probit treatment model in which the
binary variable of family business is regressed against instrumental variables and other
controls. The variable of lone-founder firm is not included as a control as the variable is
mutually exclusive from the family business variable. Overall, the four instrumental
variables are all positively and significantly related to the family business variable,
suggesting that the selection of instruments is reasonable.
Model 2 (Table 2) tests H1. Firm risk (B= -0.0001, p-value<0.05) R&D ratio (B=
-0.334, p-value<0.001) and leverage ratio (B= -0.0001, p-value<0.01) are negatively
related to the dominant strategy variable, while firm size (B= 0.010, p-value<0.01) is
positively related to the dominant strategy variable. H1 is supported, as the family
business measure (B= 0.013, p-value<0.001) is positively and significantly related to
dominant strategy. Such a result suggests that ceteris paribus, being a family business
increases the extent of dominant strategy by 0.013 units compared to the case of nonfamily business.
Model 3 (Table 2) tests H2a-H2c. Note that while H1 intends to address the
difference between family and non-family businesses, H2a-H2c aim at exploring the
heterogeneity in the family business population. Thus, Model 2 focuses on family firms
only, and the control variable of lone-founder firm is taken out because this type of
organization is mutually exclusive from family business. In support of H2a and H2c, firm
age (B= 0.002, p-value<0.05) and family ownership (B= 0.0004, p-value<0.01) are bo`th
positively related to dominant strategy. Nevertheless, H2b is not supported as
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organizational slack is not significantly related to dominant strategy, although the
coefficient of the variable is positive.
Table 12

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H1-H2c

Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business (H1)
Firm Age (H2a)
Organizational Slack (H2b)
Family Ownership (H2c)
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Family Trust
Family Sales Ratio by Industry
Family Advertisement Ratio by Industry
Family Capital Ratio by Industry
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics
Absolute Log Likelihood

Model 1
Family Business
Binary Variable
FB & NFB
0.965***

Model 2
Dominant
Strategy
FB & NFB
-0.007
0.013***

-0.012*
-0.030

-0.015***
-0.357***
4.714***
-0.019***
-0.619
-6.534***
-0.636
-0.001
2.705**
0.001
-0.765***
-0.551†
2.548***
1.618***
0.768***
3.347***
288
15
2,250
0.61
416.72***

Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Model 3
Dominant
Strategy
FB
-0.014
0.002*
0.001
0.0004**

0.000
0.000
0.010**
0.011
-0.0001*
-0.012
-0.334***
-0.043
0.066
-0.0001**
0.000
-0.005
-0.005
0.000

-0.001†
-0.004
-0.034
0.000
0.034
-0.405***
0.032
0.060†
0.000
-0.007*
0.034
-0.092
-0.023

285
15
2,250
0.33
382.23***

55
14
409
0.14
551.21***

Model 4 (Table 3) explores the performance consequence of dominant strategy in
family business. It is found that the coefficient of the interaction between the family
business measure and dominant strategy is positive but not significant. Thus, dominant
strategy does not appear to significantly affect firm performance in family business.
Model 5 (Table 3) tests for H3. Similar to Model 4, the estimated regression
coefficient of dominant strategy is positive but not significant (B= 2.530, p-value>0.10).
H3 is not supported as the interaction between family management and dominant strategy
is positive but not significant (B= 2.021, p-value>0.10). Note that for the Model 4 and 5,
the estimated coefficients of interactions are consistent with the expectations although
neither is significant. Among all hypotheses, H1, H2a and H2c are supported, while H2b
and H3 are not supported.
Robustness Test
This study runs a number of robustness tests to ensure that the results are not
artificial. Firstly, the performance measure is changed from industry-adjusted Tobin’Q to
industry-adjusted ROA23 (Table 4, Model 6&7). Indeed, Tobin’s Q reflects more about
the stock market’s perception of firm value, while ROA is a measure of firm’s annual
profitability. Interestingly, consistent with the expectation, both the interaction between
the family business measure and dominant strategy (Table 4, Model 6) and the interaction
between family management and dominant strategy (Table 4, Model 7) become
significant.

23, Industry-adjusted ROS is also used. Results are similar to industry-adjusted ROA in terms of directions,
magnitudes and significances.
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Table 13

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, H3

Model
Dependent Variable

Note:

1.
2.
3.

Sample
Constant
Family Business
Family Management
Dominant Strategy
Family Business * Dominant Strategy
Family Management * Dominant Strategy (H3)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 5
Model 4
Firm Performance
(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)
FB
FB & NFB
6.913***
3.456
1.026
2.182
0.748
2.530
1.355
2.021
-0.011
0.013
-0.013
-0.003
-0.144
0.000
-0.012
-0.961***
-0.896*
0.000
0.249
0.029***
0.093**
-5.307***
-4.699†
-2.996***
-3.908
-1.548***
-2.739***
-2.488**
-0.942
-0.023
-0.314
0.001**
0.184†
1.255***
1.848**
-1.611*
-1.316
-0.206**
-0.152
282
55
13
13
1,941
389
0.20
0.20
6.09***
8.08***

Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 14

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3

Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business
Family Management
Dominant Strategy
Family Business * Dominant Strategy
Family Management * Dominant Strategy (H3)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 7
Model 6
Firm Performance
(Industry-Adjusted ROA)
FB
FB & NFB
0.032
0.029
0.032*
-0.015 *
-0.019
0.110
0.273***
0.352*
0.003**
0.003†
-0.001***
-0.001*
-0.004
-0.0003*
-0.001
-0.016**
-0.009
0.004
-0.037
0.000
0.002***
-0.441***
-0.203†
0.087
0.568***
0.003
-0.041
-0.256***
-0.308***
-0.001
-0.036***
0.00005***
0.005
0.038
0.026
0.004
-0.042
-0.009*
0.010
282
55
13
13
1,941
389
0.11
0.10
25.15***
47.64***

Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Figure 4

Family Business, Dominant Strategy and Firm Performance (ROA)

Figure 4 plots Model 6. It is found that the use of dominant strategy does not
cause any change in performance in non-family business. However, dominant strategy
has a positive effect on family firm’s performance. When the extent of dominant strategy
is low, non-family firms outperforms family firms. But when dominant strategy reaches a
relatively high level, family firms outperform nonfamily firms.
Figure 5 plots Model 7. Even in the family business population, dominant strategy
tends to show a positive relationship with firm performance given high family
management. Indeed, when dominant strategy reaches a relatively high level, family
firms with high family management tend to outperform those with low family
management. Note that, it appears that the hypothesized moderating effect of family
involvement is more salient when using ROA as the performance measure compared to
the measure of Tobin’s Q. This finding will be further elaborated in the discussion
section.
Furthermore, note that the measure of family business does not necessarily
captures the vision of the owning family. This may suggest an isolation between the
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definition and the measurement. Here, two alternative measures of family business are
used in testing for H1.

Figure 5

Family Management, Dominant Strategy and Firm Performance (ROA)

To begin, instead of one family manager, this study uses at least two family
managers in TMT to classify family business, aligned with at least 5% family ownership
and at least two family members historically or currently involved in business. Such a
measure highlights the presence of multiple family members in TMT, which may signal
the presence of intra-family succession intention. Consistent with the primary analysis,
H1 (Table 5, Model 8) is supported. In addition, family business is measured by the
number of family managers in business if there is at least 5% family ownership and at
least two family members historically or currently involved in business. This measure is
continuous in nature and may better reflect the variance of family involvement in
business. Also note that family managers are directly involved in daily-management in
business. This issue is important as publicly-traded firms feature the isolation between
ownership and management. In addition, the number of family managers may better
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capture the vision of the owning family, as more family managers may signal a higher
intention of maintaining family’s control in business possibly across generations. Again,
H1 (Table 5, Model 9) is supported.
Table 15

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H1
Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Family Business (>= 2 family managers, H1)
Family Management (H1)
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 8
Dominant
Strategy
FB & NFB
-0.001
0.004†
-0.0001
0.000
0.010**
0.012
0.000*
-0.019
-0.335***
-0.042*
0.068*
-0.00001**
0.000
-0.005
-0.006
0.002
285
15
2,250
0.33
385.10***

Note:
1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1

Model 9
Dominant
Strategy
FB & NFB
-0.005
0.005**
-0.0001
0.000
0.010**
0.012
0.000*
-0.013
-0.335***
-0.043*
0.067*
-0.00001**
0.000
-0.005
-0.006
0.001
285
15
2,250
0.33
385.10***

In addition, this study also tries to use the sum of family members on the TMT
and the board of directors (BOD) members as an alternative measure of family
management in testing for H3 (Table 6, Model 10). This measurement reflects the fact
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that family BOD members may engage in monitoring the operations of diversified units
thus may have extensive influences in the daily management of diversified units. Again,
H3 is supported.
Table 16

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3

Model
Dependent Variable

Note:

Sample
Constant
Family Management (TMT& BOD)
Dominant Strategy
Family Management (TMT& BOD) * Dominant Strategy (H3)
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 10
Firm Performance
(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)
FB
30.309**
-8.469*
-23.767*
8.229*
0.000
-0.006
-0.002
-0.762†
0.405
0.090*
-4.590†
-2.689
-3.599***
-2.274
-0.276
0.196*
0.677
0.452
-0.013
55
13
389
0.20
3.03***

1. Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
2. † p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
3. Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
It is worth noting that H2b is rejected in the primary and the robustness tests. In
addition, there is a high level of instability regarding the relationship between dominant
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strategy and firm performance in family business. The following tests intend to provide
further analyses on these two issues. To begin, in the primary analysis the quick ratio
(case reserves and market securities divided by annual sales) is used as the measure of
organizational slack. This measure represents the unabsorbed slack at the corporate level.
Nonetheless, such a measure may not be a good indictor to capture the extent of
parsimony at the business unit level. In another words, having high slack at the
headquarters of a diversified corporate does not mean the same level of slack in
diversified business units. Thus, this measure is replaced by the SGA ratio, which is the
aggregation of selling, general, and administrative expenditures in all business units.
Different from the quick asset ratio which is largely managed by the corporate
headquarters. The SGA is the aggregation of marketing and administrative expenses from
business units. Indeed, consistent with the hypothesis, it is found that the estimated
coefficient of the SGA ratio is negative and significant (Table 7, Model 11). It appears
that the nonsignificant result of H2b in the primary analysis is due to the way
organizational slack is measured.
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Table 17

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H2b
Model
Dependent Variable
Sample
Constant
Firm Age (H2a)
Organizational Slack (SGA ratio) (H2b)
Family Ownership (H2c)
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 11
Dominant
Strategy
FB
0.036
0.003***
-0.129**
0.0002*
0.000
-0.011*
-0.025
0.000
0.113
-0.151
0.047
0.048
0.000
-0.008*
0.026
-0.074
-0.026†
53
13
390
0.13
374.06***

Note:

1.
2.
3.

Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
In addition, the analyses mentioned above show some inconsistency regarding the

interactive effect between family business and dominant strategy. One possible
explanation is that, different from strategic decision-making at the corporate level,
managing diversified business units requires a higher extent of family control by which
the owning family can transfer its influence into the actual management of diversified
business units. This argument suggests that the positive interaction between the family
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business measure and dominant strategy should be more salient when the owning family
has relatively high control of the business.
Hence, family business is measured by a 10%24 threshold of family ownership, as
well as at least two family members historically involved in business and at least one
family member currently in TMT. Here, it is found that the coefficient of the interaction
becomes positive and significant (Table 8, Model 12). Compared to the result in the
primary analysis, it seems that the positive effect of dominant strategy in family business
is salient only when the owning family has sufficient control in business.
Following the same logic, it is expected that the interactive effect between family
management and dominant strategic become more salient when the owning family has
sufficient ownership in business. This means that the effect of H3 would be more salient
if the owning family has higher control in business. Thus, H3 is tested in the family
business observations where the owning family has at least 10% ownership (Table 9,
Model 13). H3 is supported at the 0.001 level of significance.

24, 20% threshold is also used. And regression results are similar to the one reported here in terms of
direction, magnitude and significance
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Table 18

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3
Model
Dependent Variable

Note:

1.
2.
3.

Sample
Constant
Family Business (10%)
Dominant Strategy
Family Business (10%) * Dominant Strategy
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Lone-founder Firm
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 12
Firm Performance
(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)
FB & NFB
2.823***
-3.648†
0.387
3.993*
0.014
-0.025*
-0.063
0.003
-0.483*
0.282
0.021***
-4.970***
-2.560***
-0.731**
-1.302*
-0.005
0.001*
1.186**
-1.401†
-0.173*
282
13
1,941
0.21
10.31***

Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
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Table 19

Fixed-Effect Longitudinal Regression Analysis, Robustness Tests, H3

Model
Dependent Variable

Note:

1.
2.
3.

Sample
Constant
Family Management
Dominant Strategy
Family Management (10% FO Threshold) * Dominant Strategy
Firm Age
Organizational Slack
Blockholder Ownership
Firm Size
Debt Ratio
Firm Risk
Advertisement Ratio
R&D Ratio
Plant Newness
Inventory Ratio
Leverage Ratio
International Sales
Past Performance
Industrial Average Performance
Inverse Mills Ratio
Cross-section
Periods
Sample Size
Within R Square
F-statistics

Model 13
Firm Performance
(Industry-Adjusted Tobin’Q)
FB
2.100
-3.456***
-1.096*
3.357***
0.015
0.009
-0.021
-0.231
0.732
0.040*
-4.329**
-5.623†
-0.261
-0.271
-0.506
0.167*
1.281*
-1.491*
0.022
46
13
262
0.25
11.28***

Unstandardized estimation coefficients are reported
† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Mills Ratio calculated by Model 1
To summarize, results of robustness tests show some consistency with the primary

results. Nevertheless, after changing the measure and ownership threshold, all hypotheses
are supported.
Discussion
Studies have highlighted that family’s involvement in business may result in
distinctive strategic decisions (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). One area attracting particular
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attention is family business diversification. Yet no one has looked at the specific
management of diversified businesses, which is at least equally important as the
diversification itself (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987; Shayne Gary,
2005). Indeed, without proper management, any diversification or acquisition attempt
would inevitably fail.
This essay addresses this area. In particular, it is hypothesized that in comparison
to nonfamily firms, family firms are more likely to use a dominant strategy in managing
diversification, characterized by a high level of similarity in the patterns of resource
allocations across related business units. It is also hypothesized that family firms with
higher firm age, lower organizational slack and higher family ownership are more likely
to use such a strategy. In addition, it is hypothesized that such a unique way of managing
diversification would improve performance in family business, especially those with high
family’s involvement in management. Despite some inconsistent findings, the primary
and robustness, tests provide supports to all hypotheses.
It is worth noting that H2b is not supported by the primary analysis but is
supported in the robustness test when the SGA ratio –rather than the quick asset ratio- is
used as a reverse measure of resource parsimony. This is because SGA is a better
measure to capture the extent of resource parsimony in business units whereas the quick
ratio is a better measure at the corporate headquarters level. Indeed, it appears that
conceptualizations and measurements at the headquarters are not analogous to those at
the business unit level.
Also note that H3 is not supported when industry-adjusted Tobin’Q is used as the
performance measure, but it becomes supported when industry-adjusted ROA is used.
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This may reflect the fact that Tobin’Q primarily captures the market’s valuation, while
ROA is more related to the profitability of the company in creating wealth. Thus, the
relatedness resulting from the usage of a dominant strategy across diversified units should
result in higher profitability but may not necessarily improve market’s valuation. This is
because market investors do not have perfect information about strategies at the unit
level, hence having a dominant strategy in related units may not necessarily improve
investor’s evaluation toward the corporate. Another explanation is that Tobin’s Q is a
measure based upon the long-term accumulated performance of the company, whereas
ROA primarily captures the short-term fluctuation in performance. Nevertheless, the
theory used in this essay largely concern with short-term rather than long-term
performance, and the ROA performance measure may be more aligned with the theory.
In addition, H3 is also supported when the ownership threshold is increased from
5% to 10% in classifying family firms. As Gomez-Mejia and colleagues (2011, p659)
suggested, “it is safe to conclude that every operational definition (of family business) is
context specific rather than generalizable.” Indeed, diversification may create a unique
context that demands a high threshold effect of family ownership. In another words, the
increasing complexity in organizational structure in a diversified corporate requires a
higher ownership threshold to ensure that the owning family can successfully transfer its
goals into strategic behaviors at the unit level. Indeed, there often exists interest
divergence between unit managers and corporate owners (Govindarajan, 1989), thus
decision-making at the unit level may not reflect goals of corporate owners unless the
owners have sufficient control over the whole corporation. In addition, managerial
hierarchy may distort messages sent by significant owners in the headquarters
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(Govindarajan, 1986). Thus, certain ownership thresholds used at the corproate level may
no longer be appropriate when studying starties at the unit level.
All combined, it appears reasonable to conclude that the diversification setting
may create a unique context such that conceptualizations and operationalization used in
previous family business studies are no longer valid.
Theoretical Implication
This section intends to discuss the theoretical implications of this study which
may help shed light on future studies.
To begin, the family business field has experienced notable advancement with
exceptional theoretical developments in understanding how and why family firm’s
strategic behaviors would be distinctive and heterogeneous (Chrisman et al., 2013; Chua
et al., 2012). Nevertheless, these studies largely fail to distinguish corporate-level and
business-level strategies, neglecting the fact that publicly-traded family firm often holds a
portfolio of diversified business units. Note that corporate-level strategy is inherently
different from business-level strategy as the former is concerned with managing a
portfolio of multiple business areas while the latter focuses on a single business.
This essay is the first attempt to investigate how family firms manage diversified
business units as well as the performance consequence of such a unique way of
management. As discussed above, inconsistencies among the primary and robustness
tests seem to suggest that some well-grounded theoretical predictions as well as empirical
operationalization at the business level may not be valid at the corporate level. Indeed, it
is possible that strategies in some units may deviate from the owning family’s goals and
objectives given a relatively low level of family control. In particular, the findings
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suggest that transferring family shareholder’s goals to unit behaviors would require a
higher extent of controlling power compared to the case at the business level. Thus, the
operationalization of family business may need to be revised to fit into the setting of
diversified family corporations with multiple business units.
It is also worth noting that this research area remains under-developed with
multiple research opportunities existing. For instance, it is still not well known whether
family involvement in the dominant coalition may or may not affect the strategies and
performance in all business units in family-controlled and –managed corporateions. In
addition, given the presence of multiple goals and objectives in a owning family, it is also
possible that units may be assigned with distinctive goals. This issue may become salient
given the coexistence of related and unrelated business units in diversified corporates. In
other words, related units may be used to achieve the goal(s) with high priorities while
unrelated ones may be used to achieve those with low priorities. It is also possible that
individual family members may be in charge of business units, thus unit strategies may
reflect their individual interests rather than the collective interest of the whole family.
Furthermore, the owning family may endow more resources to some units instead of
others, thus the link between family resource-endowment and unit strategy/performance
may be more salient in some units rather than others. Due to the limitation of the data
especially the lack of information on owning families, this study is not able to directly
test these predictions.
In addition, the theory is based upon the argument that family firms are more
likely than non-family firms to adopt a dominant strategy in diversification. This is
because the owning family has family-centered traditions which are expected to increase
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over time, because the owning family is parsimonious in resource utilization, and because
the owning family has the power to transmit its influence in firm decision-making. Based
upon the behavioral theory of the firm, such a theoretical framework highlights that the
combination of family goals, resources, and governance structures results in unique
decision-making patterns in managing diversified business units. Note that compared to
other theories that highlight one or two rather than all three elements, the theory used in
this study ensures that the framework is comprehensive yet parsimonious.
Furthermore, when exploring the link between dominant strategy and firm
performance in family business, this study relies upon the coordination literature to build
the theory. In particular, it is argued that there are three primary sources of costs in
coordination: problem-framing, communication and conflict resolution. It is also argued
that interactions among family managers may lead to less coordination problems, thus the
performance consequence of a dominant strategy is likely to be higher in family firms,
especially those with more family managers. Although such a theoretical framework is
developed for this essay, the theory can also be applied in other settings of coordination
in family business including inter-firm alliances, new product development, creativity
and innovation, self-managing teams and others.
Finally, while previous family business studies have highlighted some potential
distinctive effects between family ownership and management upon firm performance, it
is further argued that this effect is due to the advantage of family management in
coordinating complex activities. Thus, it appears that family management can be
conceptualized as having a moderating effect on the relationship between firm strategy
and firm performance. Indeed, future studies can keep exploring this line of inquiry.
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Limitations
While this study can make several contributions, it is also important to recognize
its limitations. First, there are a large amount of missing data in the database on business
units. Based upon the portions of lone-founder and family firms, this does not appear to
be a problem. Nevertheless, this is still a potential issue that may affect the accuracy of
the findings. Indeed, missing data is relatively common in previous studies on business
units (e.g. Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Future studies may try to validate the findings with
primary data collection or other sources that would ensure a lower level of missing data.
Furthermore, family business is defined by a family’s involvement in ownership
and governance with a vision for how the firm will benefit the family, potentially across
generations (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Chua, Chrisman & Sharma, 1999). However, family
business is measured by family’s involvement in ownership and management, and did not

directly measure the owning family’s vision. This is largely due to the secondary data
source. In addition, the measurement has been widely used by previous studies in family
business (e.g. Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2003, 2010; Miller et al.,
2007, 2011). Moreover, the family’s involvement in ownership and management may
reflect the family’s ability in transferring family’s vision into firm behaviors. Finally, the
involvement of multiple family members in business may signal the presence of existing
or potential intra-family succession intention. Nonetheless, the vision of the family has
not been directly measured. Future studies may try to use a more valid measure that can
directly reflect the vision of the dominant family coalition.
Similarly, the theory is developed upon concepts such as tradition, parsimony, and
control. Nevertheless, these concepts are not directly measured. Instead, these concepts
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are used to develop testable hypotheses based upon accessible secondary data in publiclytraded family firms. Indeed, the secondary data source largely limits the abilities to
directly measure these constructs and test the theories accordingly. For instance, arguably
some junior late-generation family members may choose to deviate from rather than
completely follow family tradition. Indeed, the usage of proxy measurement may become
a potential issue that may affect the validity of the study design. Future studies may try to
develop valid scale measurement of these concepts to further test the hypotheses.
In addition, strategies and performance at the business unit level may be affected
by the status of business unit managers. In particular, whether the manager belongs to the
owning family may be a critical factor. Due to the limitation of the secondary data, this
information is not accessible. Future studies may try to collect primary data at the unit
level to further test the hypotheses.
In addition, this study focuses on firm age, organizational slack and family
ownership as three determinants in exploring the heterogeneity in family business. Such a
conceptualization was supported by the empirical results. Nevertheless, it is also
important to note that these three variables represent a small portion of variation in the
family business population. Put differently, there are more factors related to goals,
resources and governance, especially those stemming from the family system that may
further contribute to the heterogeneity of the family business population.
It is also important to note that, although there are multiple hypotheses in this
study, they are tested separately. Note that some analytic techniques such as path analysis
and structural equation modeling (SEM) may test multiple hypotheses simultaneously.
Nevertheless, the data used in this study is longitudinal, meaning that for SEM or path
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analysis, cross-sections (682 firms) and years (9 years) must be added as control variables
into the model (682+9), which may greatly limit the degree of freedom in the analysis
and make the analysis infeasible. Future studies should try to use other analytic
approaches to test all hypotheses simultaneously.
Moreover, this study uses publicly-traded firms in S&P 1500 manufacturing as
the primary sample. Indeed, one feature of public-traded family firms is the limited range
of family ownership, as it is impossible for family ownership to reach 100% by nature.
Thus, the generalizability of the findings to small and privately owned family and nonfamily firms may be limited. Future studies are encouraged to replicate this study among
privately-owned small- and medium- sized firms.
In addition, this study excludes firms without at least five years continuous
observations. Such a treatment is to ensure that the calculation of dominant strategy is
meaningful. Nevertheless, it may also affect the generalabiliy of the sampling, as newlyfounded firms or firms that are reluctant to release information to the public may be
excluded from the sample. Future studies may try to use primary data collection in
dealing with these issues.
Finally, this study chooses to focus on the 1996-2013 range in the analysis. Such a
period is not homogenous regarding economic growth as well as market competition,
which should provide enough variations in terms of dominant strategy as well as firm
performance. However, variations in such a turbulent period may bias the empirical
results. Nonetheless, even given such a long and dynamic period, the primary results are
still significant. Future studies may future test the hypotheses in different periods.
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Conclusion
To conclude, this essay intends to explore the antecedents and consequences of
dominant strategy among diversified publicly-trade family and non-family business. The
differences between family and non-family firms as well as the heterogeneity among
family firms themselves presented in this essay can help scholars, family business
members, and investors better understand family involvement and how it impacts the
management of diversified business units and firm performance.
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CONCLUSION
Drawing upon the behavior theory of the firm, this dissertation aims to explore the
homogeneity of family firms’ strategic decision-making over time (strategic persistence)
and across related business units (dominant strategy), as well as their antecedents and
performance consequences in family business. The theme that both essays share intends
to highlight that family businesses may show high levels of internal constancy in strategic
decision-making. Indeed, based upon S&P 1500 manufacturing firms from 1996 to 2013,
it is found that family firms have a higher level of strategic persistence and a more
consistent dominant strategy than non-family firms. In addition, it appears that being
older, with less organizational slack and having higher family involvement in ownership
and management tends to strengthen the two kinds of homogeneity in family businesses.
Finally, it is found that high homogeneity in decision-making can result in better
performance in family business compared to non-family firms, especially for those with
high family involvement in management. This chapter intends to summarize the findings
and discuss the implications of the two essays together.
To begin, recent development in the family business literature highlights that
family firms are heterogeneous (Chua et al., 2012), and a higher level of heterogeneity
may be a feature that distinguishes family from non-family firms (Chrisman & Patel,
2012). While this view is compelling, it does not take into account that family firms may
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show high levels of internal homogeneity in their strategic behaviors. Note that the
argument does not contradict the view of family business heterogeneity, as the focus here
is the homogeneity in an individual family business, while the heterogeneity view focuses
on inter-family-firm differences. Indeed, findings in this dissertation seem to suggest that,
although as a whole population, family firms show a high level of heterogeneity,
individual family businesses may show high levels of internal homogeneity. Thus, to get
a comprehensive understanding of this unique type of organization, we need to recognize
that both heterogeneity and homogeneity exist, but are manifested in different ways and
at different levels.
In addition, our theoretical framework covers idiosyncratic goals, resources and
governance structures in family business (Chua et al., 2012). Note that overly
emphasizing a single dimension may result in inaccurate predictions regarding how
family firms would behave and perform. Indeed, just as Chua and colleagues (2012, p2)
have warned, “Continuing to ignore family firm heterogeneity could institutionalize a
distorted homogeneous view of family firms that generates ‘panaceas’, supposedly
applicable to all family firms”. Nonetheless, few theories in the family business literature
cover all three dimensions; more than often theories only emphasize one at the expense of
others (one notable exception is Carney’s work in 2005). Thus, the theoretical framework
proposed in this dissertation is more comprehensive compared to prevailing theories in
the family business field.
Furthermore, one notable view in the family business literature is that family
firms need to learn from non-family firms to make more favorable strategic choices (e.g.
Stewart & Hitt, 2012). This view has its roots in the work of business historian Alfred
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Chandler (1990) who views family businesses as relics of an old era. His followers argue
that learning from non-family firms and embracing innovation (Block, 2012), risk-taking
or corporate entrepreneurship (Chirico et al., 2011) may bring competitive advantages to
family-owned and –managed type of organizations. Findings in this dissertation suggest
that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, both essays suggest that family firms have a
more homogeneous pattern in making and implementing its decisions, and family firms
can benefit from such a homogeneous pattern of decision-making. These findings seem to
suggest that competitive advantages in family business may stem from unique sources,
and simply imitating non-family firms may not be the best way for family firms to
achieve superior performance.
In a similar inquiry, some scholars advocate that at least some if not all family
firms should professionalize by employing non-family managers and experts. Such an
argument is often based upon the assumption that the family labor pool tends to be
limited in its size and quality, and recruiting non-family talents may help overcome the
defects of family managers (Chua et al., 2009). This dissertation challenges this view.
What have been found in both essays suggest that, the combination of family
management and homogeneous decision-making improves family firm performance.
Indeed, studies have already recognized that family mangers are different from family
owners regarding their effects on firm strategies and performance (Block, 2010;
Villalonga & Amit, 2006; Wu et al., 2007). This dissertation further demonstrates that
family managers may have certain advantages in some strategic actions. The view that
non-family professional managers are always superior compared to family managers
seems to be too simplistic. This dissertation is also consistent with the contingency view
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which proposes that there should be a “fit” between strategic action and implementation,
and a high level of fit would likely lead to superior performance (Kammerlander et al.,
2015). In this regard, it appears that family’s control in general and family involvement in
management in particular would fit better with a more homogenous pattern in a family
firm’s strategic decision-making.
The focal concern of essay 1 is strategic persistence, which is naturally related to
long-term orientation in the literature (e.g. Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011). Indeed, the
family business literature has long recognized that some family firms are oriented toward
the long run, and such long-term orientation may contribute to superior performance
(Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Nevertheless, few has developed theories regarding
what types of family firms are more likely to express such an orientation, and how such
an orientation would contribute to firm performance. More importantly, the attention is
often drawn to short-term strategic behavior rather than to the long-term window for
multiple strategic dimensions. Such neglect may result in inaccurate theoretical
propositions as well as biased empirical results. This study helps to fill these gaps and
shed light on the long-term orientation literature in the family business field. Indeed,
strategic persistence can be viewed as a manifestation of long-term orientation in firm
behavior. Our empirical results suggest that in general family firms are more persistent
compared to non-family firms, and this strategic persistence may help improve their
performance.
In addition, essay 1 uses a resource management view (e.g. Simon et al., 2007;
2008) in exploring the relationship between strategic persistence and firm performance.
Indeed, the RBV (e.g. Habbershon & Williams, 1999) has been used to explore the
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competitive advantages in some family firms. Nevertheless, existing RBV studies often
draw attention to different categories of family resources in business, assuming having
resource endowments from the family system is sufficient to ensure superior
performance. Different from this line of inquiry, essay 1 focuses on the overall features of
family resources, which may fundamentally affect the ways that owning families manage
family-endowed resources (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003). Indeed, it is the management of
resources that eventually determines the consequence of any strategic action. Thus, some
family firms are better than non-family firms not only because these family firms have
valuable, rare and non-imitable and non-substitutable resources, but also because these
family firms have a better way of managing resources. Such a perspective also suggests
that given high inseparability, specificity and intangibility, family firms may have
advantages in strategic actions that require less acquisition, mobilization, and divestment
of resources in the business systems.
Essay 2 explores the pursuit of dominant strategy in family business. To the best
of our knowledge, this essay is the first attempt to investigate how family firms manage
diversified business units as well as the performance consequence of such a unique way
of management. Indeed, most of family business studies at present tend to focus on the
business level, overlooking the fact that some family firms are large corporations with
diversified portfolios of multiple business units. Findings in essay 2 suggest that publiclytraded family firms are more likely to pursue a dominant strategy in their related business
units. Such a finding may shed light to the family business literature in terms of the
management of diversification in diversified family corporations.
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It should also be noted that essay 2 relies upon the coordination literature in
exploring the link between dominant strategy and firm performance. In particular, it is
argued that there are three primary sources of costs in coordination: problem-framing,
communication, and conflict resolution. It is also argued that interactions among family
managers may lead to less coordination problems, thus the performance consequence of a
dominant strategy is likely to be higher in family firms, especially those with more family
managers. Although such a theoretical framework is developed for this essay, the theory
can also be applied in other settings of coordination in family business. For instance,
coordination may take the form of inter-firm alliances, new product development,
creativity and innovation, self-managing teams and others. This suggests that family
firms may have better performance in these coordination activities when they are
managed by family members. Future studies should try to apply this theoretical view to
other coordination in family businesses.
Future Research Directions
While this study may make several contributions, it is also important to recognize
its limitations, which may help shed light on future studies. To begin, one underlying
argument in this dissertation is that consistent patterns of decision-making are beneficial
to family-owned and –managed businesses. While this argument is arguably accurate,
there may be some contingencies that may affect the performance consequences of
strategic persistence and dominant strategy in family business. For instance, given high
uncertainties and dynamics in the market, being overly persistent may lead to path
dependency and prohibit the family firm from adapting to changing environments.
Similarly, given the context that features frequent changes at the industrial level, having
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dynamic capability –rather than being consistent over time and/or across diversified
units- may help build competitive advantages in family business. Future studies may
further explore these contingencies to obtain better understandings of the performance
consequences of strategic persistence and dominant strategy in family business.
Also, this dissertation defines family business by the family’s involvement in
ownership and management as well as the family’s vision of using the business to benefit
the family and family members. Although several alternative measures of family business
have been used, and some of the measures are related to the “vision” of the family, it is
important to note that the “vision” of the family has not been directly measured, which
may lead to isolation between the theory and the methodology. Future studies should try
to use better scales of family business in testing for the hypotheses in this study.
In addition, this study uses firm age, organizational slack and family ownership as
three measures related to family tradition, resource parsimony and family control,
respectively. Such a conceptualization was supported by the empirical results. However,
family tradition, resource parsimony and family control are not directly measured in the
study. One reason is the secondary data source, as it is rather difficult to gain primary
data from publicly traded companies. This issue may lead to the isolation between the
theory and the methodology. Indeed, future studies should use valid scales to better test
the relationship between the constructs and strategic persistence.
Furthermore, this study uses publicly-traded firms in S&P 1500 manufacturing as
the primary sample. One feature of public-traded family firms is the limited range of
family ownership, as it is impossible for family ownership to reach 100% by nature. In
addition, it is impossible to collect data for firms with less than 5% family ownership,
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because only owners with more than 5% ownership are reported in the proxy statements.
Such a sampling would limit the generalizability of the findings in small and privately
owned family and non-family firms, as privately-owned and/or small- and medium-sized
family firms often feature high family involvement as well as a higher range of family
involvement compared to publicly-traded family firms. Future studies are encouraged to
replicate this study in the privately-owned small- and medium- sized firms.
Finally, this dissertation chooses to focus on the 1996-2013 range in the analysis.
Such a period is not homogenous regarding economic growth as well as market
competition, which should provide enough variations in terms of strategic persistence,
dominant strategy, and firm performance. However, even given such a long and dynamic
period, the primary results remain significant. Future studies may further test the
hypotheses in different periods.
In sum, this dissertation explores the homogeneous patterns of decision-making in
single family business, as well as their antecedents and performance consequences. The
findings of this dissertation can help scholars and practitioners better understand how and
why family involvement may affect the pattern of strategic decision over time and across
diversified business units, and how and why such a homogenous pattern of decisionmaking would bring competitive advantages to family firms.

142

REFERENCES
Adler, P.S. & Kwon, S.W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy
of Management Review, 27(1), 17–40.
Adner, R., & Levinthal, D. A. (2002). The emergence of emerging technologies.
California Management Review, 45(1), 50-66
Adner, R., & Levinthal, D. A. (2004). Real options and real tradeoffs. Academy of
Management Review, 29(1), 120-126.
Agarwal, R., Anand, J., Bercovitz, J., & Croson, R. (2012). Spillovers across
organizational architectures: The role of prior resource allocation and
communication in post‐acquisition coordination outcomes. Strategic
Management Journal, 33(6), 710-733.
Ahuja, G., & Katila, R. (2001). Technological acquisitions and the innovation
performance of acquiring firms: A longitudinal study. Strategic Management
Journal, 22(3), 197-220.
Aiken, M., & Hage, J. (1968). Organizational interdependence and intra-organizational
structure. American Sociological Review, 33(6), 912-930.
Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market
mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500.
Aldrich, H. E., & Cliff, J. E. (2003). The pervasive effects of family on entrepreneurship:
Toward a family embeddedness perspective. Journal of Business Venturing,
18(5), 573-596.
Almeida, H. V., & Wolfenzon, D. (2006). A theory of pyramidal ownership and family
business groups. The Journal of Finance, 61(6), 2637-2680.
Amason, A. C., & Sapienza, H. J. (1997). The effects of top management team size and
interaction norms on cognitive and affective conflict. Journal of Management,
23(4), 495-516.
Amburgey, T. L., Kelly, D., & Barnett, W. P. (1993). Resetting the clock: The dynamics
of organizational change and failure. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51-73.
143

Amit, R., Ding, Y., Villalonga, B., & Zhang, H. (2015). The role of institutional
development in the prevalence and performance of entrepreneur and familycontrolled firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 31, 284-305.
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., & Reeb, D. M. (2009). Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity
in the United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 92(2), 205-222.
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding family ownership and
the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263-285.
Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm
performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. The Journal of Finance, 58(3): 13011328.
Anderson, R. C.& Reeb, D. M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in
S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 209-237.
Ansoff, I.H. (1990), Implanting Strategic Management, Prentice Hall International, Ltd.
London
Antioco, M., De Schamphelaere, V., Moenaert, R. K., Robben, H., & Roks, E. (2010).
Strategic innovation decisions: What you foresee is not what you get. Journal of
Product Innovation Management, 840-855.
Arregle, J-L., Hitt, M.A., Sirmon, D.G., & Very, P. (2007). The development of
organizational social capital: Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management
Studies, 44(1), 73–95.
Arregle, J-L., Naldi, L., Nordqvist, M., and Hitt, M.A. (2012). Internationalization of
family-controlled firms: A study of the effects of external involvement in
governance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36, 1115-1143.
Astley, W.G. & Van de Ven, A.H. (1983). Central perspectives and debates in
organization theory, Administrative Science Quarterly, 28: 245-273.
Audia, P. G., Locke, E. A., & Smith, K. G. (2000). The paradox of success: An archival
and a laboratory study of strategic persistence following radical environmental
change. Academy of Management Journal, 43(5), 837-853.
Balakrishnan, S., & Fox, I. (1993). Asset specificity, firm heterogeneity and capital
structure. Strategic Management Journal, 14(1), 3-16.
Barkema, H.G. & Vermeulen, F. (1998). International expansion through start-up or
acquisition: A learning perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 41: 7-26.
Barker, V. L., & Duhaime, I. M. (1997). Strategic change in the turnaround process:
theory and empirical evidence. Strategic Management Journal, 18(1), 13-38.
144

Barney, J. B. (1986). Strategic factor markets: Expectations, luck, and business strategy.
Management Science, 32(10), 1231-1241.
Barney, J. B. (1991). Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 99-120.
Barney, J. B., & Arikan, A. M. (2001). The resource-based view: Origins and
implications. In M. A. Hitt, R. E. Freeman, & J. S. Harrison (Eds.), The Blackwell
Handbook of Strategic Management: 124-188. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
Barnett, W.P. & Burgelman, R.A. (1996). Evolutionary perspectives on strategy.
Strategic Management Journal. (17): 5-19.
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in
social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51(6), 1173.
Baum, J. A., Rowley, T. J., Shipilov, A. V., & Chuang, Y. T. (2005). Dancing with
strangers: Aspiration performance and the search for underwriting syndicate
partners. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50(4), 536-575.
Beer, M., & Nohria, N. (2000). Cracking the code of change. Harvard Business
Review, 78, 133-141.
Berger, P. G., & Ofek, E. (1995). Diversification’s effect on firm value. Journal of
Financial Economics, 37(1), 39–65.
Bergh, D. D. (1998). Product-market uncertainty, portfolio restructuring, and
performance: An information-processing and resource-based view. Journal of
Management, 24(2), 135-155.
Bergh, D. D. (1998). Product-market uncertainty, portfolio restructuring, and
performance: An information-processing and resource-based view. Journal of
Management, 24(2), 135-155.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C. & Gómez-Mejía, L.R. (2012). Socioemotional wealth in family
firms: Theoretical dimensions, assessment approaches and agenda for future
research. Family Business Review, 25(3), 258-279.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C. C., Gómez-Mejía, L. R., & Larraza Kintana, M. (2010).
Socioemotional wealth and corporate response to institutional pressures: Do
family-controlled firms pollute less? Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1), 82113.
Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., & Mullainathan, S. (2002). Ferreting out tunneling: An
application to Indian business groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1),
121-148.
145

Bettis, R. A., & Prahalad, C. K. (1995). The dominant logic: Retrospective and extension.
Strategic Management Journal, 16(1), 5-14.
Bettis, R. A., & Wong, S. S. (2003). Dominant logic, knowledge creation, and managerial
choice. The Blackwell Handbook of Organizational Learning and Knowledge
Management, 343-355.
Block, J. H. (2010). Family management, family ownership, and downsizing: Evidence
from S&P 500 firms. Family Business Review, 23(2), 109-130
Block, J.H. (2012). R&D investments in family and founder firms: An agency
perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 27: 248-265.
Bloodgood, J.M., Sapienza, H.J. & Almeida, J.G. (1996). The internationalization of new
high-potential U.S. ventures: Antecedents and outcomes. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice, 20(4): 61-76.
Boeker, W. (1989). Strategic change: The effects of founding and history. Academy of
Management Journal, 32(3), 489-515.
Boeker, W. (1997). Strategic change: The influence of managerial characteristics and
organizational growth. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 152–170.
Bogner, W. & Barr, P. (2000). Making sense in hypercompetitive environments: A
cognitive explanation for the persistence of high velocity competition.
Organization Science, 11(2): 212–226.
Bourgeois, L. J., & Brodwin, D. R. (1984). Strategic implementation: Five approaches to
an elusive phenomenon. Strategic Management Journal, 5(3), 241-264.
Bowman, E. H., & Hurry, D. (1993). Strategy through the option lens: An integrated
view of resource investments and the incremental-choice process. Academy of
Management Review, 18(4), 760-782.
Breschi, S., Lissoni, F., & Malerba, F. (2003). Knowledge-relatedness in firm
technological diversification. Research Policy, 32(1), 69-87.
Bunderson, J. S. (2003). Team member functional background and involvement in
management teams: Direct effects and the moderating role of power
centralization. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 458–474.
Burgelman, R. A. (1983). A process model of internal corporate venturing in the
diversified major firm. Administrative Science Quarterly, 28(2), 223-244.
Burgelman, R. A. (2002). Strategy as vector and the inertia of co-evolutionary lock-in.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 47: 325–357.
146

Cabrera-Suarez, K. (2005). Leadership transfer and the successor's development in the
family firm. Leadership Quarterly. 16(1), 71-96.
Cabrera-Suárez, K., Saá-Pérez, P. D., & García-Almeida, D. (2001). The succession
process from a resource- and knowledge-based view of the family firm. Family
Business Review, 14, 37-47.
Campa, J. M., & Kedia, S. (2002). Explaining the diversification discount. Journal of
Finance, 57(4), 1731-1762.
Carney, M. (2005). Corporate governance and competitive advantage in familycontrolled firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3), 249-265.
Carney, M., & Gedajlovic, E. (2003). Strategic innovation and the administrative heritage
of East Asian Chinese family business groups. Asia Pacific Journal of
Management, 20, 5-26.
Carney, M., Van Essen, M., Gedajlovic, E. R., & Heugens, P. P. (2013). What do we
know about private family firms? A meta‐analytical review. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice. 39(3), 513-544.
Carpenter, M.A. (2000). The price of change: the role of CEO compensation in strategic
variation and deviation from industry strategy norms. Journal of Management. 26:
1179–1198.
Carr, C., & Bateman, S. (2009). International strategy configurations of the world’s top
family firms. Management International Review, 49(6), 733-758.
Carter, S. M. (2006). The interaction of top management group, stakeholder, and
situational factors on certain corporate reputation management activities. Journal
of Management Studies, 43(5), 1145-1176.
Casson, M. (1999). The economics of family firms. Scandinavian Economic History
Review, 47(1), 10-23.
Chaffee, E. E. (1985). Three models of strategy. Academy of Management Review, 10,
89-98.
Chakrabarti, A., Singh, K., & Mahmood, I. (2007). Diversification and performance:
Evidence from East Asian firms. Strategic Management Journal, 28(2), 101–120.
Chandler, A. D. (1990). Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial
Enterprise (Vol. 120). MIT press.
Chatterjee, S., & Wernerfelt, B. (1991). The link between resources and type of
diversification: Theory and evidence. Strategic Management Journal, 12(1), 3348.
147

Chen, H. L., & Hsu, W. T. (2009). Family ownership, board independence, and R&D
Investment. Family Business Review, 22(4), 347-362.
Chirico, F., Sirmon, D. G., Sciascia, S., & Mazzola, P. (2011). Resource orchestration in
family firms: Investigating how entrepreneurial orientation, generational
involvement, and participative strategy affect performance. Strategic
Entrepreneurship Journal, 5(4), 307-326.
Cho, H.-J. & Pucik, V. (2005). Relationship between innovativeness, quality, growth,
proﬁtability, and market value. Strategic Management Journal, 26(6):555–575.
Cho, T.S. & Hambrick, D. (2006). Attention as the mediator between the top
management team characteristics and strategic change: the case of airline
deregulation. Organization Science 17(4): 453–469.
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Litz, R. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and
non-family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice. 28(4), 335-354.
Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., Pearson, A. W. & Barnett, T. (2012). Family involvement,
family influence, and family-centered non-economic goals in small firms,
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 36(2), 267-293.
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Sharma, P. (2005). Trends and directions in the
development of a strategic management theory of the family firm.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 29(5), 555-576.
Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. & Zahra, S.A. (2003). Creating wealth in family firms through
managing resources: Comments and extensions. Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice. 27(4), 359-365.
Chrisman, J. J., Memili, E. & Misra, K. (2014). Non-family managers, family firms, and
the winner’s curse: The influence of non-economic goals and bounded rationality.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 38(5), 1103-1127.
Chrisman, J. J., & Patel, P. C. (2012). Variations in R&D Investments of Family and
Non-family Firms: Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion
Perspectives. Academy of Management Journal, 55(4), 976-997.
Chrisman, J. J., Sharma, P., Steier, L. P., & Chua, J. H. (2013). The influence of family
goals, governance, and resources on firm outcomes. Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, 37(6), 1249-1261.
Christensen, H. K., & Montgomery, C. A. (1981). Corporate economic performance:
Diversification strategy versus market structure. Strategic Management Journal,
2(4), 327-343.
148

Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Bergiel, E. B. (2009). An agency theoretic analysis of the
professionalized family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 33(2), 355372.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., Kellermanns, F., & Wu, Z. (2011). Family involvement and
new venture debt financing. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(4), 472-488.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Sharma, P. (1999). Defining the family business by
behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(4), 19-39.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., Steier, L. P., & Rau, S. B. (2012). Sources of heterogeneity
in family firms: An introduction. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36(6),
1103-1113.
Claessens, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P., (2000). The separation of ownership and
control in East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 58, 81-112.
Claver, E., Rienda, L., & Quer, D. (2007). The internationalisation process in family
firms: Choice of market entry strategies. Journal of General Management, 33(1),
1-14.
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on
learning and innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 128-152.
Collins, C. J., & Clark, K. D. (2003). Strategic human resource practices, top
management team social networks, and firm performance: The role of human
resource practices in creating organizational competitive advantage. Academy of
Management Journal, 46(6), 740-751.
Combs, J. G., Penney, C. R., Crook, J. R., & Short, J. C. (2010). The impact of family
representation on CEO compensation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
34(6), 1125-1144.
Conner, D. R. (2006). Managing at the Speed of Change: How Resilient Managers
Succeed and Prosper Where Others Fail. Random House LLC.
Conner, K. (1991). A historical comparison of resource-based theory and five schools of
thought within industrial organization economics: Do we have a new theory of the
firm? Journal of Management, 17, 121-154
Côté, L., Langley, A., & Pasquero, J. (1999). Acquisition strategy and dominant logic in
an engineering firm. Journal of Management Studies, 36(7), 919-952.
Cruz, C. C., Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Becerra, M. 2010. Perceptions of benevolence and
the design of agency contracts: CEO-TMT relationships in family firms. Academy
of Management Journal, 53(1): 69–89.
149

Cyert, R. M., & March, J. G. (1963). A Behavioral Theory of the Firm. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ, 2.
Daft, R. L., & Weick, K. E. (1984). Toward a model of organizations as interpretation
systems. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 284-295.
Daily, C.M. & Dalton, D.R. (1997). CEO and board chair roles held jointly or separately:
Much ado about nothing? Academy of Management Executives. 11(3): 11–20.
Datta, D.K. (1991). Organizational fit and acquisition performance: effects of postacquisition integration. Strategic Management Journal. 12(4): 281–297.
David, P., O’Brien, J. P., Yoshikawa, T., & Delios, A. (2010). Do shareholders or
stakeholders appropriate the rents from corporate diversification? The influence
of ownership structure. Academy of Management Journal, 53(3), 636–654.
Davis, P. S. & Harveston, P. D. (1999). In the founder's shadow: Conflict in the family
firm. Family Business Review, 12(4), 311–323.
De Massis, A., Chirico, F., Kotlar, J., & Naldi, L. (2014). The temporal evolution of
proactiveness in family firms: the horizontal s-curve hypothesis. Family Business
Review, 27(1), 35-50.
De Massis, A., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. (2008). Factors Preventing Intra‐Family
Succession. Family Business Review, 21(2), 183-199.
De Massis, A., Kotlar, J., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. (2014). Ability and willingness
as sufficiency conditions for family-oriented particularistic behavior: Implications
for theory and empirical studies. Journal of Small Business Management, 52(2),
344-364.
Dean, J. W., & Sharfman, M. P. (1996). Does decision process matter? A study of
strategic decision-making effectiveness. Academy of Management Journal, 39(2),
368-392.
DeCarolis, D.M. & Deeds, D.L. (1999). The Impact of Stocks and Flows of
Organizational Knowledge on Firm Performance: An Empirical Investigation of
the Biotechnology Industry. Strategic Management Journal, 20(10):953–968.
Deephouse, D. L. (1996). Does isomorphism legitimate? Academy of Management
Journal, 39(4), 1024-1039.
Deephouse, D. L., & Jaskiewicz, P. (2013). Do family firms have better reputations than
non-family firms? An integration of socioemotional wealth and social identity
theories. Journal of management Studies, 50(3), 337-360.

150

Delacroix, J., & Swaminathan, A. (1991). Cosmetic, speculative, and adaptive
organizational change in the wine industry: A longitudinal study. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 631-661.
Donnelley, R. (1964). The family business. Harvard Business Review, 42(2), 93–105.
Durand, R. & Coeurderoy, R. (2001). Age, order of entry, strategic orientation, and
organizational performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 16(5): 471-494
Dutton, J. E., & Duncan, R. B. (1987). The creation of momentum for change through the
process of strategic issue diagnosis. Strategic Management Journal, 8(3), 279295.
Dyer, W. G., Jr. (2006). Examining the “family effect” on firm performance. Family
Business Review, 19(4), 253-273.
Dyer, W. G., Jr., & Whetten, D. A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility:
Preliminary evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
30(6), 785-802.
Eddleston, K., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2007). Destructive and productive family
relationships: A stewardship theory perspective. Journal of Business Venturing,
22(4), 545-565.
Eddleston, K.A., Otondo, R.F. & Kellermanns, F.W. (2008). Conflict, participative
decision-making and generational ownership dispersion: A multilevel analysis.
Journal of Small Business Management. 46(3), 456-484.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of
Management Review, 14(1): 57-74.
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Martin, J. A. (2000). Dynamic capabilities: What are they?
Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1105-1121.
Ensley, M. D., Pearson, A. W., & Amason, A. C. (2002). Understanding the dynamics of
new venture top management teams: cohesion, conflict, and new venture
performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(4), 365-386.
Faccio, M. & Lang, L. H. P., (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics. 65, 365-395.
Finkelstein, S. & Hambrick, D.C. (1990). Top-management-team tenure and
organizational outcomes: the moderating role of managerial discretion.
Administrative Science Quarterly. 35: 484–503.
Fiol, C. M. (2001). Revisiting an identity-based view of sustainable competitive
advantage. Journal of Management, 27(6), 691-699.
151

Fiol, C.M. & O’Connor, E.J. (2003). Waking up! Mindfulness in the face of bandwagons.
Academy of Management Review. 28(1): 54–70.
Fombrun, C. J. (1993). Envisioning strategic change. In P. Shrivastava, A. Huff, & J.
Dutton (Eds.), Advances in Strategic Management, vol. 9: 157-188. Greenwich,
CT: JAI Press.
Fombrun, C. J., & Ginsberg, A. (1990). Shifting gears: Enabling change in corporate
aggressiveness. Strategic Management Journal, 11: 297-308.
Forbes, D.P. (2005). Managerial determinants of decision speed in new ventures.
Strategic Management Journal, 26(4): 355–366.
Ford, J. D., Ford, L. W., & D'Amelio, A. (2008). Resistance to change: The rest of the
story. Academy of Management Review, 33(2), 362-377.
Foss, N. J. (1997). On the rationales of corporate headquarters. Industrial and Corporate
Change, 6(2), 313-338.
Fredrickson, J. W. & Iaquinto, A. (1989). Inertia and creeping rationality in strategic
decision processes. Academy of Management Journal, 32: 516-542.
Freeman, J. & Boeker. W. (1984). The ecological analysis of business strategy.
California Management Review, 26(3): 73-110.
Galbraith, J. R. & Nathanson, D. A. (1978). Strategy Implementation: The Role of
Structure and Process. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Company.
Gallo, M. Á., Tàpies, J. and Cappuyns, K. (2004), Comparison of Family and Non-family
Business: Financial Logic and Personal Preferences. Family Business Review,
17(4): 303–318.
Gallo, M. Á., Tàpies, J. and Cappuyns, K. (2004). Comparison of family and non-family
business: Financial logic and personal preferences. Family Business Review,
17(4): 303–318.
Gavetti, G., & Levinthal, D. A. (2000). Looking forward and looking backward:
Cognitive and experiential search. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45: 113–
137.
Gedajlovic, E., & Carney, M. (2010). Markets, hierarchies, and families: Toward a
transaction cost theory of the family firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
34(6), 1145-1172.
Gedajlovic, E., Carney, M., Chrisman, J. J., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2012). The
adolescence of family firm research: Taking stock and planning for the future.
Journal of Management, 38(4), 1010-1037
152

Gedajlovic, E., Lubatkin, M., & Schulze, W. S. (2004). Crossing the threshold from
founder management to professional management: A governance perspective.
Journal of Management Studies, 41(5), 899-912.
Gentry, R., Dibrell, C., & Kim, J. (Forthcoming). Long-term orientation in publicly
traded family businesses: Evidence of a dominant logic. Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice.
Geoffrey Love, E., & Nohria, N. (2005). Reducing slack: the performance consequences
of downsizing by large industrial firms, 1977–93. Strategic Management Journal,
26(12), 1087-1108.
George, E., Chattopadhyay, P., Sitkin, S. B., & Barden, J. (2006). Cognitive
underpinnings of institutional persistence and change: A framing perspective.
Academy of Management Review, 31(2), 347-365.
Geringer, J.M., Beamish, P.W., & da Costa, R.C. (1989). Diversification strategy and
internationalization: Implications for MNE performance. Strategic Management
Journal, 10(2), 109-119.
Gersick, C. J. (1991). Revolutionary change theories: A multilevel exploration of the
punctuated equilibrium paradigm. Academy of Management Review, 16(1), 10-36.
Gersick, C. J. (1994). Pacing strategic change: The case of a new venture. Academy of
Management Journal, 37(1), 9-45.
Gersick, K. E., Davis, J. A., Hampton, M. M., & Lansberg, I. (1997). Generation to
Generation: Life Cycles of the Family Business. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School Press.
Ghemawat, P. (1991). Commitment: The Dynamic of Strategy. Free Press, New York.
Gibbs, P. A. (1993). Determinants of corporate restructuring: The relative importance of
corporate governance, takeover threat, and free cash flow. Strategic Management
Journal, 14: 51-68.
Ginsberg, A. (1988). Measuring and modeling changes in strategy: Theoretical
foundations and empirical directions. Strategic Management Journal, 9: 559-575.
Gioia, D. A. & Chittipeddi, K. (1991), Sensemaking and sensegiving in strategic change
initiation. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 433–448.
Goll, I., & Rasheed, A. (1997). Rational decision-making and firm performance: the
moderating role of the environment. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), 583591.

153

Gomes, J., & Livdan, D. (2004). Optimal diversification: Reconciling theory and
evidence. Journal of Finance, 59(2), 507–535.
Gómez-Mejía, L.R., Campbell, J.T., Martin, G., Hoskisson, R.E., Makri, M. & Sirmon,
D.G. (2013). Socioemotional wealth as a mixed gamble: Revisiting family firm
R&D with the behavioral agency model. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
37, 1-24.
Gómez-Mejía, L.R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P. & Castro, J.D. (2011). The bind that ties:
Socioemotional wealth preservation in family firms. Academy of Management
Annals, 5(1): 653-707
Gómez-Mejía, L.R., Haynes, K.T., Núñez-Nickel, M., & Monyano-Fuentes, H. (2007).
Socio-emotional wealth and business risk in family-controlled firms: Evidence
from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52(1): 106-137.
Gómez-Mejía. L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M. & Makri, M. (2003). The determinants of
executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of
Management Journal. 46(2), 226-237.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Makri, M., & Larraza Kintana, M. (2010). Diversification decisions
in family-controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2), 223-252.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in
agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 81-95.
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate governance and equity prices. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1): 107-156.
Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity
on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241-250.
Goold, M., & Luchs, K. (1993). Why diversify? Four decades of management
thinking. Academy of Management Executive, 7(3), 7-25.
Govindarajan, V. (1986). Decentralization, strategy, and effectiveness of strategic
business units in multibusiness organizations. Academy of Management Review,
11(4), 844-856.
Govindarajan, V. (1988). A contingency approach to strategy implementation at the
business-unit level: integrating administrative mechanisms with strategy.
Academy of Management Journal, 31(4), 828-853.
Govindarajan, V. (1989). Implementing competitive strategies at the business unit level:
Implications of matching managers to strategies. Strategic Management Journal,
10(3), 251-269.
154

Govindarajan, V., & Fisher, J. (1990). Strategy, control systems, and resource sharing:
Effects on business-unit performance. Academy of Management Journal, 33(2),
259-285.
Grant, R. M. (1988). On ‘dominant logic’, relatedness and the link between diversity and
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6), 639-642.
Grant, R. M. (1996). Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic
Management Journal, 17(S2), 109-122.
Grant, R. M., Jammine, A. P., & Thomas, H. (1988). Diversity, diversification, and
profitability among British manufacturing companies, 1972–1984. Academy of
Management Journal, 31(4), 771-801.
Graves, C., & Thomas, J. (2006). Internationalization of Australian family businesses: A
managerial capabilities perspective. Family Business Review, 19(3), 207-224.
Graves, C., & Thomas, J. (2008). Determinants of the internationalization pathways of
family firms: An examination of family influence. Family Business Review, 21(2),
151-167.
Greenwood, R., Díaz, A. M., Li, S. X., & Lorente, J. C. (2010). The multiplicity of
institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational responses.
Organization Science, 21(2), 521-539.
Greve, H. R. (2003). A behavioral theory of R&D expenditures and innovations:
Evidence from shipbuilding. Academy of Management Journal, 46(6), 685-702.
Greve, H. R. (2008). A behavioral theory of firm growth: Sequential attention to size and
performance goals. Academy of Management Journal, 51(3): 476-494.
Grinyer, P. H., & Yasai-Ardekani, M. (1981). Strategy, structure, size and bureaucracy.
Academy of Management Journal, 24(3), 471-486.
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. (1984). Business unit strategy, managerial
characteristics, and business unit effectiveness at strategy implementation.
Academy of Management Journal, 27(1), 25-41.
Guth, W. D. & MacMillan, I. C. (1986). Strategy implementation versus middle
management self‐interest. Strategic Management Journal, 7(4), 313-327.
Guth, W. D. & Taguri, R. (1965). Personal values and corporate strategy. Harvard
Business Review, 43(5): 123-132.
Habbershon, T.G., & Williams, M. (1999). A resource-based framework for assessing the
strategic advantage of family firms. Family Business Review, 12(1), 1-25.
155

Habbershon, T.G., Williams, M., & MacMillan, I.C. (2003). A unified systems
perspective of family firm performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4),
451-465.
Hambrick, D. C., Geletkanycz, M. A. & Fredrickson, J. W. (1993). Top executive
commitment to the status quo: Some tests of its determinants, Strategic
Management Journal, 14:401–418.
Hambrick, D. C., & Mason, P. A. (1984). Upper echelons: The organization as a
reflection of its top managers. Academy of Management Review, 9(2), 193-206.
Hambrick, D. C., & Schecter, S. M. (1983). Turnaround strategies for mature industrialproduct business units. Academy of Management Journal, 26(2): 231-248.
Hannan, M. & Freeman, J., (1984). Structural inertia and organizational change.
American Sociology Review. 49, 149–164.
Hansen, M. T., Mors, M. L., & Løvås, B. (2005). Knowledge sharing in organizations:
Multiple networks, multiple phases. Academy of Management Journal, 48(5),
776-793.
Harrison, J. S., Hall, E. H., & Nargundkar, R. (1993). Resource allocation as an
outcropping of strategic consistency: performance implications. Academy of
Management Journal, 36(5), 1026-1051.
Harrison, J., Hitt, M., Hoskisson, R., & Ireland, D. (1991). Synergies and post-acquisition
performance: Differences versus similarities in resource allocations. Journal of
Management, 17(1), 173-190.
Haveman, H.A. (1992). Between a rock and a hard place: organizational change and
performance under conditions of fundamental environmental transformation.
Administrative Science Quarterly. 37: 48–75.
Haynes, G.W., Walker, R., Rowe, B.R., & Hong, G.-S. (1999). The intermingling of
business and family finances in family-owned businesses. Family Business
Review, 12, 225–239.
Heath, C., Larrick, R. P., & Klayman, J. (1998). Cognitive repairs: How organizational
practices can compensate for individual shortcomings. Review of Organizational
Behavior. (20), 1-37
Heckman, J.J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica,
47:153–161
Hedberg, B. L., Bystrom, P. C., & Starbuck, W. H. (1976). Camping on seesaws:
Prescriptions for a self-designing organization. Administrative Science Quarterly,
41-65.
156

Highhouse, S., Brooks, M. E., & Gregarus, G. (2009). An organizational impression
management perspective on the formation of corporate reputations. Journal of
Management, 35(6), 1481-1493.
Hill, C. W., Hitt, M. A., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1992). Cooperative versus competitive
structures in related and unrelated diversified firms. Organization Science, 3(4),
501-521.
Hill, C. W., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1987). Strategy and structure in the multiproduct firm.
Academy of Management Review, 12(2), 331-341.
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Kim, H. (1997). International diversification: Effects on
innovation and firm performance in product-diversified firms. Academy of
Management Journal, 40(4), 767-798.
Hitt, M., Ireland, R., Camp, S., & Sexton, D. (2001). Strategic entrepreneurship:
Entrepreneurial strategies for wealth creation. Strategic Management Journal,
479–491.
Hitt, M., Ireland, R., & Sirmon, D. (2003). A model of strategic entrepreneurship: the
Construct and its dimensions. Journal of Management, 963–989.
Hitt, M. A., Tihanyi, L., Miller, T., & Connelly, B. (2006). International diversification:
Antecedents, outcomes, and moderators. Journal of Management, 32(6), 831-867.
Hofer, C. W., & Schendel, D. (1978). Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts. St.
Paul., MN: West.
Hoffman, J., Hoelscher, M., & Sorenson, R. (2006). Achieving sustained competitive
advantage: A family capital theory. Family Business Review, 19(2), 135-145.
Horton, T.P. (1986). Managing in a family way. Management Review, 75(2), 3.
Horwitz, S. K., & Horwitz, I. B. (2007). The effects of team diversity on team outcomes:
A meta-analytic review of team demography. Journal of Management, 33(6),
987-1015.
Hoskisson, R. E., Harrison, J. S., & Dubofsky, D. A. (1991). Capital market evaluation of
M‐form implementation and diversification strategy. Strategic Management
Journal, 12(4), 271-279.
Hoskisson, R.E.& Hitt, M.A. (1988). Strategic control systems and relative R&D
investment in large multiproduct firms. Strategic Management Journal, 9(6):
605–621.

157

Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. (1990). Antecedents and performance outcomes of
diversification: A review and critique of theoretical perspectives. Journal of
Management, 16(2), 461-509.
Hoskisson, R. O., & Johnson, R. A. (1992). Corporate restructuring and strategic changeThe effect on diversification strategy and research-and-development intensity.
Strategic Management Journal, 13: 625–634.
Huff, J. O., Huff, A. S., & Thomas, H. (1992). Strategic renewal and the interaction of
cumulative stress and inertia. Strategic Management Journal, 13(S1), 55-75.
Hurst, D. K., Rush, J. C., & White, R. E. (1989). Top management teams and
organizational renewal. Strategic Management Journal, 10(S1), 87-105.
Hutzschenreuter, T., & Kleindienst, I. (2006). Strategy-process research: what have we
learned and what is still to be explored. Journal of Management, 32(5), 673-720.
Hutzschenreuter, T., Kleindienst, I., & Greger, C. (2012). How new leaders affect
strategic change following a succession event: A critical review of the literature.
The Leadership Quarterly, 729–755.
Ilias, N. (2006). Families and firms: Agency costs and labor market imperfections in
Sialkot’s surgical industry. Journal of Development Economics, 80(2), 329-349
Jacquemin, A.P. & Berry, C.H. (1979), Entropy measure of diversification and corporate
growth. Journal of Industrial Economics, 27, 359–369.
Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict,
Choice, and Commitment. Free Press.
Jauch, L.R., Osborn, R.N. & Glueck, W.F. (1980). Short term financial success in large
business organizations: the environment-strategy connection. Strategic
Management Journal, 1(1): 49–63.
Jensen, M. C. (1994). Self-interest, altruism, incentives, and agency theory. Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, Summer: 1-15.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency costs, and economic organization. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4):
305-360.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1994). Self-interest, altruism, incentives, and agency
theory. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7(2), 40-45.
Johnson, D.R. & Hoopes, D.G. (2003). Managerial cognition, sunk costs, and the
evolution of industry structure. Strategic Management Journal, 24: 1057–1068.
158

Johnson, G., Scholes, K., & Whittington, R. (2008). Exploring Corporate Strategy: Text
& Cases. Pearson Education.
Jones, G. R., & Hill, C. W. (1988). Transaction cost analysis of strategy-structure choice.
Strategic Management Journal, 9(2), 159-172.
Judge, W. Q., & Miller, A. (1991). Antecedents and outcomes of decision speed in
different environmental context. Academy of Management Journal, 34(2), 449463.
Judson, R. A., & Owen, A. L. (1999). Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for
macroeconomists. Economics letters, 65(1), 9-15.
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J. L., & Thaler, R. H. (1991). Anomalies: The endowment
effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1),
193-206.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under
risk. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47(2), 263-291.
Kammerlander, N., Sieger, P., Voordeckers, W., & Zellweger, T. (2015). Value creation
in family firms: A model of fit. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 6(2), 63-72.
Kanter, R. M. (1989). When Giants Learn to Dance. Simon & Schuster, New York.
Karim, S. & Mitchell, W. (2000). Path-dependent and path-breaking change:
Reconfiguring business resources following acquisitions in the U.S. medical
sector, 1978–1995. Strategic Management Journal, 21(10-11): 1061–1081.
Kazanjian, R. K., & Drazin, R. (1987). Implementing internal diversification:
contingency factors for organization design choices. Academy of Management
Review, 12(2), 342-354.
Kellermanns, F.W. & Barnett, T. (2008). Commentary: What were they thinking? The
role of family firm mental models on threat recognition. Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice. 32(6), 999-1006.
Kellermanns, F.W. & Eddleston, K.A. (2004). Feuding families: When conflict does a
family firm good. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 28(3), 209-229.
Kelly, D. & Amburgey, T.L. (1991). Organizational inertia and momentum: a dynamic
model of strategic change. Academy of Management Journal. 34: 591–612.
Kenny, D. A., Kashy, D. A., & Bolger, N. (1998). Data analysis in social psychology. In
D. Gilbert, S. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology
(Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 233-265). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill.
159

Kieser, A. (1989). Organizational, institutional, and societal evolution: Medieval craft
guilds and the genesis of formal organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly,
34(4), 540-564.
Kimberiy, J. (1979). Issues in the creation of organizations: Initiation, innovation and
institutionalization. Academy of Management Journal, 22: 437-457.
Kisfalvi, V. (2000). The threat of failure, the perils of success and CEO character:
Sources of strategic persistence. Organization Studies, 21(3), 611-639.
Klarner, P. (2010). The Rhythm of Change: A Longitudinal Analysis of the European
Insurance Industry. Springer Fachmedien.
Klenke, K. (2003). Gender influences in decision-making processes in top management
teams. Management Decision, 41(10), 1024-1034.
Koberg, C. S. (1987). Resource scarcity, environmental uncertainty, and adaptive
organizational behavior. Academy of Management Journal, 30(4), 798-807.
Kochhar, R., & Hitt, M. A. (1998). Linking corporate strategy to capital structure:
Diversification strategy, type and source of financing. Strategic Management
Journal, (19), 601-610.
Kogut, B. & Zander, U. (1992). Knowledge of the firm, combinative capabilities, and the
replication of technology. Organization Science. 3(3), pp. 383–397.
Kogut, B., & Zander, U. (1996). What firms do? Coordination, identity, and learning.
Organization Science, 7(5), 502-518.
König, A., Kammerlander, N., & Enders, A. (2013). The family innovator’s dilemma:
How family influence affects the adoption of discontinuous technologies by
incumbent firms. Academy of Management Review, 38(3), 418-441.
Kontinen, T., & Ojala, A. (2010). The internationalization of family businesses: A review
of extant research. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 1(2), 97-107.
Kor, Y. Y., & Leblebici, H. (2005). How do interdependencies among human-capital
deployment, development, and diversification strategies affect firms' financial
performance? Strategic Management Journal, 26(10), 967-985.
Kor, Y. Y., & Mesko, A. (2013). Dynamic managerial capabilities: Configuration and
orchestration of top executives' capabilities and the firm's dominant logic.
Strategic Management Journal, 34(2), 233-244.
Kotlar, J., & De Massis, A. (2013). Goal setting in family firms: Goal diversity, social
interactions, and collective commitment to family-centered goals.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37(6), 1263-1288.
160

La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around
the world. Journal of Finance, 54(2), 471-517.
Lamberg, J. A., Tikkanen, H., Nokelainen, T., & Suur‐Inkeroinen, H. (2009).
Competitive dynamics, strategic consistency, and organizational survival.
Strategic Management Journal, 30(1), 45-60.
Lampel, J., & Shamsie, J. (2000). Probing the unobtrusive link: Dominant logic and the
design of joint ventures at General Electric. Strategic Management Journal,
21(5), 593-602.
Lang, L. H., & Stulz, R. M. (1994). Tobin’s Q, corporate diversification, and firm
performance. Journal of Political Economy, 102(6), 1248–1280.
Langley, A. N. N., Smallman, C., Tsoukas, H., & Van de Ven, A. H. (2013). Process
studies of change in organization and management: unveiling temporality,
activity, and flow. Academy of Management Journal, 56(1), 1-13.
Lansberg, I. (1999). Succeeding Generations: Realizing the Dream of Families in
Business. Boston: Harvard University School Press.
Lant, T. K., Milliken, F. J., & Batra, B. (1992). The role of managerial learning and
interpretation in strategic persistence and reorientation: An empirical exploration.
Strategic Management Journal, 13(8), 585-608.
Larsson, R. & Finkelstein, S. (1999). Integrating strategic, organizational, and human
resource perspectives on mergers and acquisitions: a case survey of synergy
realization. Organization Science. 10(1): 1–26.
Le Breton-Miller, I. & Miller, D. (2006). Why do some family businesses out-compete?
Governance, long-term orientations, and sustainable capability. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice, 30, 731–746.
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D. & Steier, L. (2004). Towards an integrative model of
effective FOB succession. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 28(4), 305-328.
Lee, K. S., Lim, G. H., & Lim, W. S. (2003). Family business succession: Appropriation
risk and choice of successor. Academy of Management Review, 28(4), 657-666.
Lester, R. & Cannella, A. (2006). Interorganizational familiness: How family firms use
interlocking directorates to build community-level social capital.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(6), 755-776.
Levinthal, D., & March, J. G. (1981). A model of adaptive organizational search. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2(4), 307-333.

161

Levinthal, D. & March, J.G. (1993). The myopia of learning. Strategic Management
Journal. 14(8): 95–112.
Libation, M. & Chatterjee, S. (1994). Extending modern portfolio theory into the domain
of corporate diversification: does it apply? Academy of Management Journal,
37(1), 109-136.
Lieberman, M.B. & Montgomery, D.B. (1988). First-mover advantages. Strategic
Management Journal 9:41–58 (Summer Special Issue)
Lippman, S. A., & Rumelt, R. P. (1982). Uncertain imitability: An analysis of inter-firm
differences in efficiency under competition. The Bell Journal of Economics,
13,418-438.
Lounsbury, M. (2007). A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in
the professionalizing of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50(2),
289-307.
Love, E. G., & Nohria, N. (2005). Reducing slack: The performance consequences of
downsizing by large industrial firms, 1977 – 93. Strategic Management Journal,
26: 1087 –1108.
Lumpkin, G. T., & Brigham, K. H. (2011). Long-term orientation and intertemporal
choice in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(6), 1149-1169.
Lumpkin, G.T., Brigham, K.H., & Moss, T. (2010). Long-term orientation: Implications
for the entrepreneurial orientation and performance of family businesses.
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, 22(3), 1–24.
Luo, Y. (2003). Industrial dynamics and managerial networking in an emerging market:
The case of China. Strategic Management Journal, 24(13), 1315-1327.
Lyandres, E. (2007). Strategic cost of diversification. Review of Financial Studies, 20(6),
1901–1940.
MacKay, R., & Chia, R. (2012). Choice, chance and unintended consequences in
strategic change: A process understanding of the rise and fall of North-co
automotive. Academy of Management Journal, 56(1): 208-230
MacKinnon, D. P., Fairchild, A. J., & Fritz, M. S. (2007). Mediation analysis. Annual
Review of Psychology, 58, 593-614
Mahoney, J. T., & Pandian, J. R. (1992). The resource-based view within the
conversation of strategic management. Strategic Management Journal, 13(5),
363-380.

162

Markides, C. C. (1995). Diversification, restructuring, and economic performance.
Strategic Management Journal, 16(2), 101–118.
Markides, C. C. (1997). Strategic innovation. Sloan Management Review, 9-23.
Markides, C. C., & Williamson, P. J. (1994). Related diversification, core competences
and corporate performance. Strategic Management Journal, 15(S2), 149-165.
Markides, C. C., & Williamson, P. J. (1996). Corporate diversification and organizational
structure: A resource-based view. Academy of Management Journal, 39(2), 340–
367.
Markoczy, L. (2001). Consensus formation during strategic change. Strategic
Management Journal, 22(11), 1013-1031.
Markowitz, H. M. (1968). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Investments.
Yale university press.
Marschak, J. & Radner, R. (1972). Economic Theory of Teams. Yale University Press:
New Haven, CT.
Martinez, J. I., & Jarillo, J. C. (1989). The evolution of research on coordination
mechanisms in multinational corporates. Journal of International Business
Studies, 489-514.
Mathur, I., Singh, M., & Gleason, K. C. (2004). Multinational diversification and
corporate performance: Evidence from European firms. European Financial
Management, 10(3), 439–464.
Mazzi, C. (2011). Family business and financial performance: Current state of knowledge
and future research challenges. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 2(3), 166181.
McConaughy, D. L. (2000). Family CEOs vs. non-family CEOs in the family-controlled
firm: An examination of the level and sensitivity of pay to performance. Family
Business Review, 13(2), 121-131.
McConaughy, D. L., Walker, M. C., Henderson Jr., G. V., & Mishra, C. S. (1998).
Founding family controlled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial
Economics, 7(1), 1-19.
Meyer, A. D., Brooks, G. R., & Goes, J. B. (1990). Environmental jolts and industry
revolutions: Organizational responses to discontinuous change. Strategic
Management Journal, 11(5), 93-110.
Mezias, S.J. & Glynn, M.A. (1993) The three faces of corporate renewal: Institution,
revolution, and evolution, Strategic Management Journal, 14:77-101.
163

Michel, J. G., & Hambrick, D. C. (1992). Diversification posture and top management
team characteristics. Academy of Management Journal, 35(1), 9-37.
Miles, R. H. & Cameron, K. C.(1982). Coffin Nails and Corporate Strategies. PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ
Miller, D. (1991). Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization
and environment. Management Science, 37: 34–52.
Miller, D. (2006). Technological diversity, related diversification, and firm performance.
Strategic Management Journal, 27(7), 601-619.
Miller, D., & Friesen, P. H. (1983). Strategy-making and environment: The third link.
Strategic Management Journal, 4(3), 221-235.
Miller, D. & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005). Managing for the Long Run: Lessons in
Competitive Advantage from Great Family Businesses. Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2011). Family and lone founder
ownership and strategic behavior: Social context, identity, and institutional logics.
Journal of Management Studies, 48(1), 1-25.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. (2013). Family firm governance,
strategic conformity, and performance: Institutional vs. strategic perspectives.
Organization Science, 24(1), 189-209.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R.H. & Cannella Jr., A.A. (2007). Are family
firms really superior performers? Journal of Corporate Finance. 13(5), 829-858
Miller, D., Steier, L., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2003). Lost in time: Intergenerational
succession, change, and failure in family business. Journal of Business Venturing,
18(4), 513-531.
Minniti, M. (2004). Entrepreneurial alertness and asymmetric information in a spin-glass
model. Journal of Business Venturing, 19, 637-658.
Mintzberg H. (1978). Patterns in strategy formation. Management Science 24: 934–948.
Mishina, Y., Pollock, T. G., & Porac, J. F. (2004). Are more resources always better for
growth? Resource stickiness in market and product expansion. Strategic
Management Journal, 25(12), 1179-1197.
Mitchell, G. R., & Hamilton, W. F. (1988). Managing R&D as a strategic option.
Research Technology Management, 31(3), 15-22.

164

Mitchell, R. J., Shepherd, D. A., & Sharfman, M. P. (2011). Erratic strategic decisions:
when and why managers are inconsistent in strategic decision making. Strategic
Management Journal, 32(7), 683-704.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., Chrisman, J. J., & Spence, L. J. (2011). Toward a theory of
stakeholder salience in family firms. Business Ethics Quarterly, 21(2), 235-255.
Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Toward a theory of stakeholder
identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts.
Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 853-886.
Montgomery, C.A., (1982). The measurement of firm diversification: some new
empirical evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 25, 299-307.
Morck, R.K., & Steier, L. (2005). The global history of corporate governance: An
introduction. In A History of Corporate Governance around the World: Family
Business Groups to Professional Managers (pp. 1-64). University of Chicago
Press.
Morck, R. K., Wolfenzon, D., & Yeung, B. (2005). Corporate governance, economic
entrenchment, and growth. Journal of Economic Literature, 43, 655-720.
Morck, R.K., & Yeung, B. (2003). Agency problems in large business groups.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27(4), 367-382.
Mosakowski, E., & Earley, P. C. (2000). A selective review of time assumptions in
strategy research. Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 796-812.
Nadkarni, S., & Barr, P. S. (2008). Environmental context, managerial cognition, and
strategic action: an integrated view. Strategic Management Journal, 29(13), 13951427.
Nahapiet, J. & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the
organizational advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(2), 242–266.
Nath, D., & Sudharshan, D. (1994). Measuring strategy coherence through patterns of
strategic choices. Strategic Management Journal, 15(1), 43-61.
Nelson, R.R., & Winter, S.G. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
Nicholls-Nixon, C. L., Cooper, A. C., & Woo, C. Y. (2000). Strategic experimentation:
understanding change and performance in new ventures. Journal of Business
Venturing, 15(5), 493-521.

165

Nippa, M., Pidun, U., & Rubner, H. (2011). Corporate portfolio management: Appraising
four decades of academic research. Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(4),
50-66.
Nohria, N., & Gulati, R. (1996). Is slack good or bad for innovation? Academy of
Management Journal, 39(5), 1245–1264.
Nonaka, I. (1991). The knowledge-creating company. Harvard Business Review, 69(6),
96-104.
Ocasio, W. (1994). Political-dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in
United States industrial corporations, 1960–1990. Administrative Science
Quarterly 39(2): 285–312.
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management
Review, 16: 145–179.
Pablo, A.L. (1994). Determinants of acquisition integration level: A decision-making
perspective. Academy of Management Journal. 37: 803–836.
Palich, L. E., Cardinal, L. B., & Miller, C. C. (2000). Curvilinearity in the
diversification–performance linkage: an examination of over three decades of
research. Strategic Management Journal, 21(2), 155-174.
Patel, P., & Pavitt, K. (1997). The technological competencies of the world's largest
firms: Complex and path-dependent, but not much variety. Research Policy,
26(2), 141-156.
Pearson, A.W., Carr, J.C., & Shaw, J.C. (2008). Toward a theory of familiness: A social
capital perspective. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32(6), 949-969.
Pehrsson, A. (2006). Business relatedness and performance: A study of managerial
perceptions. Strategic Management Journal, 27(3), 265-282.
Penrose, E. T. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Cambridge, MA.
Pérez-González, F. (2006). Inherited control and firm performance. American Economic
Review, 96, 1550-1588.
Peteraf, M. A. (1993). The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource-based
view, Strategic Management Journal, 14(3), pp. 179–192.
Pfeffer, J. & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The External Control of Organizations: A Resource
Dependence Perspective. New York, NY, Harper and Row.

166

Pidun, U., Rubner, H., Kruehler, M., Untiedt, R., & Nippa, M. (2011). Corporate
portfolio management: Theory and practice. Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance, 23(1), 63–76.
Pollak, R. A. (1985). A transaction cost approach to families and households. Journal of
Economic Literature, 23, 581-608.
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy. New York: Free Press.
Porter, M. E. (1985). Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior
Performance. Free Press, New York.
Prahalad, C. K. (2004). The blinders of dominant logic. Long Range Planning, 37(2),
171-179.
Prahalad, C. K., & Bettis, R. A. (1986). The dominant logic: A new linkage between
diversity and performance. Strategic Management Journal, 7(6), 485-501.
Preble, J. F. (1992). Towards a comprehensive system of strategic control. Journal of
Management Studies. 29, 4: 391-408.
Priem, R. L. (1990). Top management team group factors, consensus, and firm
performance. Strategic Management Journal, 11(6), 469-478.
Priem, R.L. & Butler, J.E. (2001). Is the resource-based “view” a useful perspective for
strategic management research? Academy of Management Review, 26, 22-40.
Priem, R.L. & Cycyota, C.S. (2001). On strategic judgment. In M.A. Hitt, R.E. Freeman,
& J.R. Harrison (eds.), Handbook of Strategic Management, 403–519. Oxford,
U.K.: Blackwell Publishing.
Probst, G. & Raisch, S. (2005). Organizational crisis: The logic of failure. Academy of
Management Executive, 19(1), 90-105.
Pukall, T. J., & Calabrò, A. (2014). The Internationalization of family firms: A critical
review and integrative model. Family Business Review, 27(2), 103-125.
Quigley, T. J., & Hambrick, D. C. (2012). When the former CEO stays on as board chair:
Effects on successor discretion, strategic change, and performance. Strategic
Management Journal, 33(7), 834-859.
Rabinow, P., & Sullivan, W. M. (1987). Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look.
University of California Press.
Rajagopalan, N., & Spreitzer, G. M. (1996). Toward a theory of strategic change: A
multi-lens perspective and integrative framework. Academy of Management
Review, 22(1), 48-79.
167

Ramanujam, V., & Varadarajan, P. (1989). Research on corporate diversification: A
synthesis. Strategic Management Journal, 10(6), 523–551.
Rawley, E. (2010). Diversification, coordination costs, and organizational rigidity:
Evidence from microdata. Strategic Management Journal, 31(8), 873-891.
Reed, R., & DeFillippi, R. J. (1990). Causal ambiguity, barriers to imitation, and
sustainable competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 15(1), 88102.
Reichers, A.E., Wanous, J.P. &Austin, J.T. (1997). Understanding and managing
cynicism about organizational change, Academy of Management Executive, 11
(1), pp. 48-59.
Riordan, M. H., & Williamson, O. E. (1985). Asset specificity and economic
organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3(4), 365-378.
Roberts, P.W. (1999). Product innovation, product-market competition and persistent
proﬁtability in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Strategic Management Journal
20(7):655–670.
Rosenbaum, V. (1998). Corporate Takeover Defenses. Washington, DC: Investor
Responsibility Research Center Inc.
Rosenkopf, L., & Almeida, P. (2003). Overcoming local search through alliances and
mobility. Management Science, 49(6), 751-766.
Rumelt, R. P. (1974). Strategy, Structure and Performance. Gambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Rumelt, R. P. (1982). Diversification strategy and profitability. Strategic Management
Journal, 3(4), 359-369.
Rumelt, R. P. (1995). Inertia and Transformation. Springer US.
Sacristán-Navarro, M., Gómez-Ansón, S., & Cabeza-García, L. (2011). Family
ownership and control, the presence of other large shareholders, and firm
performance: Further evidence. Family Business Review, 24(1), 71.
Sanders, W.G. & Carpenter, M.A. (1998). Internationalization and firm governance: the
role of CEO compensation, top team composition, and board structure. Academy
of Management Journal. 41: 158–178.
Schneider, B., Goldstein, H. W., & Smith, D. B. (1995). The ASA Framework: An
update. Personnel Psychology, 48: 747-773.

168

Schoar, A. (2002). Effect of corporate diversification on productivity. Journal of
Finance, 57(6), 2379–2403.
Schreyögg, G., & Kliesch-Eberl, M. (2007). How dynamic can organizational capabilities
be? Towards a dual-process model of capability dynamization. Strategic
Management Journal, 28(9), 913-933.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. (2003). Exploring the agency
consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family
firms. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2), 179-194.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N. & Buchholtz, A. K. (2001). Agency
relationship in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12(2),
99-116.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934). The Theory of Economic Development, New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction Publishers
Schumpeter, J.A. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper.
Selznick, P. (1948). Foundations of the theory of organization, American Sociological
Review, 13, pp. 25–35.
Selznick, P. (1957). Leadership in Administration. Harper & Row, New York.
Sharma, P. (2004). An overview of the field of family business studies: Current status
and directions for the future. Family Business Review. 17(1), 1-36.
Sharma, P. & Chrisman, J.J. (1999). Toward a reconciliation of the definitional issues in
the field of corporate entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
11-27
Sharma, P., & Irving, P. G. (2005). Four bases of family business successor commitment:
Antecedents and consequences. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(1), 1333.
Sharma, P., & Manikuti, S. (2005). Strategic divestments in family firms: Role of family
structure and community culture. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(3),
293-311.
Sharma, P., Salvato, C. & Reay, T. (2014). Temporal dimensions of family enterprise
research. Family Business Review, 27, 10-19
Shayne Gary, M. (2005). Implementation strategy and performance outcomes in related
diversification. Strategic Management Journal, 26(7), 643-664.

169

Shen, W. & Cannella, A.A. (2003). Will succession planning increase shareholder
wealth? Evidence from investor reactions to relay CEO successions. Strategic
Management Journal 24(2): 191–198.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of
Finance, 52(2): 737-784.
Short, J. C., Payne, G. T., Brigham, K. H., Lumpkin, G. T., & Broberg, J. C. (2009).
Family firms and entrepreneurial orientation in publicly traded firms: A
comparative analysis of the S&P 500. Family Business Review, 22(1), 9-24.
Shortell , S., & Zajac, E. (1990). Research notes. Perceptual and archival measures of
miles and snow's strategic types: a comprehensive assessment of reliability and
validity. Academy of Management Journal, 817-832.
Simons, R. (1994). How new top managers use control systems as levers of strategic
renewal. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 169-189.
Simons, T.L., Pelled, L. H., & Smith, K. A. (1999). Making use of difference: Diversity,
debate, and decision comprehensiveness in top management teams. Academy of
Management Journal, 42(6), 662-673.
Simons, T. L., & Peterson, R. S. (2000). Task conflict and relationship conflict in top
management teams: The pivotal role of intragroup trust. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 85(1), 102.
Singh, J. V. (1986). Performance, slack, and risk taking in organizational decision
making. Academy of Management Journal, 29(3), 562-585.
Singh, J.V., House, R.J. & Tucker, D. (1986). Organizational change and organizational
mortality. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31: 587–611.
Sirmon, D. G., Gove, S., & Hitt, M. A. (2008). Resource management in dyadic
competitive rivalry: The effects of resource bundling and deployment. Academy
of Management Journal, 51: 919-935.
Sirmon, D.G. & Hitt, M.A. (2003). Managing resources: Linking unique resources,
management and wealth creation in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory &
Practice, 27(4), 339-358.
Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A. & Ireland, R. D. (2007). Managing firm resources in dynamic
environments to create value: Looking inside the black box. Academy of
Management Review, 32: 273-292.
Sirmon, D. G., Hitt, M. A., Ireland, R. D., & Gilbert, B. A. (2011). Resource
orchestration to create competitive advantage breadth, depth, and life cycle
effects. Journal of Management, 37(5), 1390-1412.
170

Smith, K. G., & Grimm, C. M. (1987). Environmental variation, strategic change and
firm performance: A study of railroad deregulation. Strategic Management
Journal, 8(4), 363-376.
Smith, M., Pfeffer, J., & Rousseau, D. (2000). Patient capital: How investors contribute
to B or undermine B relational wealth. In C. Leana & D. Rousseau (Eds.),
Relational Wealth: A New Model of Competitive Advantage: 261-276. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Snow, C. C.& Donald C. H. (1980). Measuring organizational strategies: Some
theoretical and methodological problems. Academy of Management Review 5, 4:
527-538.
Starbuck, W. (1965). Organizational growth and development. In J, C. March [Ed.],
Handbook of Organizations: 451-533, Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.
Steier, L. (2009). Familial capitalism in global institutional contexts: implications for
corporate governance and entrepreneurship in East Asia. Asia Pacific Journal of
Management, 26(3), 513-535.
Stewart, A. (2003). Help one another, use one another: Toward an anthropology of family
business. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 27(4), 383-396.
Stewart, A., & Hitt, M. A. (2012). Why can’t a family business be more like a non-family
business? Modes of professionalization in family firms. Family Business Review,
25, 58-86.
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches.
Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571-610.
Tagiuri, R., & Davis, J. A. (1992). On the goals of successful family businesses. Family
Business Review, 5(1), 43-62.
Tallman, S., Jenkins, M., Henry, N., & Pinch, S. (2004). Knowledge, clusters, and
competitive advantage. Academy Of Management Review, 29(2), 258-271.
Tan, J., & Peng, M. W. (2003). Organizational slack and firm performance during
economic transitions: Two studies from an emerging economy. Strategic
Management Journal, 24, 1249-1263.
Tang, J., Crossan, M., & Rowe, W. G. (2011). Dominant CEO, deviant strategy, and
extreme performance: The moderating role of a powerful board. Journal of
Management Studies, 48: 1479–1503.
Tanriverdi, H., & Venkatraman, N. (2005). Knowledge relatedness and the performance
of multibusiness firms. Strategic Management Journal, 26(2), 97-119.
171

Teece, D. J. (1980). Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise. Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization, 1(3), 223-247.
Thomas, J. B., & McDaniel, R. R. (1990). Interpreting strategic issues: Effects of strategy
and the information-processing structure of top management teams. Academy of
Management Journal, 33(2), 286-306.
Tihanyi, L., Johnson, R. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Hitt, M. A. (2003). Institutional
ownership differences and international diversification: The effects of boards of
directors and technological opportunity. Academy of Management Journal, 46(2),
195-211.
Tokarczyk, J., Hansen, E., Green, M., & Down, J. (2007). A resource-based view and
market orientation theory examination of the role of “familiness” in family
business success. Family Business Review, 20(1), 17-31.
Trigeorgis, L. (1996). Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource
Allocation. MIT press.
Tsai, W. (2001). Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of network
position and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and performance.
Academy of Management Journal, 44(5), 996-1004.
Tsang, E.W.K. (2002). Learning from overseas venturing experience: the case of Chinese
family businesses. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(1), 21-40.
Turner, S. F., & Rindova, V. (2012). A balancing act: How organizations pursue
consistency in routine functioning in the face of ongoing change. Organization
Science, 23(1), 24-46.
Tushman, M. L., & Anderson, P. (1986). Technological discontinuities and
organizational environments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 439-465.
Tushman, M. L., & Romanelli, E. (1985). Organizational evolution: A metamorphosis
model of convergence and reorientation. In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.),
Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 7: 177–222. Greenwich, CT: JAI
Press.
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1986). Rational choice and the framing of decisions. The
Journal of Business, 59(4), 251-278.
Useem, M. (1993). Executive Defense: Shareholder Power and Corporate
Reorganization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Van de Ven, A. H., & Poole, M. S. (1995). Explaining development and change in
organizations. Academy of Management Review, 20: 510-540.
172

Varadarajan, P., & Ramanujam, V. (1987). Diversification and performance: A
reexamination using a new two-dimensional conceptualization of diversity in
firms. Academy of Management Journal, 30(2), 380-393.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, management, and control
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2): 385-417.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2009). How are U.S. family firms controlled? The Review of
Financial Studies, 1-45.
Vollman, T. (1996). The Transformation Imperative. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School Press
Von Krogh, G., Ichijo, K., & Nonaka, I. (2000). Enabling Knowledge Creation: How to
Unlock the Mystery of Tacit Knowledge and Release the Power of Innovation.
Oxford university press.
Voss, G. B., Sirdeshmukh, D., & Voss, Z. G. (2008). The effects of slack resources and
environmental threat on product exploration and exploitation. Academy of
Management Journal, 51(1), 147-164.
Wernerfelt, B. (1984). A resource‐based view of the firm. Strategic Management
Journal, 5(2), 171-180.
Westphal, J. D., & Fredrickson, J. W. (2001). Who directs strategic change? Director
experience, the selection of new CEOs, and change in corporate strategy.
Strategic Management Journal, 22: 1113–1137.
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. (1992). Top management team demography and
corporate strategic change. Academy of Management Journal, 35: 91–121.
Wiersema, M. F., & Bantel, K. A. (1993). Top management team turnover as an
adaptation mechanism: The role of the environment. Strategic Management
Journal, 14: 485–504.
Wiklund, J., & Shepherd, D. (2003). Knowledge-based resources, entrepreneurial
orientation, and the performance of small and medium-sized businesses. Strategic
Management Journal, 24(13), 1307-1314.
Williams, K. Y., & O'Reilly, C. A. (1998). Demography and diversity in organizations: A
review of 40 years of research. Research in Organizational Behavior, 20, 77-140.
Williamson, O. E. (1981). The modern corporate: Origins, evolution, attributes. Journal
of Economic Literature, 19(4), 1537-1568.
Williamson, O. E. (1999). Strategy research: Governance and competence perspectives.
Strategic Management Journal. 20(12), 1087–1108.
173

Wilson, T. D., & Brekke, N. (1994). Mental contamination and mental correction:
unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations. Psychological Bulletin,
116(1), 117-142.
Wright, M., Chrisman, J. J., Chua, J. H., & Steier, L. P. (2014). Family Enterprise and
Context. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 38(6), 1247-1260.
Wu, Z., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. (2007). Effects of family ownership and
management on small business equity financing. Journal of Business Venturing,
22(6), 875-895.
Yeo, K. T. (1995). Strategy for risk management through problem framing in technology
acquisition. International Journal of Project Management, 13(4), 219-224.
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate
governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(1), 196-220.
Young, R. C. (1988). Is population ecology a useful paradigm for the study of
organizations? American Journal of Sociology, 94: 1-24.
Zahra, S. A. (1993). A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm behavior: A critique
and extension. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 17(4): 5-21
Zahra, S.A. (1995). Corporate entrepreneurship and company performance: The case of
management leveraged buyouts. Journal of Business Venturing, 10: 225–247.
Zahra, S. A. (1996). Governance, ownership, and corporate entrepreneurship: The
moderating impact of industry technological opportunities. Academy of
Management Journal, 39(6): 1713-1735.
Zahra, S. A. (2003). International expansion of US manufacturing family businesses: The
effect of ownership and involvement. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(4), 495512.
Zahra, S. A. (2010). Harvesting family firms' organizational social capital: A relational
perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 47(2), 345 - 366.
Zahra, S. A., Sapienza, H. J., & Davidsson, P. (2006). Entrepreneurship and dynamic
capabilities: A review, model and research agenda. Journal of Management
Studies, 43: 917-955.
Zajac, E. J., & Kraatz, M. S. (1993). A diametric forces model of strategic change:
Assessing the antecedents and consequences of restructuring in the higher
education industry. Strategic Management Journal, 14(1): 83-102.

174

Zajac, E. J., Kraatz, M. S., & Bresser, R. K. (2000). Modeling the dynamics of strategic
fit: A normative approach to strategic change. Strategic Management Journal,
21(4), 429-453.
Zajac, E.J. & Shortell, S.M. (1989). Changing generic strategies: likelihood, direction,
and performance implications. Strategic Management Journal. 10(5): 413–430.
Zellweger, T.M. (2007). Time horizon, cost of equity capital, and generic investment
strategies of firms. Family Business Review, 20(1), 1–15.
Zellweger, T. M., & Astrachan, J. H. (2008). On the emotional value of owning a firm.
Family Business Review, 21(4), 347-363.
Zellweger, T. M., Eddleston, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. (2010). Exploring the concept
of familiness: Introducing family firm identity. Journal of Family Business
Strategy, 1(1), 54-63.
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. (2012). Family
control and family firm valuation by family CEOs: The importance of intentions
for transgenerational control. Organization Science, 23(3), 851-868.
Zellweger, T. M., & Nason, R. S. (2008). A stakeholder perspective on family firm
performance. Family Business Review, 21(3), 203-216.
Zhang, Y. (2006). The presence of a separate COO/president and its impact on strategic
change and CEO dismissal. Strategic Management Journal 27(3): 283–300.
Zhang, Y., & Rajagopalan, N. (2010). Once an outsider, always an outsider? CEO origin,
strategic change, and firm performance. Strategic Management Journal, 31(3),
334-346.
Zhou, Y. M. (2011). Synergy, coordination costs, and diversification choices. Strategic
Management Journal, 32(6), 624-639.

175

